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Abstract 
 
 
 
This project examines the concept of decision in philosophical writing, in particular 
WKHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUVXEMHFWLYLW\FDQEHVDLG WRFRQVWLWXWHDµORFXV¶RIGHFLVLRQ
The writing of Søren Kierkegaard is the main focus of discussion. Giorgio 
Agamben, Michel Henry and Jacques Derrida also provide important contributions. 
 
Although for Kierkegaard µDOO GHFLVLYHQHVV LV URRWHG LQ VXEMHFWLYLW\¶ VXEMHFWLYH
agency takes the form of an active surrendering to an external unknown authority 
(God).   .LHUNHJDDUGXVHVWKHWHUPµOHDSRIIDLWK¶WRGHVFULEHWKHPRPHQWRIGHFLVLRQ
where subjective transformation occurs. 
 
For Derrida, any decision requires an undecidable leap beyond all reasoning made in 
preparation for that decision. He extends a reading of faith beyond the theistic by 
suggesting that .LHUNHJDDUG¶VXQNQRZDEOH*RGFRXOGDOVREHDQRWKHUQDPHIRUWKH
µVWUXFWXUHRIVXEMHFWLYLW\¶ 
 
*LRUJLR$JDPEHQ¶VZULWLQJRQWKHFRQFHSWRIKXPDQOLIHVLWXDWHGDWWKHWKUeshold of 
categories (socio-political, philosophical, physiological and so on), helps to further 
WKHH[SORUDWLRQRIVXEMHFWLYLW\DV WKHµORFXV¶RIGHFLVLRQ 0LFKHO+HQU\¶VZRUNRQ
The Essence of Manifestation SURYLGHV D IRFXV IRU D GLVFXVVLRQ RQ WKH µUDGLcal 
VXEMHFWLYLW\¶WKDW.LHUNHJDDUGSURSRVHVDVWKHIXOFUXPRIGHFLVLRQ 
 
The research project as a whole maintains a synergy between these philosophical 
concerns and the form of their explication. The thesis is made up of both written text 
and DVD documentation of live works. These instances of practice, whose form and 
mode of presentation were informed by a specific aspect of the research, are 
LQWHJUDWHGLQWRWKHWKHVLVWRFRQVWLWXWHµFKDSWHUV¶7KHSUDFWLFHFDQDQGGRHVIXQFWLRQ
independently in other contexts. However, what is presented in this research 
document constitutes the outcome of my practice-based PhD project and includes 
ERWKWKHµWKHRUHWLFDO¶DQGµSUDFWLFH¶HOHPHQWV 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
At the centre of this project has always been the question: What does it mean to 
make a decision?  In order to approach this general question, it must be broken down 
into several more specific areas: Who or what is the agent of decision? What is it 
that occurs in a decision as such or what does decision actually give rise to?  At what 
point can I say that such a thing as a decision takes place, if it takes place at all?   
 
7KHTXHVWLRQ,DPDVNLQJLVLQIDFWWRGRZLWKWKHµORFXV¶RIGHFLVLRQ6XEMHFWLYLW\
WKHµ,¶ZKRmakes the GHFLVLRQPD\EHVDLGWREHVXFKDµORFXV¶EXWDVVRRQDVWKH
investigation begins, subjectivity, as a locatable agency, starts to dissolve.  
 
In order to address this problem, I looked at the writings of philosophers who have 
approached the question of decision from the point of view of subjectivity, that is, 
QRWDVDQDWWHPSWWRORRNDWREMHFWLYHDQDO\VLVRULQWHUPVRIIRUH[DPSOHµGHFLVLRQ
WKHRU\¶,QVWHDGWKHH[SORUDWLRQWKDW,FDUULHGRXWLVFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHFRQQHFWLRQ
between thought and subjectively lived experience and the kind of philosophical 
thinking that takes into account these two, often contradictory, spheres of human 
existence.  
 
My interests in the research question are philosophical, but I am not a philosopher in 
a conventional sense. The environment that I have worked in over the years has been 
fine art practice.  Although I have been studying philosophy independently for many 
years, I have no formal qualifications in the subject. This fostered in me a level of 
uncertainty as to where I could situate myself as a researcher. I wanted to explore the 
research question philosophically whilst still remaining an artist. The situation of not 
entirely belonging in one discipline or the other turned out to have intrinsic value in 
developing the research, not least in keeping me keenly attuned to the notion of 
threshold that I was trying to explore. Therefore, I decided that it was in the best 
interests of what I was trying to do to make the most of this in-between status (an 
artist engaged with philosophical questions or vice-versa?) and to develop a 
philosophically inspired practice of my own.  
 
the practice  
, DP LQWHUHVWHG LQZKDW FRQVWLWXWHV WKH µSUDFWLFH¶ RI SKLORVRSK\ WKDW LV VRPHWKLQJ
which is not only an intellectual activity orientated towards universalising or 
objectifying aims but which also has emotional, playful or embodied aspects, in 
brief, an activity where contingency and subjectivity play a role. This aspect is 
frequently erased in the final product of philosophy, that is, the printed text or the 
FRQIHUHQFHSDSHU:KDWSURFHVVRFFXUVLQWKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKHµSKLORVRSKHU¶LQKLV
or her professional guise and in the development of the work that is called 
SKLORVRSK\" $W ZKDW SRLQW DQG E\ ZKRVH DXWKRULW\ FDQ D SHUVRQ VD\ µ, DP D
pKLORVRSKHU¶ DQG ZKDW DXWKRULW\ GRHV WKLV GHVLJQDWLRQ WKHQ KROG"   , ZRQGHUHG
whether the practice of the philosopher could be compared to that of the artist and 
whether there is a way in which each can inform the other.  As much as possible, I 
wanted to avoid making work or indeed writing about philosophy. I was looking for 
a way that I could do something that might be called philosophical, even if it was not 
conventionally recognisable as philosophy in the academic or institutional sense. 
The works that are presented with the thesis are the results of my endeavour towards 
such a philosophical practice.  
 
Practice-based doctoral research in a fine-art context often means that the researcher 
writes an academic thesis about their area of interest and presents their artworks 
independently of the thesis.  In such an approach, the division between what 
constitutes theory and what constitutes practice is made clear (at least in terms of 
presentation and methodology). Although my research was also practice-based, to 
LPSRVH D VWULFW VHSDUDWLRQ EHWZHHQ µSUDFWLFH¶ DQG µWKHRU\¶ VHHPHG HQWLUHO\
antithetical to my concerns. I felt that the interdisciplinary nature of what I was 
doing meant, precisely, that I would be working in the space between fine art and 
philosophy and that my task was to develop a practice which would be situated 
there.  With this in mind, it will be helpful for the purposes of this Introduction, to 
discuss the different forms of presentation included in this thesis as well as the 
theoretical sources.  
 
In the course of the project, I produced a series of works which aimed to synthesise 
philosophical ideas with artistic practice in such a way that research question itself 
was performed, or enacted.  Two of these are presented as DVD documents and 
included as part of the main thesis.  These instances of practice function 
independently from the thesis: they have been and/or will continue to be presented 
within other contexts. Here, the written thesis itself provides one such contexts 
through which they can be seen.  In terms of the final presentation of this research 
SURMHFW WKHUHIRUH LW LV P\ LQWHQWLRQ WKDW WKH '9'¶V DUH VHHQ DQG LQWHUSUHWHG LQ
relation to the written text in the thesis. The effort I made in the presentation of the 
thesis was as much as possible towards a coherent structure so that the different 
formats function together as a self-contained body of research. I have tried to 
signpost the shifts in format in such a way that the reader can orientate the thesis 
easily, from reading to watchinJ'9'¶VEDFNWRWKHWH[W 
 
works on DVD  
Onlookers is the title I give to a dialogue between two philosophers that was 
recorded on DVD.  You will be directed to look at the DVD on p32 of the thesis. 
There is a Postscript on the dialogue on p119, which gives some the background and 
context for the discussion.  With the risk of seeming evasive, I will presently refrain 
from introducing Onlookers in any detail here. Instead, for the sake of continuity, I 
would suggest that when p.32 is reached in the thesis, the reader watches the DVD 
of the discussion and then reads the Postscript on p.119 before continuing with the 
rest of the thesis.  
 
Reading Michel Henry 
Reading Michel Henry is a video diary documenting my reading of The Essence of 
Manifestation, by the philosopher Michel Henry, during the summer of 2005. The 
edited work was completed in February 2006.  The diary documents my search for a 
GHHSHU LQVLJKW LQWR WKH QRWLRQ RI µUDGLFDO VXEMHFWLYLW\¶ LQWURGXFHG E\ .LHUNHJDDUG
though a reading this text.  Reading Michel Henry also reflects how the activity of 
thinking is prone to the interruptions of everyday life and receptive to the context in 
ZKLFKLWWDNHVSODFH,ZDVLQWHUHVWHGLQWKHIRUPDWLRQRIµWKHH[SHUW¶SKLORVRSKHURU
WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI µSURIHVVLRQDO¶ SKLORVRSK\ HPHUJLQJ IURP D SURFHVV RI SULYDWH
endeavour, which,  like that of any artist or writer,  is marked by procrastination, 
struggle, doubt, discipline, elation, gratification and indeed a whole range of 
experience. Such an enterprise is paralleleG LQ WKH SUHGLFDPHQW RI .LHUNHJDDUG¶V
character Johannes Climacus, referred to later in the text (Chapter 7: Repetition).  
 
The Essence of Manifestation as a publication is hard to find in English translation 
DQG WKH HGLWLRQ , ERXJKW ZDV µSULQW RQ GHPDQG¶ I donated the book to Chelsea 
library who arranged for it to be hard bound. The DVD and short text about the 
DVD is inserted into the cover as a supplement. Although the video can function 
independently, I see the book and DVD combined as a complete work in itself.  
Therefore, if someone refers to this thesis in Chelsea library, they will also be 
directed towards the book and the DVD together. The work (DVD and book 
WRJHWKHULVQRZNHSWDVSDUWRI&KHOVHD¶VFROOHFWLRQRIDUWLVWV¶ERRNVDQGFDWDORJXHG
under both Michel Henry and my own name. In the catalogue it will also be linked to 
this thesis. For archiving purposes elsewhere (British library for example),  a DVD 
will be inserted into the cover of the thesis along with the Chelsea library catalogue 
reference. Supplement 2 (p 135) of this thesis is a reflection on the process of 
making this work.  
 
other work  
Reading/performance: What is radical subjectivity? 
7KLVZDVDSHUIRUPDQFHLQYROYLQJWKHUHDGLQJRIDUHVHDUFKSDSHUFDOOHG µ:KDW LV
radical subjectLYLW\"¶ZKLFK,SUHVHQWHGQHDUWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHSURMHFWLQ)HEUXDU\
2004.  I invited a friend, Vasiliki Boutopoulous, to present a paper in my place at a 
small research symposium at Chelsea School of Art.  Although many of those 
present knew me, none of them had met Vasiliki before.  I introduced her to them at 
the beginning of the presentation and said that she would be presenting a paper in 
my place. I sat next to her while she delivered the paper.  At the time, I saw this 
presentation as an experiment and did not foresee that it would be a significant 
moment in the development of the project.  For this reason there is no video 
documentation of the performance but instead I have included a written reflection on 
the event and a transcript of the paper, which can be found in Supplement 3 (p.137 ± 
149), at the back of the thesis. 
philosophical sources  
7KH WKHVLV LV DQH[SORUDWLRQRI WKH WKHPHRI µORFXVRIGHFLVLRQ¶ZLWK WKHQRWLRQRI
subjectivity as the specific locus in question. The primary resource in the research 
has always been Søren Kierkegaard. For him, philosophical thinking could not be 
independent of existence and in his own life the role of writer, lover, citizen of 
Denmark, Christian and quite simply human being were matters that could not be 
excluded from the concerns of the philosopher. His life events also provided a sense 
of urgency, which compelled him to write.  At the same time he showed, possibly 
more than any other philosopher, that the nature of human existence, including his 
own, was comic, terrifying and perplexing; an absurdity to which no language could 
adequately respond.   
 
The biographical information that is available about Kierkegaard; his thwarted love 
for Regine Olsen, where he broke off his engagement with no clear explanation to 
her because he felt that he was not worthy of her; his epilepsy, an illness which 
would quite literally take the ground from under his feet; his role as a philosopher 
troubled by Christianity and as a Christian troubled by the uncompromising views 
and expectations that his personal faith demanded of him, all contribute to the 
intensity of his authorship.  
  
Kierkegaard was a prolific writer producing both theological and philosophical texts, 
sometimes publishing several works at the same time.  Stylistically, his approach 
ZDV DOVR GLYHUVH +H IUHTXHQWO\ ZURWH XQGHU SVHXGRQ\PV LQ µLQGLUHFW
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶WKHDLPRIZKLFKZDVWRGHIOHFWDXWKRULW\DZD\IURPKLPVHOI WKH
ZULWHUXUJLQJKLVUHDGHUVWRµMXGJHIRUWKHPVHOYHV¶ 
 
In Kierkegaard, there is a kind of creative philosophical practice in which the form 
and style provide a stage where thought plays itself out and where something other 
than intellectual understanding is at stake.  
 
In the thesis, I also bring in other thinkers in order to provide a counterpoint or 
additional insight into my reading of decision in Kierkegaard: Jacques Derrida ( no 
discussion on decision could be complete without him), Giorgio Agamben, Étienne 
Balibar and Michel Henry.   
 
The thesis is in two main sections: 
Part One explRUHVWKHILJXUHRI$EUDKDPWKHVXEMHFWRI.LHUNHJDDUG¶VJUHDWZRUN
Fear and Trembling, which is written under the pseudonym of Johannes de Silencio.  
This work uses the biblical story of Abraham who is commanded by God to kill his 
son Isaac as the basis for an exploration that can be read on two levels. Firstly, it 
H[DPLQHVZKHWKHULWLVSRVVLEOHRUGHVLUDEOHRUFRUUHFWWRVXVSHQGµWKHHWKLFDO¶WKDW
is moral or human law in favour of a higher purpose or divine law. Secondly, it 
examines what it means to have faith. Faith, for Kierkegaard, is something that can 
only be based on a belief in the (humanly) impossible and is therefore based on the 
absurd.  Fear and Trembling FDQDOVREHUHDGDVDUHIOHFWLRQRQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VIDLOHG
engagement to Regine Olsen where he hopes against all reason that, having 
relinquished her, she may still returned to him.  
 
In order to elucidate this figure of Abraham and how it was possible to make his 
decision in faith, Derrida appears throughout and provides invaluable readings on 
the nature of faith, decision and sacrifice as well as the notion of a decisive 
VXEMHFWLYLW\  &KDSWHU WZR RQ µ([FHSWLRQ¶ LV DQ H[SORUDWLRQ RI $EUDKDP WKURXJK
$JDPEHQ¶VILJXUHRIhomo sacer DQGWKHFDWHJRU\RIµWKHH[FHSWLRQ¶7KLVLVWDNHQ
further with a live dialogue, presented in the form of a DVD.  In chapter three 
µ2EHGLHQFH¶ the insights of Étienne Balibar and George Steiner are enlisted to 
further the discussion around the enigmatic Abraham and the nature of his obedience 
WR*RG¶VGHPDQG,QWKHODVWFKDSWHURI3DUW2QHRQWKHµ,QYLVLEOH¶WKHUHLVDQRWKHU
µOLYH¶ GRFXPHQWDWLRQ ZKLFK H[SORUHV WKH QRWLRQ RI UDGLFDO VXEMHFWLYLW\ WKURXJK D
UHDGLQJRI0LFKHO+HQU\¶VEssence of Manifestation3DUW2QHIRFXVHVRQWKHµZKR¶
RU µZKDW¶ WKDW GHFLGHV DQd the mechanisms that can be said to effect decision, for 
example faith, the leap and the moment. 
 
Part Two uses as its main focus the figure of the actress who is the subject of a 
newspaper article by Kierkegaard called Crisis and Crisis in the life of an actress. 
The article is based on a theatre performance by the real life actress Johanne Luise 
Pätges Heiberg (1812-1890), wife of Johan Ludvig Heiberg, one of Denmark's 
leading literary and social figures. The article was written in 1847 and published in 
the newspaper Fædrelandet LQ -XO\  &KDSWHU ILYH µ3DVVLRQ¶ H[DPLQHV WKH
elliptical subjectivity of the character Juliet and involves Étienne Balibar once more 
in a discussion of subjectivity and persona.  The subsequent four chapters: 
µ0HWDPRUSKRVLV¶ µ5HSHWLWLRQ¶ µ$Q[LHW\¶ DQG µ&ULVLV¶ ORRN DW KRZ WKH
transformation is effected in the performance of the actress by drawing on other texts 
IURP.LHUNHJDDUG7KLVVHFWLRQLVPRUHDERXWWKHµKRZ¶RIGHFLVLRQDQGVWD\VFORVHU
to Kierkegaard in order to examine the complex character of the actress and what is 
DWVWDNHIRU.LHUNHJDDUGKLPVHOILQKHUµPHWDPRUSKRVLV¶ 
 
2QH PDMRU RPLVVLRQ LQ WKLV GLVFXVVLRQ LV +HJHO D NH\ ILJXUH LQ .LHUNHJDDUG¶V
thinking.  I made the decision to leave out any real discussion of Hegel for several 
reasons but mainly because if the thesis began to investigate Hegel, then the entire 
weight and feel of the thesis would have been altered. It would have become quite a 
different kind of discussion than I wanted it to be. This thesis is not intended as an 
µDUJXPHQW¶ZKLFKSLWFKHV.LHUNHJDDUGDJDLQVW+HJHO 
 
 
texts used in the thesis 
 
Kierkegaard 
0DQ\RI.LHUNHJDDUG¶VZRUNVDUHZULWWHQXQGHUSVHXGRQ\PVEXWWRDYRLGFRQIXVLRQ
,DOZD\VUHIHUWRWKHDXWKRUDVµ.LHUNHJDDUG¶H[FHSWIRUD short section on Johannes 
Climacus (Part Two).  The texts of Kierkegaard that I have used in this thesis span 
what are normally considered to be his three periods of authorship. In the body of 
the thesis they are not used in any chronological thematic order, but for the purposes 
of this Introduction, I will present them as such (excluding the works of his youth): 
 
First Authorship (1841-46): In this period, Kierkegaard starts to use pseudonyms 
RU µLQGLUHFW FRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶ 7KLV DXWKRUVKLS LQVWLJDWHV ZKDW LV known as 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VGLDOHFWLFLQZKLFKKHSUHVHQWVWKUHHH[LVWHQWLDOVWDJHVRIGHYHORSPHQW
the aesthetic, ethical and the religious. The dialectic, however, is never truly realised 
in the religious. During this time, Kierkegaard was working through the break-up of 
his relationship with Regine Olsen.  In 1843 he discovered that she was engaged to 
be married to Johan Frederik Shlegel.  The First Authorship also sees the beginning 
RI WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI .LHUNHJDDUG¶V µH[LVWHQWLDO SV\FKRORJ\¶ ZKHUHE\ LQGLYLduals 
are faced with having to decide and to take responsibility for their decisions. It is 
DOVR ZKHQ .LHUNHJDDUG¶V FULWLTXH RQ +HJHO EHJLQV DQG ZKHQ KH RYHUWO\ VWDUWV WR
consider whether or not to become religious (Christian).  
 
The texts that I have used from this period are Fear and Trembling, published 1843 
(and already cited above), Repetition, (Constantin Constantinius), Philosophical 
Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. 
(both by Johannes Climacus) and The Concept of Anxiety (Vigilis Haufniensis) 
 
Repetition, published concurrently with Fear and Trembling in 1843, is a 
µSKLORVRSKLFDOQDUUDWLYH¶FRPSULVHGRIWKHOHWWHUVRID\RXQJPDQZKRLVLQORYHEXW
who cannot go through with marriage because it requires dedication to one person. 
This is an ethical duty which entails repetition, something he is either not ready for 
or of which he does not know himself to be capable. Recollection on the other hand 
falls under the category of the aesthetic. In recollection, the young man can only 
ORYH KLV EHORYHG DIWHU KH OHDYHV KHU WKDW LV µSRHWLFDOO\¶  7KH ERRN LV RVWHQVLEO\
ZULWWHQE\DSV\FKRORJLVWZKRµGLVFRYHUV¶WKLV\RXQJPDQEHIULHQGVKLPDQGWKHQ
counsels him by correspondence. The author admits at the end of the book that there 
never was such a young man and that he had invented him.  
 
Kierkegaard called the pseudonymous author of Philosophical Fragments (1844) 
and Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (1846) Johannes 
Climacus, after a Greek monk (c.570-649) who wrote Klimax tou Paradeisou (The 
Ladder of Paradise).  Klimax, which is Greek for ladder in this context refers to the 
thirty steps, that the monk Climacus claims lead to imperturbability, a quality that he 
believes all of those embarking on the monastic life should have. The idea of the 
ladder also represents a kind of logical progression from one premise to the next 
WRZDUGV XOWLPDWH NQRZOHGJH  .LHUNHJDDUG¶V DXWKRU -RKDQQHV &OLPDFXV LV D
µSUDFWLFLQJGRXEWHU¶ZKRGRHVQRWEHOLHYHWKDW development in spiritual matters can 
be approached in an objective or logical manner. Nonetheless,  his is a  
µSKLORVRSKLFDO¶YRLFHDQGLQJohannes Climacus, he tries to discover what it means 
to become a philosopher. In these works Kierkegaard insists on truth as subjective, 
not in a denial of objective truth, but rather in order to propose that truth can only be 
known and appropriated subjectively.  
 
In Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard begins the enquiry into the subjective 
approach to knowledge acquisition. He completes this work in Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript which is in fact a much longer text than its precursor. This 
work was intended both as a conclusion to Philosophical Fragments and to 
Kierkegaard's career as writer.  At the end of the book he takes leave of all of his 
pseudonyms which he lists and claims overtly as his own creations.   
 In The Concept of Anxiety, also published in 1844, Kierkegaard examines the 
Christian doctrine of original sin and how it relates to what he calls anxiety. Anxiety, 
for Kierkegaard, is a privileged existential state which can effect change. He 
proposes that it is freedom that brings about anxiety.  The original sin, committed by 
Adam, was a qualitative change out of freedom into sinfulness.  Every human being 
is born with the same freedom as Adam, and with that freedom comes its inherent 
anxiety. We are not born sinners but we become sinners through our own free 
choice. An awareness of sin, however, is the first step towards salvation. 
 
The Second Authorship (1846- 53 7KLV LQFOXGHV D SHULRG RI µGLUHFW
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶ -51). This period focuses on the hypocrisy of what 
.LHUNHJDDUGFDOOVµ&KULVWHQGRP¶WKHFKXUFKDVLWKDVGHYHORSHGDZD\IURPZKDWKH
sees as its true purpose.   
 
The main work that I use from this period is The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an 
ActressDQDQRPDO\LQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSHULRGRIGLUHFWDXWKRUVKLSVLQFHLWZDVZULWWHQ
under the pseudonym Inter et Inter. It was written in 1847 and published in 1848.  It 
is now published along with Christian Discourses even though that book is written in 
direct authorship.  
 
 
I briefly refer to Works of Love, a group of essays on the subject of the Christian 
GXW\ WR µORYH WK\ QHLJKERXU DV WK\ VHOI¶ SXEOLVKHG LQ  +HUH .LHUNHJDDUG¶V
poetic insights take themes from the Bible and show what their real meaning is for 
Christian life. Love, another name for God is unfathomable and mysterious 
 
The Book on Adler, published posthumously, which I mention in relation to 
Abraham, was written in reaction to the writings of Adolf Peter Adler. Adler was a 
pastor and teacher of theology who became a great follower of Hegel until, he 
claimed, he had a revelation from Christ which turned him against Hegelianism.  
 
The Sickness Unto Death was published 1849 under the name of Anti-Climacus and 
is a companion piece to the Concept of AnxietyDQGLVDOVRDµSV\FKRORJLFDO¶ZRUN
Here Kierkegaard considers the spiritual aspects of despair. This book is referred to 
LQWKHVHFWLRQRQ0LFKHO+HQU\7KHSVHXGRQ\Pµ$QWL-&OLPDFXV¶GRHVQRWPHDQLQ
opposition to Johannes, rather the Anti is an old form of 'ante' (before). Unlike 
Johannes who claims not to be a Christian, this Climacus is a Christian in what 
:DOWHU/RZULHFDOOVµDVXSHUODWLYHGHJUHH¶.LHUNHJDDUGGLGQRWZDnt to suggest that 
he thought of himself as such an idealised Christian. Anti-Climacus is also author of 
Training in Christianity. 
 
7KH WKLUG SHULRG RI .LHUNHJDDUG¶V DXWKRUVKLS LV FDOOHG µ7KH $WWDFN 8SRQ
&KULVWHQGRP¶ -55) where he concentrates on the religious stage of 
development. I have included no texts from this period. His Journals and Papers are 
published posthumously and I refer to these frequently. Kierkegaard, however, 
would not have considered that these would be used as an interpretation of his other 
writings.  
 
other literature (in alphabetical order) 
*LRUJLR $JDPEHQ¶V GLYHUVH ZRUN HODERUDWHV D WKLQNLQJ RI µVXEMHFWLYLW\ ZLWKRXW D
VXEMHFW¶+HGHYHORSVDQRWLRQRIVXEMHFWLYHH[LVWHQFHDVSRVVLELOLW\RUSRWHQWLDOLW\
In my research I have drawn mainly on two works: Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power 
and Bare Life (1988). and The Open: Man and animal (2004). 
 
Étienne Balibar ZDV D SXSLO RI /RXLV $OWKXVVHU
V DQG DIWHU $OWKXVVHU¶V GHDWK
became one of the leading exponents of French Marxist philosophy.  Balibar insists 
that philosophical writing cannot be detached from its specific determinations such 
as the political, economic and cultural conditions in which it arises, and that indeed 
these are intrinsic to philosophical activity itself. In this way. he advocates 
SKLORVRSK\ILUVWDQGIRUHPRVWDVDµSUDFWLFH¶,QWKLVWKHVLV,RQO\UHIHUWRWZRVKRUW
EXW LPPHQVHO\ LQIRUPDWLYH DUWLFOHV E\ %DOLEDU µ&LWL]HQ 6XEMHFW¶ LQ &DGDYD HW DO
Who Comes After the Subject? DQGµ9RFDEXODULHVRI(XURSHDQ3KLORVRSKLHV Part 1: 
µ6XEMHFW¶LQRadical Philosophy. 
 
No discussion of decision or subjectivity would be complete without Jacques 
Derrida. I have drawn mainly on his later works, which focus on the paradoxes that 
afflict concepts such as decision (responsibility, hospitality, forgiving, mourning etc) 
with µSRVVLEOH-LPSRVVLEOHDSRULDV¶ZKHUHWhe very condition of possibility becomes 
WKHFRQGLWLRQRIWKHLULPSRVVLELOLW\'HUULGDXVHVWKHQRWLRQRIµXQGHFLGDELOLW\¶WRWU\
to free up thinking from traditional binary oppositions such as presence/absence, 
subject/object.  I directly refer to Derrida mainly in Part One, although his thinking 
has been instrumental from the beginning of the project. In the thesis, I refer to 
Derrida several times overtly but Gift of Death is the primary reference for Part One. 
 
Michel Henry (who died in 2002) was a philosopher who also produced novels. He 
FDPH IURP D SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO WUDGLWLRQ DQG GHYHORSHG ZKDW KH FDOOHG µa 
SKHQRPHQRORJ\RIOLIH¶RURIµWKHLQYLVLEOH¶+LVSKLORVRSK\UHYHUVHG the traditional 
SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO IRFXVRQ WKH DSSHDUDQFHRI WKLQJV LQ WKHZRUOG)RU KLP µWUXWK¶
did not manifest itself exteriorly but was immanent to life lived in radical 
subjectivity. In this research I examine his thought through and early work The 
Essence of Manifestation, published in 1963. 
 
a few notes on language 
I have used terms in the thesis from Greek, French and Danish. Where they are taken 
from the literature, I have copied them exactly as they appear. The Greek terms, 
therefore, used in Kierkegaard are written in Greek alphabet as well as English. The 
Greek terms from Agamben tend to be only in the English alphabet. I have only been 
able to find the Jean Wahl texts in French, and so have taken the liberty of 
translating them myself into English.  
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PART ONE 
 
ABRAHAM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TO THE ROARING WIND 
What syllable are you seeking, 
Vocalissimus, 
In the distances of sleep? 
Speak it. 
Wallace Stevens 
 
 
 
 3 
Preface 

 
 
 
Fear and Trembling, written by Kierkegaard under the name of Johannes de Silencio,1 re-
tHOOV WKHELEOLFDOVWRU\RI$EUDKDP7KLVVWRU\KDVEHHQH[DPLQHGE\VRPHRI WKHZRUOG¶V
greatest philosophers and discussed in depth by theologians.  It is repeated in churches 
throughout the Christian world to this day.2  Like all Old Testament stories it is short, 
UHODWLQJDOOEXW WKH VWDUNHVWRI IDFWV .LHUNHJDDUG¶V µO\ULFDO¶ H[SORUDWLRQRI WKHSDUDEOHRI
Abraham in Fear and Trembling gives an extensive insight into the nature of faith. For 
Kierkegaard, the idea of faith cannot be complacently accepted as if it were something that 
DOOKXPDQEHLQJVZHUHFDSDEOHRI)RUKLP$EUDKDPLVWKHH[FHSWLRQDOµNQLJKWRIIDLWK¶D
person that no-one can truly understand. 
 
In this first section of the thesis, Fear and Trembling, as well as other Kierkegaard texts, 
provide a basis for an examination of what the locus of decision could be.  Although this 
text is about faith, what Kierkegaard means by faith seems to be the same as what Derrida 
PHDQVE\µGHFLVLRQ¶ $EUDKDP¶VWHVWRIIDLWKLVDOVRµGHFLVLRQ¶RIWKHPRVW radical kind. I 
WKHQH[DPLQHKRZVXEMHFWLYLW\FDQEHVDLG WREH WKHµORFXV¶ WKURXJKZKLFK decision takes 
SODFH E\ H[SORULQJ $EUDKDP WKURXJK *LRUJLR $JDPEHQ¶V FRQFHSW RI µWKH H[FHSWLRQ¶ DV
well as his writing on the figure of homo sacer.  
 
Finally, I will ORRN DW WKH QRWLRQ RI µWKH FDOO¶ WKDW XQIDWKRPDEOH GHPDQG IURP *RG LQ
UHVSRQVH WR ZKLFK $EUDKDP PDGH KLV GHFLVLRQ  7KH FDOO DQG $EUDKDP¶V UHVSRQVH RI
REHGLHQFH WDNHSODFH LQZDUGO\ IRU .LHUNHJDDUG LQ µUDGLFDO VXEMHFWLYLW\¶ VRPHWKLQJZKLFK
the philosopher Michel Henry has written extensively about.  This section ends with a 
QDUUDWLYH MRXUQH\ WKURXJK WKH QRWLRQ RI UDGLFDO VXEMHFWLYLW\ WKURXJK D UHDGLQJ RI +HQU\¶V
The Essence of Manifestation.
 
                                                   
1 The name Johannes de Silencio is taken from the Grimm¶VWDOHµ)DLWKIXO6HUYDQW¶ 
2
 The story is also important to Jewish  faith.  Thanks to an acquaintance called Suki, I learned that in 
+HEUHZWKHVWRU\RI$EUDKDPVSHDNVRIµWKHELQGLQJ¶LQVWHDGRIµsacrifice¶µ%LQGLQJ¶LVDOVRDZRUGIRU
composition. In this reading, Isaac is created or made through thiVVWRU\7KHZRUGµNQLIH¶DOVRPHDQVµWR
HDW¶A tradition in Jewish faith is the aggadah, which refers to non-legalistic texts which are part of 
Jewish oral law. Also known as Aggadata and Haggadah (pl. Haggadot), the aggadot are related in the 
form of folklore, historical anecdotes, advice and so on and often include mythical creatures, and 
fantastical historical events. I would like to explore this further elsewhere, but for now this indicates the 
importance of telling stories in understanding levels of law and theology, in Judaism as elsewhere. 
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Chapter 1: Leap 
 
 
 
the test of Abraham 
In the Biblical parable, *RG WROG$EUDKDPWKDWKHZDV WREH µWKH IDWKHURIDPXOWLWXGHRI
QDWLRQV¶  *RG VDLG WR KLP µ, ZLOO HVWDEOLVK D FRYHQDQW EHWZHHQ PH DQG \RX DQG \RXU
descendants after you through out their generations for an everlasting covenant, to be God 
to you and to \RXUGHVFHQGDQWVDIWHU\RX¶+HWROG$EUDKDPWKDWKHDJHGDQGKLVZLIH
Sarah, aged 90 will bear a child. The child, a son, was born and they called him Isaac .3 . 
Isaac was the first in the line of descendants that God spoke about in his promise to 
Abraham.  
 
6RPH WLPH SDVVHG DQG *RG FDOOHG $EUDKDP µ+HUH DP ,¶ $EUDKDP UHSOLHG *RG VDLG WR
him, µ7DNH\RXUVRQ\RXURQO\VRQ,VDDFZKRP\RXORYHDQGJRWR WKH ODQGRI0RULDK
and offer him there as a burnt offering upon one of the mountains of which I VKDOOWHOO\RX¶ 
 
Abraham did what God asked and took Isaac to Moriah. They were travelling with others 
DQGDIWHUWKUHHGD\VDQGWKUHHQLJKWV$EUDKDPWRRNOHDYHRIWKHPZLWK,VDDFWRDZDLW*RGV¶
instructions. When Isaac asked where the sacrificial animal was, Abraham replied only that 
µ*RG ZLOO SURYLGH¶ 7KH\ DUULYHG DW WKH SODFH RQ WKH PRXQWDLQ GHVLJQDWHG E\ *RG DQG
Abraham bound Isaac and raised his knife. At the very moment when he was about to slay 
,VDDF DQ DQJHO¶V YRLFH WROG KLP WR VWRS DQG WXUQ DURXnd. Behind him was a ram. He 
sacrificed the ram and Abraham and Isaac returned home. 
« 
For Christians, Abraham is the father of faith but faith is not a question of whether God 
exists or not. That too is a matter of faith, but Abraham already had faith in God. What is in 
TXHVWLRQLQ$EUDKDP¶VVWRU\LVWKHQDWXUHRIIDLWKLWVHOI  ,QWKHSDUDEOHWKHWHUPµIDLWKµLV
QRWPHQWLRQHGDVVXFK,QVWHDGLWGHVFULEHV*RG¶VFRPPDQGDVWKHµWHVW¶RUµWHPSWDWLRQ¶RI
$EUDKDP :KHQ$EUDKDP¶VRUGHDOZDVRYHU*RGGHclared to him µby your descendants 
                                                   
3 The biblical source that  I use is Holy Bible and the Apocrypha, revised Standard Edition, New York: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. 1952. Genesis 22. p.20. Abraham had a son from a previous relationship 
with a slave woman called Hagar. Sarah asked Abraham to send her away. God tells him to do as Sarah 
VD\VDQGKHZLOOPDNHDQDWLRQRI+DJDU¶VVRQWRR+DJDUDQGKHUFKLOGDUHFDVWRXWLQWRWKHGHVHUW
Abraham¶V and Sarah¶s names were both changed from Abram to Sarai respectively. 
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VKDOO DOOQDWLRQVRI HDUWKEOHVV WKHPVHOYHV¶:KDW$EUDKDPGLGZDV WRGHFLGH DJDLQVW DOO
KXPDQFRPSUHKHQVLRQWRGR*RG¶VZLOO+HPDNHVDdecision in the most radical sense of 
the term, perhaps the only sense in which tKH ZRUG µGHFLVLRQ¶ FDQ DFFXUDWHO\ EH XVHG
Without faith, Abraham would have been incapable of decision. 
 
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard holds up Abraham as a figure of both admiration and 
frustration. He cannot comprehend him.  He seeks a contemporary equivalent and hopes 
that if he can find such a person, he might be able to discover what Abraham was like. He 
FRQMXUHV WKH µWKH NQLJKW RI IDLWK¶ DV D GHVFULSWLRQ RI VXFK D SHUVRQ DQG WHOOV RI KRZ KH
sought such a person out. When, finally, he thought that he had found his knight, he looked 
HQWLUHO\ RUGLQDU\ MXVW OLNH µD WD[-FROOHFWRU¶ 7KLV PDQ VD\V .LHUNHJDDUG µWDNHV SDUW LQ
HYHU\WKLQJ¶ZLWKWKHDSSHDUDQFHRIWDNLQJOLIHLQKLVVWULGHDQGHQMR\LQJKLPVHOIWKRURXJKO\
µ&DUHIUHHDVDGHYLO-may-care-good±IRUQRWKLQJKHKDVQ¶WDZRUU\LQWKHZRUOG¶DQG\HWKH
VD\VµSXUFKDVHVHYHU\PRPHQWWKDWKHOLYHV«¶4  
 
For Kierkegaard, contemporary Christians cannot simply inherit faith by virtue of being the 
µGHVFHQGDQWV¶ RI $EUDKDP EXW PXVW FRPH WR LW E\ WKHPVHOves through their own efforts.  
Just as faith is not transmissible through lineage, neither is it transmissible through 
language, learning or any form of communication whatsoever.5  When we learn to swim, 
says Kierkegaard, we can imitate the movements without getting into the water. Then if we 
are thrown into the water, we can swim in order to save our lives, but not for its own sake.  
µ, FDQ VZLP LQ OLIH¶ KH VD\V µEXW IRU WKLV P\VWHULRXV IORDWLQJ , DP WRR KHDY\¶ 6  What 
Abraham did was like swimming with no thought of saving himself. 
 
To do as Abraham did is not a simple matter of imitation since, from the outside, there is 
nothing to see. In order to be like Abraham, I must be prepared to actually do what he did 
without instruction or corroboration.  
 
In a more recent tale, $7KLHI¶V-RXUQDO-HDQ*HQHWWDONVRIKRZLWLVµLPSLRXV¶ for an artist 
to use crime without having committed the crime themselves: 
 
Someone risks his life, his glory, only to be used as ornament for a 
dilettante. Even though the hero be imaginary, a living creature inspired 
him. I refuse to take delight in his sufferings if I have not yet shared 
them. I shall first incur the scorn of men, their judgement. I distrust the 
                                                   
4
  S. Kierkegaard. Fear and Trembling. London: Penguin Classics, 1985. pp.68-69. 
5
  µWKHRQHNQLJKWRIIDLWKVLPSO\FDQQRWKHOSDQRWKHU¶,ELGS 
6
 Ibid. p78.   
 6 
saintliness of Vincent de Paul. He should have been willing to commit 
the galley-slaves crime instead of merely taking his place in irons.7 
It would be ludicrous to suggest that Kierkegaard is advocating any act of crime (remember 
that Isaac was not killed). Nonetheless, what Genet says echoes Kierkegaard; what 
Abraham went through is greater than any martyr because he had to be prepared to do what 
God asked of him. He had to, absolutely, and without the slightest hesitation, be ready to 
kill.8 
What is so extraordinary is that Abraham is held up as an example for Christianity. His 
story is told as an inspiration. Kierkegaard brings to attention the fact that a decision made 
in faith requires a sacrifice of unimaginable proportions. To be prepared to kill his own 
child is in itself terrible enough, but Abraham was also being asked to sacrifice the future of 
all of his descendents and their protection in the covenant with God. In effect, he was 
prepared to sacrifice nothing less than humanity itself, along with its future security and 
salvation. In order to make such a decision he had to relinquish all grounds of certainty 
within himself (what reason could justify such a sacrifice?). In his decision there was 
nothing to rely on, no community of assent, no reassurance and absolutely no predicable 
outcome. Faith is one thing and if it requires no decision then perhaps it is imaginable to 
achieve it. A decision, made on the basis of faith, however, is an altogether rarer 
occurrence. Who is capable of such a thing?  
                                                   
7
  J. Genet. 7KH7KLHI¶V-RXUQDOMiddlesex: Penguin Books, 1965. p177. 
8
 µ>«@WKHVOLJKWHVWWUDFHRIDQDEHU>EXW@WKHQWKHEHJLQQLQJPLVFDUULHV¶VD\V.LHUNHJDDUG6
Kierkegaard. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1974. p.138 . 
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the movement of faith 
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard gives VHYHUDODOWHUQDWLYHYHUVLRQVRI$EUDKDP¶VVWRU\
and suggests what the outcome would be in each case: 
 
i. Abraham tells Isaac what God has asked him to do, thereby turning himself into 
DPRQVWHULQ,VDDF¶VH\HV$EUDKDPORVHV,VDDFEHIRUHWKHMRXUQH\KDVEHJXQ. 
ii. Abraham saw the ram before it is time. He sacrificed the ram and they returned 
home. He could not forget that God had demanded this of him. $EUDKDP¶VH\H
was darkened. He saw joy no more 
iii. Abraham thought about the son he had with Hagar the slave woman and how he 
had cast them both out into the desert. He realised that he had done wrong and 
was about to do wrong again. He begged God for forgiveness at having even 
considered killing Isaac. There was no sacrifice. 
iv. Isaac saw his father raising the knife, but Abraham did not realise that he had 
seen this.  Isaac saw the whole thing and lost his faith. He said nothing to 
Abraham or anyone else.9 
 
,Q DQ\RQHRI WKHVHYHUVLRQV WKHRXWFRPHZRXOGQRW KDYHEHHQ D UHDO WHVWRI$EUDKDP¶V
faith, that is, his ability to GHFLGHDJDLQVWDOOUHDVRQWRIROORZ*RG¶VFRPPDQG.LHUNHJDDUG
asks us to consider the true version - that for three days and three nights Abraham kept 
VLOHQW+HVWRRGE\KLVUHVROYHWRGR*RG¶VZLOOXQDEOHWRXQGHUVWDQGZK\VXFKDWKLQJZDV
being asked of him and unable to speak about it to anyone. The moment arrived when he 
had to carry out the sacrifice. He did not know that God would substitute a ram. The ram 
appeared neither too early nor too late. 10  At the very last possible moment, just when it 
was impossible to turn back, Isaac was saved.  
 
7KHPRYHPHQWRIIDLWKLVFRPSOHWHGLQWZRVWDJHVVD\V.LHUNHJDDUGEXWVXFKµVWDJHV¶DUH
hardly a logistical progression. Instead, they seem to contradict each other. 
 
The first movement that Abraham makes, says Kierkegaard, is to give up his claim on Isaac 
LQ µLQILQLWH UHVLJQDWLRQ¶  7KLV LV D µSULYDWH XQGHUWDNLQJ >«@ VRPHWKLQJ QR-one can 
XQGHUVWDQG¶$EUDKDPZDVSUHSDUHG WR VDFULILFHZKDWZDV LQHIIHFW WKH µZKROHZRUOG¶ IRU
him. Right up until the very last possible moment, when the knife was poised ready to fall 
                                                   
9
 S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 1985. pp.45-48. 
10
 Ibid. p65  
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on Isaac, whom he loved then with an intensity greater than ever, he was prepared to do it.  
 
And yet, he believed that it would not happen. This belief, that it would not happen, is the 
second movement of faith. Both of these movements constitute the decision that Abraham 
PDGHLQ IDLWK WKDW LV  µRQ WKHVWUHQJWKRI WKHDEVXUG¶11  However, such a decision is not 
PDGH RQFH DQG IRU DOO LW PXVW EH FRQWLQXRXVO\ PDGH LQ WKH IOX[ EHWZHHQ WKH µLQILQLWH
resiJQDWLRQ¶ DQG WKH µQHYHUWKHOHVV LW ZRQ¶W KDSSHQ¶ $QG VXJJHVWV .LHUNHJDDUG LI WKH
VDFULILFHRI,VDDFGRHVKDSSHQ WKHUHLVDQRWKHUSRVVLELOLW\  µWKH/RUGZLOOJLYHPHDQHZ
,VDDF¶12 
 
What people often mean by faith, says Kierkegaard, is something one needs in order to 
renounce everything, instead of something which presupposes that one has already 
renounced everything. Faith requires the sacrifice of that which is loved. This does not 
mean ceasing to love the beloved, once they have been relinquished, but continuing to love 
the beloved in our abandonment of them.13 If I do not continue to love what I have 
sacrificed, then there has been no sacrifice. As Derrida, who wrote so beautifully on Fear 
and Trembling, VD\Vµ,I,JUDQWGHDWKRUSXWWRGHDWKWKDWZKLFK,KDWHLWLVQRWDVDFULILFH¶14 
The sacrifice of Isaac, he says, is also the sacrifice of love to love. It is only at the point 
ZKHUH$EUDKDP¶VDFWRIGUDZLQJWKHNQLIHLVµLQDEVROXWHFRQWUDGLFWLRQWRKLVIHHOLQJVRQO\
WKHQ GRHV KH VDFULILFH ,VDDF¶ 15  In effect, Abraham had already relinquished Isaac and 
already sacrificed him before the ram appeared. Isaac was at that moment no longer the son 
of Abraham.  The sacrifice had already been made in the decision to obey God, but the act 
itself, the killing of Isaac, had not yet been enacted.  If the ram had not appeared everything 
would have been lost. There would have been no possibility of Abraham retrieving what he 
had renounced.  Instead, Isaac was given back to Abraham on the proper basis, that is, as a 
gift from God.  For Kierkegaard, the good things in life derive their value not from the fact 
that they exist, but from the source of existence itself. Isaac and all of his descendants were 
once again restored to the world.   
 
Kierkegaard says of Abraham¶VVWRU\ 
If one imagines one can be moved to faith by considering the outcome of 
WKLV VWRU\ RQHGHFHLYHVRQHVHOI DQG LV RXW WR FKHDW*RGRI IDLWK¶V ILUVW
movement, one is out to suck the life-wisdom out of the paradox. One or 
another may succeed, for our age does not stop with faith, with its 
                                                   
11
 Ibid. p.139. 
12
 Ibid. p.139. 
13
 This is precisely what Kierkegaard does when he breaks off the relationship with Regine.  
14
 J. Derrida, The Gift of Death. US: University of Chicago Press, 1995. p.64. 
15
 Ibid. p.65. Here, Derrida quoting an amended translation from his edition of Fear & Trembling. 
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miracle of turning water into wine; it goes further, it turns wine into 
water. 16 
 
Only the one who draws the knife gets Isaac.17 Faith is a decision before God, that is in 
accord with an unfathomable demand. For Kierkegaard, is also a form of madness. In 
$EUDKDP¶V FDVH WKH GHFLVLRQ PDGH LQ IDLWK DOVR UHVWRUHG IDLWK WR KLP DQHZ )DLWK LV WKH
outcome of divine, not human, possibility and as such, is unfathomable and unpredictable. 
However, the decision itself, to carry out what God asked, whilst at the same time believing 
WKDW LW ZRXOG QRW KDSSHQ ZDV $EUDKDP¶V GHFLVLRQ QRW *RG¶V  7KH GHFLVLRQ LWVHOI LV
humanly possible even if the outcome is not. 
 
WKHUHPXVWEHDQJXLVK« 
7KH µNQLJKW RI IDLWK¶ LQ Fear and Trembling appears content, like someone who has no 
burden to bear in this world. Despite enduring, one assumes, the same ordeals as any human 
being, he goes through life with apparent ease.  Such an individual seems inviolable, 
resolute and unperturbed. With an imperceptible effort, he fulfils whatever task is placed 
before him. Kierkegaard imagines Abraham like this knight and as such it is easy to see 
why he causes frustration to someone who would like to learn about faith. Nothing of the 
difficult betrays itself on the surface. However, considering the task that is demanded of 
$EUDKDP VXFK D GHPHDQRXU VHHPV DOPRVW PRQVWURXV  µZKLOH $EUDKDP DURXVHV P\
DGPLUDWLRQVD\V.LHUNHJDDUGµKHDOVRDSSDOVPH¶18   
 
If Abraham really did effortlessly make his decision to carry out his task in complete 
unquestioning security, then there is good reason to be appalled. An image that Kierkegaard 
describes in Repetition, comes to mind.  The narrator (Constantin Constantius), saw a 
nursemaid pushing a pram with two children inside. One was fast asleep and the other, wide 
awake, was taking up most of the space, and, eager to get a good view of what was going on 
around her, had pushed herself to the front of the pram. A cart suddenly came speeding 
along and the pram, being in its path, was obviously in danger: 
 
«SHRSOH UDQ WRZDUG LW  DQG ZLWK D VZLIW WXUQ WKH QXUVHPDLG SXVKHG LW
into a doorway. All the by-standers were apprehensive, I among them.  
During all this, the little lady sat quite calm and passively kept on picking 
her nose. Presumably she thought: What does all of this have to do with 
                                                   
16
  S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 1985. p.66. 
17
 µ\RXKDGWRGUDZWKHNQLIHEHIRUHNHHSLQJ,VDDF¶,ELGS 
18
 Ibid p.89  
 10 
PHLW¶VWKHQXUVHPDLG¶VEXVLQHVV6XFKKHURLVPLVVRXJKWLQYDLQDPRQJ
adults 19 
 
6RPHWKLQJ LQ .LHUNHJDDUG¶V GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKLV FKLOG DQG KHU DEVROXWH WUXVW LQ KHU RZQ
security suggests an almost JURWHVTXHQDUFLVVLVP  ,I$EUDKDPUHDOO\GLGFDUU\RXW*RG¶V
FRPPDQGZLWK WKHFDOP UHVROXWHQHVV DQG DSSDUHQW HDVHRI WKH µNQLJKW RI IDLWK¶ WKHQ WKLV
would be one conclusion to reach.  A child, however, is un-aware of danger and therefore 
cannot be courageous.  Innocence is also ignorance, but Abraham would have known the 
dangers. What is missing IURPWKH$EUDKDPVWRU\VD\V.LHUNHJDDUGLVµWKHDQJXLVK«Yet 
anguish is a dangerous affair for the squeamish, so people forget it, notwithstanding they 
want to WDONDERXW$EUDKDP¶20 
 
Imagine you are in one of those rickshaws that have become popular in town.21  You are 
being taken all round the streets amongst pedestrians and busy traffic.  What if a car comes 
veering towards you? Would you stay put, trusting the rickshaw driver to save you? Unless 
you are quite unusual, this is unlikely to be the case. You know the dangers from past 
experience and you know the possible outcomes. There is nothing peculiar about fear in the 
face of danger, what would be unusual is a person who does not try to save themselves.   
 
Abraham knew all the dangers involved in the ordeal he was facing, but he did not retreat. 
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard asks the reader to imagine what Abraham must have 
gone through in those three days and three nights. It is possible to imagine his thoughts: 
How could God ask him to do such a thing? This cannot be the benevolent God that 
Abraham thought he was.  How could he agree to kill his own child? If Isaac ever knew that 
his father intended to kill him, he would never forgive him. If Sarah knew then he would 
have been stopped from ever going. He would be branded a murderer or a madman.  
Thoughts and fears, unimaginable to those who have not undergone what he did (and what 
person has or who would aGPLWLW"PXVWKDYHSDVVHGWKURXJK$EUDKDP¶VPLQG 
 
Kierkegaard encourages us to understand that Abraham did not accept his task passively in 
the usual sense of the word. Rather, he actively decided to relinquish all that he had claim 
to: Isaac, Sarah, his culture, even his own self and his relation with the God who demanded 
such an unthinkable thing of him. At the point where the knife was poised over Isaac, there 
would have been no remaining reason, nothing to invoke as an even tenuously reliable 
                                                   
19
 S. Kierkegaard. Repetition. New Jersey Princeton University Press. 1983. p.172. 
20
  S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 1985. p.58.  
21
 In the Soho area of London. 
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ground for his decision, nothing but the senselessness of total abandonment to an act that 
still must be done without knowing why.   
 
«DQGDVHFUHWWUHPEOLQJ 
At the beginning of Fear and Trembling LQDVHFWLRQFDOOHGµ$WWXQHPHQW¶.LHUNHJDDUGWHOOV
the story of DPDQZKREHFDPHLQFUHDVLQJO\IDVFLQDWHGE\$EUDKDP¶VVWRU\DVKHJUHZROGHU
whilst at the same time finding it harder to understand. He wanted to be there with Abraham 
when he was alone with Isaac on the mountain. What occupied him, says Kierkegaard, is 
QRWWKHµIDEULFRIWKHLPDJLQDWLRQ¶EXWµWKHVKXGGHURIWKRXJKW¶22 
 
How is it possible that Abraham could keep silent? Surely such an ordeal would push 
anyone to unburden themself by seeking the counsel of another? However, if Abraham had 
revealed what he intended do, there would have been no possibility of making the 
movement of faith.  
 
$WWKHFHQWUHRI$EUDKDP¶VVWRU\WKHQLVVLOHQFH6SHDNLQJZLWKRXWVD\LQJDQ\WKLQJLVVWLOO
the best way of keeping a secret, says Derrida, and when Isaac asks where the burnt offering 
LVDQG$EUDKDPUHSOLHV µ*RGZLOOSURYLGH¶ WKLV LVH[DFWO\ZKDWKH LVGRLQJ  23  Abraham 
was guardian of a secret that could not be spoken of, not because he was forbidden to speak 
of it (nowhere is such an injunction mentioned), but because he did not know what it was. It 
was also hidden from him. He could not speakµHe can say what he will, but there is one 
thing he cannot say and since he cannot say it i.e. say it in a way that another understands it, 
KH GRHV QRW VSHDN¶ 24 The only possiEOH H[SUHVVLRQ RI $EUDKDP¶V PXWH DQJXLVK LV µWKH
VKXGGHU RI WKRXJKW¶, WKH WUHPEOLQJ LQ WKH WLWOH RI .LHUNHJDDUG¶V ERRN25 What makes us 
tremble, says Derrida, is µThe mysterium tremendumWKHIULJKWIXOVHFUHW¶:K\WUHPEOHKH
DVNVDQGµZKDWGRHVWKHERG\mean to say by trembling, presuming one can speak here of 
WKH ERG\ RU RI VD\LQJ RI PHDQLQJ DQG RI UKHWRULF"¶ 7UHPEOLQJ KH FRQWLQXHV µLV ERWK
                                                   
22
 S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 1985. p.44 . 
23
 J. Derrida, The Gift of Death. US: University of Chicago Press, 1995. p.59  
24
 S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 1985. p137. Concealment and revelation may belong to the 
VSKHUHRIDHVWKHWLFVVD\V.LHUNHJDDUGµDWWKHPHUHVRXQGRIWKHZRUG³FRQFHDOPHQW´HYHU\RQHFDQHDVLO\
VKDNHDGR]HQURPDQFHVDQGFRPHGLHVIURPKLVVOHHYH¶+RZHYHUZKDW.LHUNHJDDUGZDQWVWRGRLVWRµOHW
concealment pass dialectically between aesthetics and ethics, for the point is to show how absolutely 
GLIIHUHQWWKHSDUDGR[DQGDHVWKHWLFFRQFHDOPHQWDUHIURPRQHDQRWKHU¶,ELGS-112. 
25
 Which Derrida also reminds us is an implicit reference to St Paul where the disciples are addressed by 
&KULVWµ:KHUHIRUHP\EHORYHGDV\HKDYHDOZD\VREH\HGQRWDVP\SUHVHQFHRQO\EXWQRZPXFKPRUH
LQP\DEVHQFHZRUNRXW\RXUVDOYDWLRQZLWKIHDUDQGWUHPEOLQJ¶'HUULGDTXRWLQJPhilippians 2:12 from 
King James Bible) J. Derrida, The Gift of Death. US: University of Chicago Press, 1995 p.56. 
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anticipation and a being reminded in such a way that is neither seeing or knowing¶ 26  
 
For the Christian, humanity became separated from God through their own actions and this 
separation, which also constitutes an inequality between God and man, is an unbreachable 
difference which is a source of suffering for both God and man alike. It also constitutes a 
relation of responsibility; a human duty towards the source of existence and a divine duty 
towards creation. It is this responsibility towards an unknown, invisible source of existence 
that makes us tremble, says Derrida: 
 
It is the gift of infinite love, the dissymmetry that exists between the 
GLYLQHUHJDUGWKDWVHHVPHDQGP\VHOIZKRGRHVQ¶WVHHZKDWLVORRNLQJ
at me; it is the gift and endurance of death that exists in the irreplaceable, 
the disproportion between the infinite gift and my finitude, responsibility 
as culpability, sin, salvation. repentance and sacrifice.27 
          
'HUULGD VD\V WKDW HYHQ LI ZH UHPDLQ µIUHH WR GHFLGH WR ZRUN WR DVVXPH RXU OLIH DQG RXU
GHDWK¶28, for Kierkegaard it is ultimately God who decides for us. However, as God never 
shows himself and offers no reliable assurance, any decision that I make must be made as 
though it were mine and mine alone. 
 
The decision WKDW$EUDKDPPDGH LQDFFRUGZLWK*RG¶VGHPDQG LVEH\RQGUHDVRQ LW LV LQ
excess of that which can be contained and assimilated by human discourse. The ethical 
expression, that which can be spoken about, is that Abraham is willing to murder. The 
religious expression, that which cannot be justified, spoken about or even comprehended is 
that Abraham was willing to sacrifice his beloved son Isaac $EUDKDP ZDV µHLWKHU D
PXUGHUHU RU D PDQ RI IDLWK¶29 How can Abraham be praised for being a murderer, or in 
Christian terms, for committing the gravest kind of sin? 
 
,I$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQZDVPDGHDWWKHlevel of the ethical alone, the trial of faith would be 
HUDVHG7KHµPRQVWURXVSDUDGR[¶30 that is faith consists in giving oneself over to a demand 
that is unthinkable in terms of human law or consensus.  In being prepared to go through 
with such a demand and at the same time believing that it will not happen, despite there 
being no justifiable cause for such a belief,  Abraham assumes a responsibility that goes 
EH\RQG WKH HWKLFDO  7KH VDFULILFH RI ,VDDF LV WKHQ DOVR WKH VDFULILFH RI µWKH HWKLFDO¶ 7KH
ethical, says Kierkegaard, is also the universal and therefore includes the divine:  
                                                   
26
 Ibid. p.53. 
27
 Ibid. p.55-56. 
28
 Ibid. p.56. 
29
 S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 1985. p.60. 
30
 µ)DLWKLVWKHPRQVWURXVSDUDGR[± faith begiQVSUHFLVHO\ZKHUHWKLQNLQJOHDYHVRII¶,ELGS 
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It is therefore correct to say that all duty is ultimately duty to God; but if 
one cannot say more one says in effect that really I have no duty to God. 
The duty becomes duty to God by being referred to God, but I do not 
enter into relation with God in the duty itself.31 
 
7KH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WKDW $EUDKDP DVVXPHV LV WRZDUGV WKH µPRUH HWKLFDO WKDQ HWKLFDO¶ DQ
HWKLFVZKLFKLQFOXGHVDGXW\WRRQH¶VQHLJKERXUWRRWKHUKXPDQEHLQJVEXWDWWKHVDPHWLPH
is a duty towarGVWKHXQNQRZDEOH :KDWLVFDOOHGµUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶FDQQRWEHFRQWDLQHGE\
any concept, says Derrida, it has within it an µHVVHQWLDOH[FHVVLYHQHVV¶32.  Unlike the laws 
UHJXODWHGE\ FRQFHSWV VXFKGXW\ UHJXODWHV LWVHOI WKURXJK µWKH LQFDOFXODEOH¶  )RU'HUULGa, 
concepts such as responsibility (and decision, hospitality, forgiving, mourning etc) are 
DIIOLFWHG E\ D SDUDGR[ WKH µSRVVLEOH-LPSRVVLEOH DSRULDV¶ ZKHUH WKH YHU\ FRQGLWLRQ RI
possibility becomes the condition of their impossibility.33  $EUDKDP¶V GHFLVLRQ assumed 
responsibility in the way that Derrida describes. 
 
'HUULGD¶VZULWLQJRQFear and Trembling in The Gift of Death,  is one of many occasions 
where he ties the concept of responsibility to that of decision. Drawing on Kierkegaard, he 
says that a decision,  if it truly to be called a decision, must be made against the background 
of undecidability.34   
He describes the problem as follows:  
 
However careful one is in the theoretical preparation of a decision, the 
instant of the decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous 
to the accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise, there is no responsibility. 
In this sense not only must the person taking the decision not know 
everything... the decision, if there is to be one, must advance towards a 
future which is not known, which cannot be anticipated.35 
 
                                                   
31
 Ibid. p.96. 
32
  -'HUULGD³(DWLQJ:HOO´RUWKH&DOFXODWLRQRIWKH6XEMHFW$Q,QWHUYLHZZLWK-DFTXHV'HUULGD¶LQ
Cadava, E, Connor, P. and Nancy, J.L. (Eds). Who Comes After the Subject? London: Routledge, 1991. 
p.108. 
33
  6HHµ$ZDLWLQJDWWKH$UULYDO¶LQ-Derrida, Jacques.  Aporias. California: Stanford University Press, 
1993. p.56. 
34
 IELG'HUULGDRIWHQWDONVRIGHFLVLRQLQWKLVZD\IRUH[DPSOHLQµ3HUKDSV0D\EH¶'HUULGDLQ
conversation with Alex Garcia Duttman, ICA talks,May 8 1996 and Limited Inc. Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1990. p.116. 
35
 -'HUULGD µ1LHW]VFKH DQG WKH0DFKLQH ,QWHUYLHZ ZLWK -DFTXHV'HUULGD¶ LQWHUYLHZHU %HDUGVZRUWK
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 7, SpriQJ  S 2QH RI 'HUULGD¶V SULPDU\ FRQWULEXWLRQV WR
philosophy is, of course, différance, the endless deferral of meaning which constitutes a ground of 
knowledge that is provisional, contingent and forever shifting. Différance is, according to Derrida, not a 
concept but rather a temporization or spacing and allows for the inclusion of something unknown and 
unknowable in the presentation of any object (of thought, signification etc).  These unknowns refer to 
µSDVW¶RUµIXWXUH¶SRVVLELOLWLHVZKLFKDUHFDrried with and which trouble the notion of present, presentation 
and representation.  
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'HUULGDXVHVWHUPVVXFKDVµXQGHFLGDEOH¶RUµLQFDOFXODEOH¶QRWRXWRIµDVLPSOHSUHGLOLFWLRQ
IRUSOD\QRULQRUGHUWRQHXWUDOL]HGHFLVLRQ¶EXWEHFDXVHKHVD\VµRQWKHFRQWUDU\,EHOLHYH
there is no responsibility, no ethico-political decision, that must not pass through the proofs 
of the incalculable or the undecidable. Otherwise everything would be reduced to 
FDOFXODWLRQSURJUDPFDXVDOLW\DQGDWEHVW³K\SRWKHWLFDOLPSHUDWLYH´¶ 36   
 
The ethical WKDWLVµPRUHWKDQHWKLFV¶DQGZKLFK.LHUNHJDDUGSURSRVHVDVµWKHWHOHRORJLFDO
VXVSHQVLRQRIWKHHWKLFDO¶LQFear and Trembling,  is unspeakable in the simple sense that 
no words can describe it but also because to speak about it dissolves the very responsibility 
that is intrinsic to it. Ethics, in a general sense, that is an ethics which can be spoken about 
through human discourse, is in fact, according to Derrida an incitement to µLUUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ 
Abraham made his decision alone, as an individual and QRWDVDµUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶RIKXPDQ
ODZ+LV VLOHQFH VD\V'HUULGDDVVXPHG  µWKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WKDW FRQVLVWV LQDOZD\VEHLQJ
DORQHHQWUHQFKHGLQRQH¶VRZQVLQJXODULW\DWWKHPRPHQWRIGHFLVLRQ-XVWDVQR-one can die 
in my place, no-one can make a deFLVLRQZKDWZHFDOO³DGHFLVLRQ´LQP\SODFH¶37  
 
What if Abraham had spoken about it? What if he had discussed it with Sarah and Isaac?  A 
decision would have been made in the general sense but such a decision for God in faith 
would not have been made. The movement of faith would not have been achieved and 
Abraham would have lost everything. 
 
1HYHUWKHOHVVDV'HUULGDSRLQWVRXWDWWKHµLQVWDQWRIGHFLVLRQ¶WZRFRQWUDGLFWRU\GXWLHVFR-
exist. Abraham assumed sole responsibility for the sacrifice of his son and in doing so he 
DOVRVDFULILFHGHWKLFV$WWKHVDPHWLPHLQRUGHUIRUWKHVDFULILFHWRWDNHSODFH$EUDKDP¶V
ORYHIRUKLVVRQPXVWEHDVVWURQJDVHYHUWKHµRUGHURIKXPDQGXW\PXVWFRQWLQXHWRLQVLVW
on its rights¶38 This is the very condition of his decision; that even as he is on the very point 
RI NLOOLQJ ,VDDF $EUDKDP¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR KLP UHPDLQV DV VWURQJ DV LW HYHU ZDV  (YHQ
thought he is about to kill his own son through his own decision, he has not relinquished his 
love for him and still believes that he will not die. 
 
                                                   
36
 Derrida in Cadava, E, Connor, P. and Nancy, J.L. (Eds). Who Comes After the Subject? London: 
Routledge.  p.108. 
37
 J. Derrida, The Gift of Death. US: University of Chicago Press, 1995. p.60-61. 
38
 Ibid. p.65. 
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the moment 
The instant of decision was at the very moment when the point of the knife was ready to 
descend, when it was already too late to retreat. The point of the knife, then, is one image of 
the decisive moment. Abraham though, had already decided. When Abraham answered 
*RG ZLWK µ+HUH , DP¶ KH SUHVHQWHG KLPVHOI UHDG\ IRU DFWLRQ OLNH D VROGLHU DQVZHULQJ D
military roll call. It is also as though he is literally pointing himself out, as though he was 
lost to view and God could not find him until he indicated his whereabouts. He offers 
himself and, at the very same time, he is summoned. There too, just like the point of the 
knife, is a decisive moment. Already, there are two moments that can be described as 
decisive. At what point, then, did the decision definitively take place, if it can be said that it 
µWRRNSODFH¶DWDOO" 
 
7KHFDWHJRU\RIWKHPRPHQWLVFHQWUDOWR.LHUNHJDDUG¶VWKLQNLQJWKHµLQVWDQW¶VD\V'HUULGD
is always indispensable in Kierkegaard 39) and nowhere more so than in the parable of 
$EUDKDP7KHPRPHQWLVOLNHWKHIXOFUXPRQZKLFKHYHU\WKLQJWXUQVµ7KHPRPHQW¶VD\V
.LHUNHJDDUGLVQRWDGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWLPHEXWUDWKHUDµILJXUDWLYHH[SUHVVLRQDQG>@QRW
easy to deal with. However, it is beautiful word to FRQVLGHU¶40 
 
It could be said that in life, each moment takes care of itself and that what ought to be of 
concern is the whole; the general direction or destination towards which these moments 
OHDG7KLVFRXOGEHFDOOHGµWDNLQJFRQWURO¶HQVXULQJDQDGYDQFement towards certain goals 
in life. If someone does not put themselves at the helm then they will drift along aimlessly, 
without achievements.41 
                                                   
39
 Ibid p.72. 
40
 S. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981. p.87. 
41
 Tolstoy tells how he was suicidal, feeling that despite his worldy success,  life had no meaning. He felt 
like a person carried along in a boat by the wind and waves, accompanied by other people in boats, all 
going in the same direction. He, like them,  was not asking where he should go but rather only that he be 
carried along somewhere.  Tolstoy decides to turn around and go in another direction (towards faith).    
(L.Tolstoy. A Confession and other religious writings. London: Penguin, 1987.) 
 
Agnes Varda, in her film Vagabond tells another story of a young girl found in the French  countryside 
frozen to death in a ditch, wearing filthy clothes, her hair matted. She had no identification. I seemed that 
VKHKDGEHHQGULIWLQJ IRUPRQWKV7KHQDUUDWRURI WKHVWRU\ WULHV WRSLHFH WRJHWKHU WKHJLUO¶VKLVWRU\DQG
comes to envisage her as someone who was by all appearances gifted; beautiful, intelligent and 
charismatic. In the film, we are introduced to people who knew her. One of these is a goatherd and his 
family. The goatherd has a graduate degree in philosophy. He understands the desire to escape from the 
demands of the modern world and spent some time drifting himself. This life of tending animals and 
making his living from the earth rather than from books is his chosen solution. Many of his friends from 
before are dead through drugs or suicide.  The young woman arrives at his farm and together with his 
wife they offer her accommodation and work.  However, she loses interest and sits around smoking and 
bored, leaving her accommodation unkempt. The goatherd warns her that if she pursues this route of total 
freedom it will destroy her, ultimately through loneliness.  She is a dreamer, he says, without purpose or 
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For Kierkegaard, however, the moment is significant because it possesses the potential for 
an irreversible overturning of a life, in other words it is decisive in the most radical sense.   
 
,QRUGHUWRLQYHVWLJDWHZKDWLVLQYROYHGLQWKLVFDWHJRU\RIµWKHPRPHQW¶IXUWKHU,ZLOOWXUQ
to other texts in which it is explored (and philosophically examined) by Kierkegaard: 
Philosophical Fragments and The Concept of Anxiety. In these texts, it is possible to see 
ZKDWWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIµWKHPRPHQW¶LVIRU.LHUNHJDDUGLQ$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQ 
 
In Philosophical Fragments, written under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus,42  
Kierkegaard is concerned with the acquisition of knowledge. How is it possible to learn 
something previously unknown? In the Socratic form of teaching, claims Kierkegaard, the 
teacher is not indebted to pupil and pupil not indebted to teacher. The unequal become 
equal.  
 
God is also a teacher but, says Kierkegaard,  he is not the equal of his pupils, like Socrates. 
Between God and humanity there lies an unquantifiable gulf so that it is difficult to say how 
these two entities can even be compared. Not only does God impart knowledge but he also 
provides the learner with the very conditions for understanding. Such a God needs no pupil 
to understand himself, as all knowledge is his already.43  There is in fact no necessity for 
him to teach for his own gain, but there is a profound desire for reconciliation with the 
learner. 
 
7KHDXWKRU-RKDQQHV&OLPDFXVFODLPVQRWWREHD&KULVWLDQEXWUDWKHUDµSUDFWLFLQJGRXEWHU
ZKR EHFRPHV D SULYDWH WKLQNHU¶44  )RU KLP WKH WHUP µ*RG¶ LV D SODFHKROGHU IRU WKH
unfathomable, that which cannot be reasoned, or that at which one arrives when reason runs 
out:  
But what is this unknown against which the understanding in its 
paradoxical passion collides and which even disturbs man and his self-
                                                                                                                                                     
aim.  The young woman leaves the goatherds, stealing some cheese to sell on the way. (Vagabond. [Sans 
Toi Ni Loi]. Cine Tamaris Films A2.1985) 
Both of these characters turned their back on convention and progress. They decided to be individuals. 
The difference is that although both required tremendous courage the turning around of Tolstoy was 
towards something (an ambition to develop faith)and thus towards life buWWKH\RXQJZRPDQ¶VFKRLFHKDG
no direction at all and ended in death. 
42
 See Introduction of this text for and explanation of the name Johannes Climacus. 
43
 In Phaedo, Socrates proposes the theory that all knowledge is pre-existent either through this or another 
life. The reference to reincarnation though may have been because Socrates was waiting to be executed 
and this allusion  may have been a way to console his friends. 
44
  S. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus. New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1985. p.xiv [Introduction by Hong] 
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knowledge? It is the unknown. But it is not a human being, insofar as he 
knows man, or anything else that he knows. Therefore, let us call this 
unknown the god. It is only a name we give to it. 45 
 
The Socratic view holds that the learner merely needs to be reminded in order to call to 
mind, by himself, what he already knows. However, for Kierkegaard, this view allows the 
DFWXDO RFFDVLRQ IRU OHDUQLQJ WR EH IRUJRWWHQ LW EHFRPHV D µYDQLVKLQJ PRPHQW¶ )RU WKH
PRPHQW WR KDYH GHFLVLYH VLJQLILFDQFH LW PXVW QHYHU EH IRUJRWWHQ µEHFDXVH WKH HWHUQDO
previously non-H[LVWHQWFDPHLQWRH[LVWHQFH« LQWKDWPRPHQW¶46  The eternal, in this sense, 
is not only infinite temporality but also infinite possibility which presents itself in the 
moment.47 
 
The first pre-requisite for a decisive occasion for learning, for Kierkegaard, is that the 
WHDFKHU PXVW EH *RG WKH µXQNQRZQ VRPHWKLQJ¶ 7KH LQGLYLGXDO PXVW DOVR already be a 
learner, that is one in whom there is a total absence of truth (even, as Kierkegaard notes, in 
its negative form of ignorance) to the extent that they are not even a seeker. The learner is 
GHILQHG E\ .LHUNHJDDUG DV µXQWUXWK¶ DQRWKHU ZRUG IRU µVLQ¶ ZKLFK DOVR PHDQV µWR EH LQ
HUURU¶ 7KH FRQGLWLRQ IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ LV JLYHQ E\ *RG ZKR µFUHDWHV¶ WKH OHDUQHU  
However, the learner did originally possess this condition, which was granted by God and 
lost it, not by accident nor because it was taken away by God (this would be a contradiction, 
since he originally imparted it), but because through sin, the learner willed their own 
exclusion from truth. The\HQJHQGHUHGWKHLURZQµXQIUHHGRP¶DV.LHUNHJDDUGSXWVLW(YHQ
WKRXJKWKHOHDUQHUZLOOHGWKHLURZQ¶XQIUHHGRP¶WKH\FDQQRWXVHWKHVDPHZLOOWRUHYHUVH
WKHSURFHVVµ8QIUHHGRP¶VD\V.LHUNHJDDUGLVOLNHDWR\ERXJKWE\DFKLOGZKRWKHQZDQWV
to take it to a bookshop to exchange it for a book. The toy, once it has been bought, 
EHFRPHVZRUWKOHVVDVDPHDQVRISXUFKDVLQJZKDWKHZDQWV,QWKHVDPHZD\µXQIUHHGRP¶
RQFHLWKDVEHHQµSXUFKDVHG¶ORVHVDOOYDOXHLPPHGLDWHO\2QO\*RGFDQUHWXUQIUHHGRPWR
the learner. 48 
 
For Kierkegaard, it is love, not power, that is the basis for the authority that God assumes 
over human beings.  The learner owes God everything but God cannot reveal himself as the 
teacher, since he would also reveal an intransigent inequality, something which extinguishes 
the possibility of love. God does not want to see humanity separated from him in the 
suffering of existence but yearns for reconciliation. However, he cannot save humanity 
                                                   
45
 Ibid. p.39 
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 Ibid. p.13 
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 Thanks to Howard Caygill for making this point. 
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 S. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus. New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1985.pp.13-15. 
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from themselves. The only way for the learner to be saved is by his or her own actions in 
the freedom bestowed on them by a God. Such freedom must appear to them as their own 
and God can never reveal that it is he who bestowed it to them or he who wishes them to 
XVHLWµ:KRJUDVSVWKLVFRQWUDGLFWLRQRIVRUUow; not to reveal oneself is the death of love, to 
UHYHDORQHVHOILVWKHGHDWKRIWKHEHORYHG¶49 
 
The workings of the god-teacher are mysterious and unfathomable. Nevertheless, the 
learner, in order to receive the teaching of God, must apply themselves to their task of life 
absolutely without expectation of anything but what their own efforts will bring them. It is 
like the story of the PDJLF ODPS WRZKLFK.LHUNHJDDUG UHIHUV µIUHHGRP¶KH VD\V µLV WKH
wonderful lamp. When a person rubs it with ethical passion, God comes into existence for 
KLP¶50   
 
a place and a time 
Just as the moment of decision for Abraham cannot be located at any one time or place, it is 
impossible to say when or where the decisive moment or the occasion for learning might 
occur. To try to locate it at all would suggest something fixed, immovable and locatable.  It 
may be helpful instead to imagine the moment of decision as a locus, something like a 
geometrical point of intersection or a point in time in which a number of events coincide.  
 
All of the moments that comprise a life are just like a geometrical locus where the time and 
place of decision intersect. Each moment arises from an infinite web of connections and 
paths which have all been decided by someone or something at some time. Who knows 
where the origin of those paths lie? From the point of view of here and now, none of them 
form a straight or uninterrupted line; each one becomes bifurcated, scattered in a web of 
causation and coincidence as they dissolve into the horizon.  
 
TKH µKHUH DQGQRZ¶ WKLVPRPHQW LQ WLPH LV QRW VXVSHQGHG LQ WLPHRU VSDFHEXW IRUPVD
continuous flow as it is replaced by the next and so on ad infinitum. This incalculable series 
of substitutions can be called movement or the passing of time. The question is that if  
                                                   
49
 Ibid. p.30  
50
 S. Kierkegaard. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. New Jersey: Princeton 
8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV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to have in his human life.  God created Jesus, says Kierkegaard, who was a human being endowed with 
µFDSDFLWLHVXQPDWFKHGE\DOORWKHUV¶DQGSODFHGKLPLQDUHPRWHVSRWDQGVDLGWRKLPµ1RZJRDQGOLYH
WKHKXPDQOLIHWKRXJKZLWKDVWUHQXRXVQHVVXQPDWFKHGE\DOORWKHUV«\RXVKDOOEHHQWKXVLastic , because 
WKLVLVWKHKLJKHVW¶,ELGS  
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movement actually occurs, is there a thread of continuity between moments or are they 
LQVWHDG GLVFUHHW DQG XQFRQQHFWHG SRLQWV" 7KH FDWHJRU\ RI µWKH PRPHQW¶ LQYLWHV
contradiction and as such was the subject of great interest to the ancient Greeks.  For 
.LHUNHJDDUGLWZDVDOVRRIH[WUHPHVLJQLILFDQFHVLQFHKLVYLHZRIµOHDUQLQJ¶ZDVQRWDVDQ
accumulation or amassing of knowledge in time, but the discovery of something totally 
new. As such, the moment was, for Kierkegaard, a break in continuity. If the moment is 
both decisive but also a break in continuity, then it falls out of the flow of time. How would 
a movement of any kind (including that of the movement of faith) come about? 
 
In The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard examines (under the name of Vigilius Haufniensis), 
in extensive footnotes as well as the main body of the text, the theories of movement 
proposed by the Greeks, notably the Eleatics. Zeno, a thinker for whom of riddles and 
paradoxes were central, was part of this group. What is knRZQ DV µ=HQR¶V SDUDGR[¶ LV D
theory which held that motion is impossible. In order to travel from point A to point B, a 
person must pass through a midpoint X to get there. However, in order to get to X he must 
pass through a midpoint between A and X and so on ad infinitum. Motion is therefore an 
illusion as we are always simply at a static point.  
 
)RU .LHUNHJDDUG KRZHYHU µWKH PRPHQW¶ LQ LWV GHFLVLYH SRWHQWLDO LV DV KDV EHHQ QRWHG
instrumental, in that it provided the momentum for change. The ancient philosophers were 
DOVRFRQFHUQHGZLWK µWKHPRPHQW¶DVDFDWHJRU\RI WUDQVLWLRQ ,Q The Concept of Anxiety, 
.LHUHNHJDDUG GHVFULEHV KRZ WKH SDUDGR[LFDO QDWXUH RI µWKH PRPHQW¶ ZDV FRQVLGHUHG E\
Plato, for example in Parmenides, a dialogue in which he aims not to resolve the 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQVµLQKHUHQWLQWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHPRPHQW¶EXWUDWKHUWRPDNHWKHPFOHDU 
 
)RU WKH *UHHNV µWKH PRPHQW¶ ZDV FRQVLGHUHG DV D FDWHJRU\ RI µQRQ-EHLQJ¶ LQ UHODWLRQ WR
time.  Non-being, the Greek term for which is WR NHQR9 (meaning empty, literally or 
figuratively, or in vain), was of great interest to philosophy both modern and ancient, says 
Kierkegaard. The philosophical emphasis on bringing non-being into being, makes it seem 
HDV\WRµGRDZD\¶ZLWKQRQ-EHLQJ+RZHYHUKHVD\VµChristians take the view that non-
EHLQJLVSUHVHQWHYHU\ZKHUHDVWKHQRWKLQJRXWRIZKLFKHYHU\WKLQJLVFUHDWHG¶3ODWRVD\V
.LHUNHJDDUGVKRZVKRZWKHPRPHQWµLVUHODWHGWRWKHWUDQVLWLRQRIWKHRQHWRWKHPDQ\RI
the many to the one, of likeness to unlikeness and that it is the moment in which there is 
neither HQ [one] nor SROOD >PDQ\@QHLWKHUDEHLQJGHWHUPLQHGQRUDEHLQJFRPELQHG¶51 
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The moment, as this category of transition, is nothing in itself but rather like a vessel 
through which change occurs µ7KHPRPHQW¶KHUH VWDUWV WRDSSHDU OLNHDQRQ-concept or 
FDWHJRU\,WLVQRORQJHUSRVVLEOHWRVD\ZKHQLWRFFXUVLILQGHHGLWµRFFXUV¶DVVXFKDWDOO
,WVSDUDGR[LFDOQDWXUHPHDQVWKDWWKHSUHVHQWµWKHSUHVHQFH¶, which supposedly comes to be 
in the here and now, in fact never arrives. The moment as a vanishing point is like the point 
;LQ=HQR¶VSDUDGR[ZKLFKOLHVµEHWZHHQPRWLRQDQGUHVWZLWKRXWRFFXS\LQJDQ\WLPHDQG
into this and out from this that which is in motion changes into rest, and that which is at rest 
changes into motion¶ It is best described by the Greek term DWRSRQ  PHDQLQJµWKDWZKLFK
has no place¶ZKLFKLVDOVRWKHµQRZ¶ 
7KHµQRZ¶>WDQXQ@OLHVEHWZHHQµZDV¶DQGµZLOOFRPH´DQGQDWXUDOO\µWKH
RQH¶FDQQRWLQSDVVLQJIURPWKHSDVWWRWKHIXWXUHE\SDVVWKLVµQRZ¶,W
comes to a halt in the now, does not become older but is older. In most 
recent philosophy, abstraction culminates in pure being, but pure being is 
WKH PRVW DEVWUDFW H[SUHVVLRQ IRU HWHUQLW\ DQG DJDLQ DV µQRWKLQJ¶ Lt is 
precisely the moment. 52 
 
For Kierkegaard, the moment, as paradox, is distinguished by its transformative or decisive 
potential, that is its capacity for conversion. The paradox is not simply a conundrum which 
eventually, using the correct methodology and correct thinking, can be resolved.  Rather, it 
is like a hole in the universe which allows you step into a parallel world; a world which may 
look the same as before but which is qualitatively different. 53   
 
The moment, as paradox, an assault on reason LV SUHFLVHO\ WKH µIRROLVKQHVV¶ WKDW
Kierkegaard talks about in Philosophical Fragments.  The instant of decision for Abraham 
was rooted in such folly.54 
 

7KHPRPHQW¶LQ$EUDKDP¶VVWRU\DOVRDSSHDUVWREHH[DFWO\WKLVWUDQVLWLRQDOQRQcategory 
of the Greeks and which was described by Kierkegaard as having decisive significance. It 
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brings about a renewed understanding or perspective in the re-institution of faith for 
Abraham, and is therefore an occasion for learning for Abraham.  
 
However, the question of when this moment, the occasion for learning, occurs exactly is 
still less than clear. The instant of $EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQZDVRYHULQWKHtwinkling of an eye 
and yet it endured (and he endured it) over a period of three days and three nights.  When 
Abraham DQQRXQFHG µ+HUH DP ,¶ HYHQ EHIRUH KH NQRZV ZKDW *RG ZLOO DVN RI KLP KH
opened himself to the demand. At that moment is the knife already drawn? At that moment, 
even before the demand is made, who or what was it that decided? Was it Abraham, the 
man, who is called or some other (someone or something?) who preceded him, who (or 
ZKLFKZDV$EUDKDPDQGDW WKH VDPH WLPHQRW\HW$EUDKDP WKH µIDWKHURI IDLWK¶"   One 
thing remains certain, the decision had already been made in advance of the demand but the 
anguish had not been lived and it is the anguish that Abraham assumes responsibility, in his 
VD\LQJµ\HV¶55 
 
In The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard says:  
 
Nothing is as swift as a blink of the eye, yet it is commensurable with the 
FRQWHQWRIWKHHWHUQDO«DVLJh, a word, etc. have power to relieve the soul 
of the burdensome weight, precisely because the burden, when merely 
expressed, already begins to become something of the past. A blink is 
therefore a designation of time, but mark well, of time in the fateful 
conflict when it is touched by eternity. What we call the moment,  Plato 
calls WRH[DLIQK9[the sudden]« it is related to the category of the 
LQYLVLEOH« 7KH /DWLQ WHUP LV PRPHQWXP IURP movere [to move]), 
which by derivation expresses the merely vanishing. 56 
 
So this point, the moment, erupts suddenly in time and just as suddenly it vanishes. There 
VHHPWREHDWOHDVWWZRVXFKPRPHQWVLQ$EUDKDP¶VVWRU\: the moment when he presented 
KLPVHOIEHIRUH*RGWRKHDU+LVFRPPDQGZLWK WKH µ+HUH ,DP¶DQGWKHPRPHQt when he 
drew the knife. For him, however, it had to be precisely the right moment, the one moment, 
neither too early nor too late WKDW PDGH WKH GHFLVLRQ LQ IDLWK SRVVLEOH ,I µD EOLQN RI WKH
H\H«LVFRPPHQVXUDEOHZLWKWKHFRQWHQWRIWKHHWHUQDO¶ LVLWDt all possible to say at what 
SRLQWWKHµIDWHIXOFRQIOLFW¶RFFXUUHGIRU$EUDKDP" 
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:KDWLIWKRVHWZRPRPHQWVRI$EUDKDP¶VZHUHQRWWZRGLVFUHHWSRLQWVVHSDUDWHGE\WKUHH
days and three nights? $EUDKDP¶VDQQRXQFHPHQWµ+HUH,DP¶DQGWKHGUDZLQJRIWKHNQLIH 
are perhaps the same simultaneous decision; the decision itself seems to be like a vortex in 
which all logical separation dissolves and into which everything collapses including 
Abraham himself as a discrete subjective agency. The moment itself drops out of time and 
DV VXFKFDQQRWEH WKRXJKWRI DVD WHPSRUDO µFDWHJRU\¶7KHGHFLVLYHPRPHQW OLNHRQHRI
'HUULGD¶V µSRVVLEOH-LPSRVVLEOHDSRULDV¶ZDV WKHSRLQWZKHUHGHFLVLRQZDVERWKQHFHVVDU\
and yet impossible and as such an impasse that could not be negotiated through reason.  
 
7KH LGHD RI µORFXV¶ WKHQ VHHPV DQ DSSURSULDWH WHUP WR GHVFULEH WKH PRPHQW DW ZKLFK
GHFLVLRQµRFFXUV¶/RFXVLQPDWKHPDWLFVLVSRLQWRILQWHUVHFWLRQRURYHUODSSLQJRIOLQHV,WLV
HDV\WRLPDJLQH$EUDKDP¶VRUGHDOOLNHWKDWJHRPHWULFDO locus, which, instead of being the 
point where a few lines intersect, took place in an infinite mesh of coincidence; the whole 
content of eternity presented itself there.  Mathematics offers another useful way of 
conceptualising such a locus. Topology proSRVHVµWKHKDLU\GRJWKHRU\¶LI\RXFRPEDOOWKH
hairs on a dog (or a human head) in one direction there will be a point at which there is no 
hair at all ± the parting. This parting is not linear but can be defined by its perimeter as a 
kind of point or circle perhaps. The area itself is empty (no hairs grow here) and exposed. 
This theory also describes the way in which the direction of winds as they move round the 
HDUWKIRUPDNLQGRIµSDUWLQJ¶DWWKLVSRLQWWKHUHZLOOEHDF\FORQH57  It is easy to imagine 
WKHSODFHDWZKLFK$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQRFFXUUHGDVWKHSODFHLQZKLFKWKHF\FORQHRFFXUV
an overwhelming chaos of anguish and confusion. Both of these models, in their own way, 
describe the place from which Abraham makes his movement of faith.  58  Yet, an 
LQILQLWHVLPDO VSHFN RI FODULW\ UHVRXQGHG LQ WKDW WKURQJ WKH µ\HV¶ ZKLFK SUHVLGHG DW HYHU\
stage of his ordeal.  
 
 
decidere 
7KH(QJOLVKYHUE µWRGHFLGH¶FRPHVIURPWKH/DWLQ decidere, with de- PHDQLQJµRII¶DQG
caedere µWRFXW¶,Q$EUDKDP¶VPRPHQWRIGecision it is as though all routes on the plane of 
FRPSUHKHQVLRQ WKH µKRUL]RQWDO¶ SODQH DUH DOUHDG\ FXW  He could have been paralysed or 
forced to retreat but instead, in his decision, he made a movement of faith, a movement that 
.LHUNHJDDUGFDOOVµWKHOHDS¶ $EUDKDP¶VOHDSZDVOLNHDFXWRQWKHYHUWLFDOSODQHDMXPSXS
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(or down) out of that place onto another level of existence altogether. 59 Decision, then is 
also a sacrifice, it is the putting to death of human possibility for a reward that exceeds any 
earthly compensation.  
 
'RHV GHFLVLRQ FRPSULVH RI PRUH WKDQ RQH FXW" $EUDKDP¶V GHFLVLRQ ZDV PDGH LQ
anticipation of the unknown demand of God. Later, he also decided when he was on the 
verge of killing Isaac. Both of these moments effected a transformation that, for 
.LHUNHJDDUG LV WKH RXWFRPH RI $EUDKDP¶V OHDS ,W ZDV DQ LUUHYRFDEOH WXUQLQJ DURXQG D
conversion that put everything in its rightful place once more, man in relation to God and 
Isaac in relation to Abraham.  
7KLVOHDSRI$EUDKDP¶VPD\KDYHIHOt endless to him, as he lived it.  In one sense, it seems 
to span the whole length of his journey - from the moment God called him to the moment 
ZKHUHWKHUDPDSSHDUHG$WWKHVDPHWLPHLWLVOLNHWKDWµEOLQNRIDQH\H¶IURPWKHSRLQWRI
view of eternity it is over in a flash but from the point of view of subjectivity it is lived as a 
lifetime. 
« 
)RU.LHUNHJDDUGDQGDOVRLQ'HUULGD¶VWHUPVWKHUHLVQRH[SODQDWLRQWKDWFDQDGHTXDWHO\
define how Abraham was capable of his decision, made in that leap of faith. Speculative 
philosophy, in trying to give explanations to such things, according to Kierkegaard, only 
DWWHPSWVLQYDLQµWRZKLVWOHZLWKDPRXWKIXOORIFUDFNHUV¶,QWU\LQJ to explain, it actually 
denies the full meaning of whatever is being reflected upon. Kierkegaard states that all 
GHFLVLRQ LV µURRWHG LQ VXEMHFWLYLW\¶60 If subjectivity as existence is by definition not yet 
finished, then how can anything be said conclusively about it?  When truth appears it 
presents itself in the form of the paradox VD\V .LHUNHJDDUG ZKLFK µHPHUJHV IURP WKH
SODFLQJ WRJHWKHU RI WKH HWHUQDO DQG H[LVWLQJ KXPDQ EHLQJ¶  ,I DQ H[SODQDWLRQ VHHNV WR
UHPRYHWKHSDUDGR[WKHQDVNV.LHUNHJDDUGGRHVLWµDOVRUHPRYHH[LVWLQJIURPWKHH[LVWLQJ
SHUVRQ"¶61   
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In the same way, in order to H[SODLQ ZKDW LV GHFLVLYH VD\V .LHUNHJDDUG PHDQV WR µWR
WUDQVIRUPWKHH[SUHVVLRQLQWRDUKHWRULFDOORFXWLRQ¶ZKLFKDOWKRXJKQRWRYHUWO\GHQ\LQJWKH
SRVVLELOLW\RIGHFLVLRQUHODWLYLVHVLWDQGDVVXFKRQO\µDVVXPHVLWRQO\WRDFHUWDLQGHJUHH¶
This, in effect, he says, is a denial of decision: 
Decision is designed specifically to put an end to that perpetual prattle 
DERXW ³ WR DFHUWDLQGHJUHH´6R WKHGHFLVLRQ LV DVVXPHG ± but , lo and 
behold, assumed only to a certain degree. Speculative thought is not 
afraid to use expressions of decision; the only thing it fears is thinking 
something decisive with them.62  
 
6SHFXODWLYHWKRXJKWGRHVQRWH[SODLQEXWµFRUUHFWV¶DQGVXFKFRUUHFWLQJLPSRVHVWKHOLPLWV
of reason on the object of thought. It is possible WKDWDQRWKHUNLQGRIµH[SODQDWLRQ¶FDQEH
given, one which simply makes clear in what the paradox consists without trying to reduce, 
relativise or categorise it.  This kind of explanation is what Kierkegaard attempts to do.  
 
If I try to explain something according to a preconceived model, then some thought which 
contradicts my hypothesis is bound to come along, something may occur to me which 
means that I reach an impasse. I might double back on myself to check if somewhere along 
the way, I took a wrong turning, or, I might stay in the impasse trying to work through the 
contradiction. Once I have done so, I can go on my way.  A line of thought is a beautiful 
thing and enjoyable for the thinker. There is nothing wrong with wanting to preserve 
linearity if what it traces are mere abstractions - fantasies of order and purity. What 
concerned Kierkegaard, however, was not pure abstract thought, but life as a living project.  
Life is full of interruptions.  The problem with some philosophers, says Kierkegaard, is that  
they deceive themselves by ignoring contradictions that present themselves in life. They try 
WRSODFHWKHPVHOYHVRXWVLGHRUDERYHH[LVWHQFH,QVWHDGRIEHLQJµSOD\HUV¶KHVD\VWKH\DUH
merely score keepers.63 
 
nothing happened 
What was the outcome RI $EUDKDP¶V RUGHDO" )RU .LHUNHJDDUG WKHUH ZDV DQ LUUHYRFDEOH
transformation in Abraham. On the face of it though, nothing happened. Decision in the 
sense that I am using the term, after Derrida and in relation to what Kierkegaard calls faith, 
is precisely based on this absence of a quantifiable outcome. That is not to say that there is 
QRRXWFRPHDWDOO)RU$EUDKDP¶VWULDOWRVXFFHHGLWZRXOGKDYHWRDSSHDUIURPWKHRXWVLGH
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like a commonplace event: the sacrifice of an animal.  From the point of view of Abraham, 
KRZHYHU KLV µSULYDWH XQGHUWDNLQJ¶ SXW KLP WKURXJK DQ RUGHDO ZKLFK WUDQVIRUPHG KLP
absolutely.  Although he drew the knife, he did not kill Isaac; instead he sacrificed Isaac by 
wholly renouncing him whilst continuing to love him.  Sacrifice, sa\V .LHUNHJDDUG LV µWR
JLYHDZD\VRPHWKLQJRIYDOXHLQWKHLQWHUHVWRIDKLJKHUYDOXH¶64  Abraham received Isaac 
DJDLQDQGµWKHZKROHZRUOG¶KLVDQFHVWU\RQWKHSURSHUEDVLVWKDWLVDVDJLIW IURP*RG
God gave Isaac back to Abraham as though for the first time. Abraham was turned around 
once more towards God and his faith was renewed.  
In that leap, in a decisive movement which appeared to draw everything together beyond 
the categories of time and space, in a coincidence of the infinite and the finite, man and 
*RGLQWKDWEOLQNRIDQH\HLWKDSSHQHG$EUDKDP¶Vµ+HUHDP,¶KLVµ*RGZLOOSURYLGH¶
*RG¶VFRPPDQGDQGWKHYRLFHRIWKHDQJHODOOVRXQGHGDWRQFH7KHOHDSLVDGLIILFXOWWKLQJ
to arrive at, and involves all of the anguish I have spoken about, and more, but the 
movement itself is like rubbing that magic lamp. All of a sudden, everything appears as 
usual. 
$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQZDVDUHQHZDORIIDLWKWRVXFKDGHJUHHWKDWLWZDVDVWKRXJKLWKDGEHHQ
brought into existence for the very first time. How this came about is not something that can 
EHH[SODLQHGRUWDXJKW'HFLVLRQPDGHRQWKHEDVLVRIIDLWKµWKHDEVXUG¶KDVQRREVHUYDEOH
outcome and can only be made subjectively. I cannot learn how to make such decision. 
Faith is neither transmissible through the reading of the Gospels or any kind of intellectual 
examination whatsoever.  
In this chapter, I have not tried to explain decision but rather to trace its movement, to chart 
the territory of decision in terms of the moment, the locus or the point at which decision 
takes place. It has become apparent that the question of decision as I wish to explore it is 
intimately bound up with the category of faith, in the way that Kierkegaard thinks of it. 
Indeed decision must be, if Derrida is right, a movement which, like faith, is based on an 
unknowable ground of subjective existence; an existence which is not yet finished and 
therefore not objectively definable as long as I live. The leap of faith is like an instrument of 
decision, a very particular tool that makes decision in the most radical sense possible.  
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Chapter 2: Exception 
 
 
 
 
Abraham was without doubt exceptional and yet he is held up as an example. The previous 
FKDSWHUPDGHFOHDU WKHH[WUDRUGLQDU\QDWXUHRI$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQ ,Q WKLVFKDSWHU , will 
extend the notion of µORFXV¶ RI GHFLVLRQ E\ ORRNLQJ DW $EUDKDP KLPVHOI DV WKH GHFLVLYH
DJHQF\ ,I WKH OHDS RI IDLWK LV WKH µLQVWUXPHQW¶ RI GHFLVLRQ WKHQ WKH VXEMHFW LV WKH µWKLQJ
ZKLFKOHDSV¶DFDWDO\VWWKURXJKZKLFKGHFLVLRQLVHIIHFWHG$VVXFK$braham as subject, is 
DQRWKHUHOHPHQWLQZKDW,KDYHFDOOHGDµORFXV¶RIGHFLVLRQ,QWKHODVWFKDSWHUWKHPRPHQW
was seen to be non-FDWHJRUL]DEOHLQWHUPVRIWKHµSODFH¶RUµWLPH¶RIGHFLVLRQ,QWKLVFKDSWHU
, ZLOO ORRN DW *LRUJLR $JDPEHQ¶V ZULWLQJ RQ µWKH H[FHSWLRQ¶ DQG µKRPR VDFHU¶ both of 
which help to give form to Abraham as the subject through which decision takes place. 
$JDPEHQ¶VFDWHJRULHVDOVRKHOSWRVKRZWKDW$EUDKDPDVVXEMHFWLVDOVROLNHWKHPRPHQW
in the realm of the uncategorizable. 
 
who is sacred? 
,Q WKHVDPHZD\WKDW WKHFRQFHSWRIGHFLVLRQFDQQRWEHµH[SODLQHG¶H[FHSWE\OHDYLQJRXW
the inexplicable, so too it would be hopeless to try to explain Abraham in terms of any 
philosophical model without first editing out his contradictions. However, another historical 
LQGLYLGXDO UHVRQDWHV ZLWK $EUDKDP DQG PLJKW JR VRPH ZD\ WRZDUGV LI QRW µH[SODLQLQJ¶
then at least reconfiguring him and giving him some kind of earthly context. That individual 
is homo sacer. 
Giorgio Agamben, in his book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life uses Carl 
6FKPLWW¶VZULWLQJRQVRYHUHLJQGHFLVLRQDVµKHZKRGHFLGHVRQWKHVWDWHRIH[FHSWLRQ¶DVD
key reference points.  The sovereign is at the same time outside and inside the law. He (as it 
ZDVDµKH¶KDV WKH OHJal power to suspend the law, thereby placing himself outside.  The 
paradox lies in the fact that, as Agamben says, this placing oneself outside the law means  
µ, WKH VRYHUHLJQZKR DPRXWVLGH WKH ODZ GHFODUH WKDW WKHUH LV QRWKLQJRXWVLGH WKH ODZ¶
The sRYHUHLJQ¶V VWDWXV LQ ZKLFK KH H[FOXGHV KLPVHOI IURP WKH DEVROXWH UXOHV ZKLFK KH
LPSRVHVRQRWKHUVFRQVWLWXWHVWKHQRWLRQRIµWKHH[FHSWLRQ¶VRPHWKLQJZKLFK$JDPEHQVHWV
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RXW WR H[DPLQH LQ KLV ERRN +H DOVR OLQNV WKH QRWLRQ RI VRYHUHLJQW\ WR SRZHU RYHU µEDUe 
OLIH¶65  
 
At the beginning of Homo Sacer, Agamben claims that we tend to think of the political 
realm as being where the rights of citizens, free will and social contracts are upheld.  
+RZHYHU KH VD\V IURP WKHSRLQW RI YLHZRI VRYHUHLJQW\RQO\ µEDUH OLIH¶ LV DXWKHQWLFDOO\
political.  What distinguishes us as human beings rather than simply living beings had 
already been thought through by Aristotle. A living being who has a political life is human, 
as is one who has language.  Agamben reminds us that the Greeks had no single term to 
GHVFULEHµOLIH¶7KHVLPSOHIDFWRIOLYLQJFRPPRQWRDOOOLYLQJEHLQJVZDVFDOOHGzoë, which, 
says Agamben, has no plural. The means of livelihood or way of living particular to an 
individual or group was bios OLWHUDOO\µOLIH¶EXWDOVRµWKHSUHVHQWVWDWHRIH[LVWHQFH¶In the 
classical world the city, polis, the public sphere was where a particular way of life was 
upheld, the life of polites, the citizen.  Natural life, (bios) is something which became 
excluded from polis.66  
 
What Agamben asks us to look at in Homo Sacer, is a life which occupies neither the 
territory of political bios nor that of natural zoë EXW UDWKHU ZKDW KH FDOOV D µ]RQH RI
LQGLVWLQFWLRQ¶WKHVDFUHG7KHILUVWWLPHµVDFUHGQHVVLVWLHGWRDKXPDQOLIH¶, he says, is in 
the treatise by Pompeuis Vestus FDOOHG µ2Q WKH 6LJQLILFDQFH RI ZRUGV¶ XQGHU WKH WLWOH RI
sacer mons (homo sacer).   The most ancient form of capital punishment, Agamben says, is 
not the putting to death of someone for a crime but the purification rite.  In the purification 
ULWHWKHVDFUHGPDQZDVVHHQDVµEDG¶RUµLPSXUH¶DQGVWULSSHGRIKLVVWDWXVDVDµSHUVRQ¶
Usually the act of consecration changes the status of an object from profane to sacred. 
Homo sacer KRZHYHULVµVLPSO\VHWRXWVLde human jurisdiction without being brought into 
WKH UHDOPRIGLYLQH ODZ¶ 7RGHVWUR\D VDFUHGREMHFWZRXOGQRUPDOO\FRQVWLWXWH VDFULOHJH
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and was illegal, but in this case it was legal to kill homo sacer.  What distinguishes homo 
sacer is that he can be killed with impunity but not sacrificed:  
Just as the law, in the sovereign exception, applies to the exceptional case 
in no longer applying and in withdrawing from it, so homo sacer belongs 
to God in the form on unsacrificeability and is included in the community 
in the form of being able to be killed. Life that cannot be sacrificed and 
yet may be killed is sacred life 67 
 
µ:KDWLVWKHOLIHRIWKHhomo sacer¶DVNV$JDPEHQµLILWLVVLWXDWHGDWWKHLQWHUVHFWLRQRID
capacity to be killed and yet not sacrificHGRXWVLGHERWKKXPDQDQGGLYLQHODZ"¶68 
If classical politics comes about through the separation of the two spheres, bios and 
zoëthen the life of homo sacerµLVWKHKLQJHRQZKLFKHDFKVSKHUHLVDUWLFXODWHGDQGWKH
WKUHVKROGDWZKLFKWKHWZRDUHMRLQHGLQEHFRPLQJLQGHWHUPLQDEOH¶7KHSHFXOLDUVWDWXVRI
sacred life is that it occupies neither sphere but at the same time belongs to both spheres. It 
LV VD\V$JDPEHQ VLWXDWHG LQ WKDW µ]RQHRI LQGLVWLQFWLRQ LQZKLFK zoë and bios constitute 
HDFKRWKHULQLQFOXGLQJDQGH[FOXGLQJHDFKRWKHU¶ Homo sacer is not protected from any 
recognised forms of divine or human law and as such is H[SRVHGWRDYLROHQFHZKLFKµRSHQV
a sphere of human action that is neither the sphere of sacrum facere nor that of profane 
DFWLRQ¶69 
In a sense, the status of homo sacer is not as unusual as it might seem. In ancient Rome, a 
father has the right to kill his son with impunity. This power, bestowed on the father, 
contradicted the principles in Roman law which forbade that a citizen be put to death 
without trial.70 
The intricacies of Roman law, its implications for contemporary life and the complex set of 
relations that Agamben discusses are too much for this discussion and cannot be done 
justice to here.71 However, what has been briefly touched upon may help to imagine 
Abraham, not merely as an abstract concept or mythical being but, through the category of 
homo sacer and the exception, as someone living in a social and political context. 
 
Whilst homo sacer is not the same as Abraham, or subject to the same laws, divine or 
KXPDQ $EUDKDP¶V SHFXOLDU VLWXDWLRQ VHHPV WR HFKR KLV  /LNH $EUDKDP LW LV GLIILFXOW WR 
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imagine how homo sacer would appear in the world.  Presumably, if he were subject to 
being killed with impunity then he would not be protected by the walls of a prison but 
would be living amongst the population. Would he be set apart by his appearance, his 
apparel or some mark on his person, in an open invitation to brutality?  Or, would he appear 
like a poor man (it is hard to believe that he would have the means to live well) going about 
his business?  I imagine a person, of which there are so many in cities to this day, whom 
one would not notice, not for the fact that there are so many other people, but because of 
that kind of averted posture and deflecting gaze which renders them invisible. Sometimes, it 
is also the vulnerability of a person that makes one look away.  Either might have been the 
case of homo sacer. 72 
 
It is difficult to envisage such historical and enigmatic characters such as Abraham and 
homo sacer. However, it is possible to see that it may not only have been Abraham but 
Isaac too who aSSHDU WR LQKDELW WKDW µ]RQH RI LQGLVWLQFWLRQ¶ ZKHUH VRPH KXPDQ EHLQJV
µEHORQJ¶LQGHHG$JDPEHQ¶VTXHVWLRQEHFRPHV'RZHQRWDOOEHORQJWKHUH"$WWKHVDPH
time, they become indistinguishable one from the other. Father and son, both exceptions, 
take on the shape of that sacred man.  
 
$EUDKDP LV SDUDGHG DV DQ H[DPSOH IRU &KULVWLDQV µWKH IDWKHU RI IDLWK¶ .LHUNHJDDUG¶V
rendition of him in Fear and Trembling presents him as unfathomable and the idea of doing 
as he did as an absurdity. How, then, can Abraham be an example for any human being? 
Abraham is an example but he is also an exception.   The exception is also the example, 
says Agamben.  
 
In Homo Sacer, Agamben describes both the relation and the distinction between these two 
states.   The example belongs to a class of entities. By virtue of being selected or showing 
LWVHOIWREHORQJWRWKDWFODVVKRZHYHULWPXVWVWHSRXWRILWµLQWKHYHU\PRPHQWLQZKLFKLW
H[KLELWVLWVRZQEHORQJLQJ¶7KHH[DPSOHWKHQERWKEHORQJVDQGQRORQJHUEHORQJVWRWKH
class.  If, says Agamben, one had to say whether the rule that applied to the class also 
applied to the example, the answer would be far from straight-forward. The rule applies to 
WKHH[DPSOHRQO\LILWLVDµQRUPDOFDVH¶LQWKHFODVV,WVVWDWXVDVµWKHH[DPSOH¶H[FOXGHVLW
IURPEHLQJDµQRUPDOFDVH¶7KHH[DPSOHLVµH[FOXGHGIURPWKHQRUPDOFDVHQRWEHFDXVHLW
GRHVQRWEHORQJWRLWEXWRQWKHFRQWUDU\EHFDXVHLWH[KLELWVLWVRZQEHORQJLQJWRLW¶,WLV
µH[FOXVLYHLQFOXVLRQ¶. 
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By contrast, the exception is included in the normal case by virtue of not belonging to it. 
This is because non-belonging to a class can only be demonstrated from within the class.  
At the same time since it is immune from the general rule, it is a kind of exclusion.  
However, it still maLQWDLQVDUHODWLRQWRWKHUXOHLQWKDWWKHUXOHµapplies to the exception in 
QR ORQJHUDSSO\LQJ  LQZLWKGUDZLQJ IURPLW¶  6R WKHH[FHSWLRQ LVQRW µVLPSO\H[FOXGHG¶
VD\V$JDPEHQEXW µtaken outside (ex-capere)¶  7KHH[FHSWLRQ µVHUYHV WR LQFOXGHZKDW LV
H[FOXGHG¶DQGDVVXFKLVµLQFOXVLYHH[FOXVLRQ¶  
 
µ,Q DQ\ ORJLFDO V\VWHP MXVW DV LQ HYHU\ VRFLDO V\VWHP WKH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ RXWVLGH DQG
LQVLGHVWUDQJHQHVVDQGLQWLPDF\LVWKLVFRPSOLFDWHG¶VD\V$JDPEHQ 73 
 
2I FRXUVH µRXWVLGH¶ DQG µLQVLGH¶ DV ILJXUHV of speech are useful only to conceptualise a 
VSKHUH LQ WHUPVRI LWVPRVWJHQHUDOERXQGDULHVPXFK LQZD\ WKDW µEHIRUH¶DQGµDIWHU¶FDQ
GHOLQHDWH D WHPSRUDOLW\ RI WKH µQRZ¶ 6XFK WHUPV DUH RI OLWWOH XVH LQ KHOSLQJ WR WKLQN WKH
question of this threshold catHJRU\ ZKLFK $JDPEHQ FDOOV µWKH H[FHSWLRQ¶ HLWKHU
FRQFHSWXDOO\ RU DV D OLYHG UHDOLW\  $JDPEHQ¶V LQWHUURJDWLRQ RI WKH WHUPV µH[DPSOH¶ DQG
µH[FHSWLRQ¶VKRZMXVWKRZGLIILFXOWLWLVWRIXOO\FRPSUHKHQGWKHµ]RQHRILQGLVWLQFWLRQ¶LQ
which homo sacer finds himself situated, and in which by extension, all of us may find 
ourselves, when subject to the law, the command of God or the mechanism of decision.    
 
What does this tell us about Abraham? Abraham as both the not yet Abraham (the one who 
VDLG µ\HV¶ DQG WKe no longer Abraham (the one who drew the knife), in the moment of 
decision, no longer belonged to the social or ethical order of things. He was no longer in 
possession of himself. He was an exception since, by being willing to kill his own offspring, 
he took himself outside of humanity: what he knew himself to be capable of was in excess 
of what might be called human. At the same time, he was an example: he remained 
profoundly human in that he continuing to love Isaac and showed his belonging to the class 
of humans through his suffering.  At that moment of decision as both example and 
exception, he was uniquely uncategorizable.   
Man, says Kierkegaard, is a synthesis of psyche and body, the third term of which is spirit. 
Man is also a synthesis of the temporal and the HWHUQDOµWKHWKLUGWHUP¶LQWKLVFDVHEHLQJ
the present (which is also the eternal and which exists in that paradoxical moment) 74 
$EUDKDPDFFRUGLQJWR'HUULGDLVDOVRDV\QWKHVLVRIµWKHPRVWPRUDODQGPRVWLPPRUDOWKH
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most responsible and WKH PRVW LUUHVSRQVLEOH¶ 75 7KH µWKLUG WHUP¶ RI 'HUULGD¶V V\QWKHVLV
FRXOGEHWKRXJKWRIDV$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQHIIHFWHGLQIDLWKLQDEVROXWHUHVSRQVLELOLW\WKH
responsibility which is in excess of responsibility) and in the moment. Abraham, as 
subjective agency, was the ground of a decision which was, at the same time, a synthesis of 
categories (that is, as Derrida says, the ground in which the moral, immoral and so on 
FRLQFLGHDQGDFXWWLQJDZD\IURPWKRVHFDWHJRULHVWRZKLFKKHµEHORQJHG¶ 
Abraham, like homo sacer, had the shape of a man, but it is difficult to think of him as a 
human being in the usual sense of the term. Thus, what emerges in the figure of Abraham, 
WKURXJK$JDPEHQ¶VPRGHORIWKHH[FHSWLRQLV$EUDKDPDVDSDUDGR[,QHIIHFWLWLVQROess 
WKDQ WKH NLQG RI µV\QWKHVLV¶ ZKLFK .LHUNHJDDUG SURSRVHV DV WKH UHDOLW\ RI DQ\ KXPDQ
existence.  Such a synthesis is not a resolution but rather a kind of holding together of 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQV 7KURXJK $EUDKDP WKH SDUDGR[ PRYHV DV LI KH WRR LV µWKH QRZ¶ DWRSRQ, 
µWKDWZKLFKKDVQRSODFH¶ and like the state of exception is unlocalizable.76   
 
an example 
The liminal space of exception opened up through homo sacer is an exploration of the limits 
of decidability not as an abstract concept but as lived through the subject. The life which 
occupies this territory exists at the threshold of categories designates some life as worthy of 
WKHULJKWVDQGSURWHFWLRQVRIWKHµKXPDQ¶RUWKHµSHUVRQ¶DQGRWKHUVDVKDYLQJWKHVWDWXVRID
µWKLQJ¶$WZKDWSRLQWGRHVDKXPDQEHLQJFHDVHWREHDKXPDQDQGEHFRPHDµWKLQJ¶"7KH
living being is not only subject to such decision but lives it out in as embodied existence. 
Whether all such beings can be said to live it out subjectively is what is in question here. To 
have subjectivityWREHVXEMHFWLVDOVRDGHVLJQDWLRQRIµKXPDQLW\¶7KRVHZKRRFFXS\WKH
category of the exception are denied such a clear status.   
 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VHPSKDVLV LV DOZD\VRQ WKH VXEMHFWLYH DOONQRZOHGJHDOOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ DOO
external law and conventions arH DSSURSULDWHG VXEMHFWLYHO\ :KDW WKHQ RI $EUDKDP¶V
subjectivity? This category of the exception, as I have said, is also what Kierkegaard calls 
the paradox that is human existence. Subjectivity, then, is not something that can be 
µGHVLJQDWHG¶DVDIL[HGFategory as such. It is rather like the point at which all external (and 
often contradictory) categories of life coincide: the biological, social, political, legal and so 
on.   
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In The Open: Man and Animal, Agamben explores the way in which the status of human 
life is decided in another context. +HUHKHTXHVWLRQV WKHSULYLOHJHG VWDWXV RI µWKHKXPDQ¶
RYHUµWKHDQLPDO¶DQGH[DPLQHVWKHVSDFHVZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHWKDWGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHVSKHUHV
of the medical, social, ethical, political, legal and so on). Agamben looks at states of life 
which seem to exist on the borderline, or the caesuraZKLFKKHFDOOVµEDUHOLIH¶7KHERRN
XVHV +HLGHJJHU¶V H[DPLQDWLRQ RI DQLPDOLW\ ZKLFK LV LQ LWVHOI D UHVSRQVH WR WKH SRHP E\
Rilke, The Eighth Duino Elegy. He describes the problem that Heidegger draws attention to 
as follows: 
Dasein is simply an animal that has learned to become bored; it has 
awakened from its own captivation to its own captivation. This 
awakening of the living being to its own being-captivated, this anxious 
and resolute opening to a not-open, is the human.77 
 
Jean-Luc Nancy asks whether the way in which Heidegger talks of animality could be 
WKRXJKWRIDVDµVDGQHVV¶RIWKHKXPDQDWEHLQJµGHSULYHGRIWUXWK¶78 Such deprivation is 
also that of freedom.  
 
The questions that Agamben raises all require decisions (again medical, social, political, 
legal and so on) made on behalf of myself or another. In terms of such decisions, says 
Derrida,  µ:HNQRZOHVVWKDQHYHUZKHUHWRFXW¶.79 The problem once more comes back to 
agency; who chooses to or is ordained to decide? 
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discussion with Elena Carnell and Anthony McElville, November 2004 
 
 
In order to take this discussion further, I would ask you to now play the DVD entitled 
µGLVFXVVLRQZLWK(OHQD&DUQHOODQG$QWKRQ\0F(OYLOOH1RYHPEHU¶,WLVDUHFRUGLQJ
of a conversation between two speakers at a public symposium on art and philosophy that I 
helped to organise. The DVD is attached to the back cover of this document. The quality of 
the sound is slightly faint at first and I must apologise for this. However, there is a transcript 
of the discussion in Supplement 1.80 
 
At the beginning of the recording is my introduction and since it is very faint, I will give the 
background to the discussion here.  In my introduction I was explaining that initially I had 
invited Anthony McElville (philosopher) and Vanessa Brooks (artist and writer) to 
SDUWLFLSDWHDWWKHFRQIHUHQFHLQDQµLQFRQYHUVDWLRQ¶IRUPDW:HGHFLGHGWRXVHWKLVTXRWHDV
from Repetition as a starting point for their discussion: 
 
Who tricked me into this whole thing and leaves me standing here? Who am I? How 
did I get into the world? Why was I not asked about it, why was I not informed of 
the rules...How did I get involved in this big enterprise called actuality? Why should 
,EH LQYROYHG" ,VQ¶W LWDPDWWHURI FKRLFH"$QG LI , DPFRPSHOOHG WREH LQYROYHG
where is the manager.  To whom shall I make my complaint? 81 
 
Vanessa Brooks, however, had to cancel at the very last minute. Fortunately, an academic 
called Elena Carnell made herself known to me and generously volunteered to take 
9DQHVVD¶V SODFH  6KH LV 3URIHVVRU LQ 3KLORVRSK\ RI 6FLHQFH DW 8QLYHUVLW\ RI *XHOSK
Ontario, Canada.  Anthony McElville is Reader in Philosophy and Aesthetics at Vanderbilt 
University. His work traverses various disciplines including anthropology, politics and 
cultural history. Crossing the Line: animal life from Spinoza to Deleuze (1997, Suny series 
in Contemporary Continental Philosophy and more recently Creating the Human: art, 
brutality, modernism, Stanford University Press).  
 
Please play the DVD now. The running time is approximately 38 minutes. When you have 
finished watching the DVD, I would suggest reading the Supplement on p119 before 
resuming your reading of this text.  I have put a coloured dot at the top of the page so that 
you can find your place again easily. 
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   «$QGZHZHVWD\VSHFWDWRUVWXUQHGWRZDUGV 
   all things and still transcending none.  
   All overwhelms us. We set all in order. 
   All falls apart. We order it once more 
   and fall, collapse , disintegrate ourselves. 
 
   How were we first persuaded to perform 
   our every act as though it were our last? 
 
                                  Rainer Maria Rilke 
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Chapter 3: Obedience 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter put into question the agency of decision; who or what decides? What 
does legislation, birthright, learning or any externally determined circumstance, bestow on a 
person and what level of agency do they have, if any, in altering these externally enforces 
OLPLWDWLRQVRU GHPDQGV" 7KLV FKDSWHU ORRNVDW WKHTXHVWLRQRI$EUDKDP¶VREHGLHQFH DQG
examines in what way he might be said to have exercised his own agency in the decision of 
faith.  
 
According to Kierkegaard (and to Christianity) God must remain hidden. How was it then 
that Abraham was able to hear Gods command? And how could he know that if he heard a 
voice, that it was God who spoke to him?  
$ VLQJHU GRHV QRW µVSHDN¶ LQ WKH QRUPDO VHQVH EXW UDWKHU WKHLU YRLFH FRPPXQLFDWHV LQ D
different way from their everyday voice.  It is tempting to infer that song also comes from a 
GLIIHUHQWµSODFH¶WKDQRUGLQDU\VSHHFK3HUKDSVLWLVSRVVLEOHWRWKLQNRI$EUDKDPµVLQJLQJ¶
KLV UHVSRQVH µ+HUHDP ,¶ WR*RG LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK VRPHWKLQJ µRWKHU¶ WKDQKLs everyday 
VHOI:KDWLVDWLVVXHKHUHLQERWK*RG¶VFRPPDQGDQG$EUDKDP¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKDWFDOOLV
what is in question in the notion of obedience. Who or what was it that decided to obey:  the 
not yet Abraham or the no longer $EUDKDP")URPZKDWµSODFH¶Zas that decision made? 
 
subditus 
eWLHQQH%DOLEDU¶VGLVFXVVLRQ µ&LWL]HQ6XEMHFW¶GUDZVDWWHQWLRQ WR VRPHGLVWLQFWLRQVZKLFK
(once again) come from Roman law and which help to think through the question of 
obedience with regard to Abraham.  
 
In part of his essay, Balibar presents the notion of the subject as subditus, meaning one who 
has entered into a relationship of obedience to the sublimus, that is the sovereign prince who 
has been  µFKRVHQµWRFRPPDQG7KHsubditi , the subjects, turn to him to hear the law.   
 36 
Obedience, says Balibar,  
 
«LQVWLWXWHVWKHFRPPDQGRIWKHKLJKHURYHUORZHUEXWLWIXQGDPHQWDOO\
comes from below: as subditi, the subjects will their own obedience. And 
if they will it,  it is because it is inscribed in an economy of creation ( 
their creation) and salvation ( their salvation, that of each taken 
individually and of all taken collectively)  the loyal subject (fidèle sujet) , 
KHZKR³YROXQWDULO\´³OR\DOO\´WKDWLVDFWLYHO\DQGZLOOLQJO\REH\VWKH
law and executes the orders of a legitimate sovereign ), is necessarily a 
faithful subject (sujet fidèle). He is a Christian, who knows that all power 
comes from God. In obeying the law of the prince he obeys God.82 
         
The subject as servus, by contrast, is forced to obey, in the relation of slave to master.  What 
the Christian responds to is the sovereign as a divided entity, that is as both human and 
GLYLQH*RGVSHDNV WKURXJKWKHSULQFH7KLVVD\V%DOLEDU LQVWLJDWHVDQµLQILQLWHGLDOHFWLF¶
which both unifies and divides the subjeFW:KDWKHFDOOVµREHGLHQFH¶LVWKHUHVSRQVHERUQH
of such a dialectic. The Stoics suggested another level of division within the subject through 
the SDUDGR[LFDOQRWLRQRIµIUHHREHGLHQFH¶,  which proposed that if it were possible for the 
mind to be free even though the body was not, then a slave can also be free. This other level 
RIIUHHGRPLPSOLHVVD\V%DOLEDUWKHQRWLRQRIµWKHVRXO¶µ7KHPLQG¶RUµWKHVRXO¶QHHGVWR
be thought of as something that is on another register of existence to the body, that is not on 
WKHQDWXUDOSODQHµ>7KH] soul must come to name a supernatural part of the individual that 
KHDUVWKHGLYLQLW\RIWKHRUGHU¶VD\V%DOLEDU83 
 
The idea of subditus-subjectus, the one who willingly obeys, has always been separate from 
the idea of the slave says Balibar, just as with the sublimus, WKH QRWLRQ RI DQ µRUGDLQHG¶
authority is separate from the despot.  The life of the Christian, unlike that of the slave,  was 
QRW WUHDWHG OLNH D µWKLQJ¶ E\ WKH VRYHUHLJQ ERWK VRYHUHLJQ DQG &KULVWLDQ HQtered into an 
apparently mutual agreement. Obedience to the sovereign brought salvation to the Christian 
DQG LQ UHWXUQ WKH SULQFH KDG D UHVSRQVLELOW\ WRZDUGV KLP DV D NLQG RI µJXDUGLDQ¶ RI KLV
salvation. To say that the Christian obeyed µZLWKKLVVRXO¶FDQ be interpreted in two ways 
VD\V%DOLEDUHLWKHUDVDQDFWLYHDQGZLOOLQJSDUWLFLSDWLRQµFRRSHUDWLQJ¶LQRQHVVDOYDWLRQ
or the annihilation of the will. 84 Whichever one of these was the case, they are both 
decisions that the Christian must make by themselves. The will is not annihilated without an 
active relinquishing on the part of the subject. If it were then there would be no spiritual 
HIIRUWRUHQJDJHPHQWDQGQRVDOYDWLRQZRXOGEHµHDUQHG¶ 
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This theological model was not the only way of thinking about such a divided subject. In 
political terms the separation between a subject and a slave was like the distinction of the 
citizen from the zÔon politikon WKH µVRFLDEOH DQLPDO¶ 7KRPDV $TXLQDV IRU H[DPSOH
according to Balibar, distinguishes between man as christianitas (supernatural) and 
KXPDQLWDV QDWXUDO  µWKH EHOLHYHU¶ DQG µWKH FLWL]HQ¶.  The citizen submits to political 
authority by being submitted as a member of an order or body that is recognized as having 
FHUWDLQULJKWVRUVWDWXVLH¶IDWKHU¶. Here, says Balibar, it becomes more difficult to think 
of him in terms of subditus+LVREHGLHQFHKHVD\VEHFRPHVµPHQDFHG¶85.  
 
,Q WKH OLJKW RI WKLVPXFK FRQGHQVHG YHUVLRQ RI %DOLEDU¶V GLVFXVVLRQ LV LW QRZ SRVVLEOH WR
think of Abraham as both hearing anG REH\LQJ µZLWK KLV VRXO¶"  %DOLEDU  E\ SRVLWLQJ D
dialectical model in the case of the subditus, suggests a subjectivity which consists of 
factions with vying interests; political versus spiritual, personal versus legal and so on. The 
notion of obedience rather than servitude situates the free individual at the centre of those 
factions, as one who can decide to submit, rather than one who is forced to do so , because it 
safeguards their own (eternal) salvation.  Another word for obedience might well be faith, 
EXW LQ $EUDKDP¶V FDVH ZKDW ZDV EHLQJ VDIHJXDUGHG WKURXJK KLV WULDO ZDV QRW KLV RZQ
HWHUQDOVDOYDWLRQEXWUDWKHUKLVOLIHKLVVRQ¶VOLIHDQGWKDWRIDOORIKLVGHVFHQGHQWVRQWKLV
earth.  
 
The notion of obedience in Balibar, by introducing the divided and dialectical subject, 
opens up a space of communication which is not of a material order. The soul, with which 
the subditus hears and REH\V LV SHUKDSV ZKDW 'HUULGD FDOOV µWKH LQHOXFWDEOH¶ 'HUULGD
invents a word, désistance, which whilst related to the verb désister, does not actually exist 
LQ)UHQFK$OWKRXJKµWRGHVLVW¶LQ(QJOLVKPHDQVµWRVWDQGGRZQ¶RUµWRDEVWDLQ¶LQ)UHQFK
désister  WRGHVLVWLVWUDQVODWHGPRUHDVµWRZLWKGUDZ¶Désistance LVDQRWKHUZRUGIRUµWKH
LQHOXFWDEOH¶7KH LQHOXFtable is experienced in at least two ways, says Derrida.  One is a 
kind of inevitability or acceptance of events that happen to me. Such events µwhich come 
upon me or to which I come¶ are accidental and do not impinge on my freedom as such. 
µ7KH\GRQRWFRnstitute me. I am constituted without it¶says Derrida. A second experience 
RIWKHLQHOXFWDEOHDSSHDUVWRKDYHµDOUHDG\KDSSHQHG¶I arrive on the scene as a latecomer 
but nonetheless do not remain outsider. Instead, I undergo that which has already begun: 
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If I insist upon remaining the subject of this experience, it would have to 
be as a prescribed, pre-inscribed subject, marked in advance by the 
imprint of the ineluctable that constitutes this subject without belonging 
to it, and that this subject cannot appropriate even if the imprint appears 
to be properly its own.86 
 
+HUH VD\V'HUULGD WKHRXWOLQHVRIZKDWKHFDOOV µ a certain constitutive désistance of the 
VXEMHFW¶ EHJLQV WR HPHUJH 7KLV LV QRW DV KH VD\V D µGHVWLWXWLRQ¶ EXW UDWKHU D
µGHFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶OLNHDNLQGRIGHIHUUDORIbeing constituted . 87  Certainly this is like a kind 
RI UHVLVWDQFH RI WKH VXEMHFW WR µEHLQJ PDUNHG LQ DGYDQFH¶ EXW LW LV DOVR D NLQG RI OLYLQJ
alongside, the ineluctable, as something which can neither be appropriated as its own nor 
SXVKHGDZD\7KLVµOLYLQJDORQJVLGH¶LVDZLWKGUDZDORIVRUWVDQGDJDLQLQWURGXFHVDVFKLVP
or separation in the idea of the subject. 
 
(OVHZKHUH 'HUULGD VSHDNV RI D µGHKLVFHQFH¶ DW WKH KHDUW RI VXEMHFWLYLW\ 'HKLVFHQFH
describes a movement or action whereby something begins to gape or to peel away from 
LWVHOI'HUULGDDOVRGHVFULEHVGHKLVFHQFHDVDQµLQWULQVLFGLVORFDWLRQ¶ 88  Perhaps desistance, 
that movement which Derrida describes in those two experiences of the ineluctable as 
something undergone by a subject in a kind of self-willed undoing, or a movement RIµXQ-
UHVLVWLQJ¶ or voluntary withdrawal, produces the opening, the déhiscence at the centre of the 
subject?   The subditus, as the one who puts him or herself (willingly)  in a relation of 
subjection through obedience may also be defined in terms of dis-locatedness.  Through 
dislocation, the empty space or the DWRSRQ µWKDW ZKLFK KDV QR SODFH¶ appears and in 
which the ineluctable may make its demand heard.  
 
Abraham was called by God to obey his command, but the decision to obey was his. 
Whatever level of submission can be attributed to him, he did deliberately and fully 
undertake to submit himself.   
 
the calling 
Kierkegaard seemed to be advocating, through Abraham, something that was for the most 
exceptional kind of individual. It was not only what Abraham was able to do that made him 
exceptional but also the fact that he was chosen in the first place. (God summons me, I do 
                                                   
86
 -'HUULGDµ,QWURGXFWLRQ'HVLVWDQFH¶LQTypography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics. US: Stanford 
University Press, 1998. p.2. 
87
 Ibid pp.1-2. 
88
 ,WLVDQµHIIHFW¶LI\RXlike, of undergoing deconstruction.  Derrida in  Cadava, E., Connor, P. and 
Nancy, J. L. (Eds). Who Comes After the Subject? London: Routledge, p.103. 
 39 
not summon God.)  Obedience then comes from a certain privilege as well as responsibility. 
To be a chosen one must be the rarest occurrence. Since it is so rare and since I would be so 
special to be called by God, if I were called would I feel so overwhelmed, so grateful or so 
surprised at being chosen that I would, without hesitation, do his bidding?   Yet, asks 
George Steiner: 
 
How does a human being know that he/she is being summoned by God? 
How can human sensibility and intellect differentiate between ecstatic, 
deeply felt intimation of divine solicitation, whose actual sources are 
those of personal need or emotion, and the authentic word of God? 89 
 
The origin of the call, says Derrida, iVµQRWµ³KXPDQ´QRPRUHWKDQLWLVµGLYLQH¶EXWWKLV
GRHV QRW µFRPH GRZQ WR FDOOLQJ LW LQKXPDQ¶ 1HYHUWKHOHVV µVRPHWKLQJ RI WKH FDOO PXVW
remain non-LGHQWLILDEOH QRQ VXEMHFWLYHDEOH¶90 Can this unknown which cannot be 
assimilated be refused, since it comes upon me before I know it? 
 
7KLV LGHDRI µWKHFDOOLQJ¶ZDVQRWRQO\ WKHRUHWLFDO IRU.LHUNHJDDUGEXW DW WKHKHDUWRI DQ
actual event which was to haunt him throughout his life. Adolph Peter Adler was pastor in 
the Danish island of Bornholm who became a Magister of Theology and, like many at the 
time, a great follower of Hegel.  In 1842, he claimed to have had a revelation from Christ 
which turned him against Hegel and commanded him to burn all of his previous writings. 
He was informed that he would be dictated a new work in revelation.  In 1843 (the year 
that Fear and Trembling was published) he published four books simultaneously of sacred 
verses and insights that he claimed were from Jesus.  Kierkegaard, who knew Adler, 
bought the books and subsequently wrote The Book on Adler, a scathing critique of Adler.  
Despite his scepticism, there remained for Kierkegaard the possibility that Adler had in fact 
received direct communication from Christ.  Even if he felt that the manner in which Adler 
expressed himself was undignified or that he was potentially prone to hallucinations or 
delusions, his claim was immune to all criticism; it was indefensible, but as Kierkegaard 
himself admitted, at the same time inviolable. How could he know for sure that Adler was 
not speaking the truth? 
 
Adler was suspended from his position in 1844 and later admitted that he may have 
exaggerated his claim when he said that he had had a revelation. He later published other 
ZRUNVZKHUHKHFODLPHGWKDWKLVIRUPHUµUHYHODWRU\ZRUN¶ZDVLQVWead a work of genius.  
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The situation that Kierkegaard was trying to come to terms with in the writing of Fear and 
Trembling through the figure of Abraham, came to life in the form of Adler.  However, 
Adler became an object of both envy and fear for Kierkegaard; the man was either a 
PDGPDQ RU DQ DSRVWOH RI &KULVW DQG QRWKLQJ LQ .LHUNHJDDUG¶V SRZHUV FRXOG GLVFRYHU WKH
truth.  
 
By claiming that he had a revelation from God and that he had been chosed to deliver this 
revelation to humanity, Adler was announcing that he was an apostle, something that  
would have seemed outrageous to Kierkegaard. It is easy to imagine his  frustration.  An 
apostle  (from the Greek apostolos, meaning one who is sent, i.e. by God) would never 
make such a boastful claim. µ'RHVWKLVHOHFWLRQJORULI\WKH$SRVWOH"¶DVNV6WHLQHUµ2QWKH
contrary argues Kierkegaard. The authenticating mark of the apostolic is an existential 
KXPLOLW\RIWKHPRVWUDGLFDONLQG¶91   However, Adler by speaking out in such a way,  could 
also be the mocked and  ridiculed outsider, who is also the true apostle. 
 
The fact that Adler later claimed he was a genius, not an apostle did not resolve the matter. 
A genius, says Kierkegaard, is born ( Genius from the Latin ingenium, means inborn talent 
or ability). The apostle is not born but sent by God on a mission: 
 
A genius and an apostle are qualitatively distinct, they are categories 
which belong each of them to their own qualitative spheres: that of 
immanence and that of transcendence«7KH JHQLXV LV ZKDW KH LV E\
reason of himself, i. e. by what he is in himself: an apostle is what he is 
by reason of his divine authority.92 
 
Either claim was problematic for Kierkegaard.  If Adler really was the recipient of a 
revelation then how could he turn round and claim it as his own work of genius?  Whatever 
the truth of the case of Adler what remained for Kierkegaard was the impossibility of ever 
knowing for sure what took place.  At the interior of ourselves,  the place at which the 
unknown summons us is always sealed off, untransmissable, unpresentable and 
unjustifiable. 
 
)RU6WHLQHUµ7KHFUX[RIWKH$GOHUDIIDLULVWKDWRI³FDOOLQJ´LQWKHYHU\VWURQJHVWVHQVHRI
WKHWHUP¶ 93   
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<HW WKLV HQWLW\ WKDW , KDYH SHUVLVWHQWO\ FDOOHG *RG µWKH XQNQRZQ VRPHWKLQJ¶ DQG WKDW
KierkegaaUG LQVLVWV LV WUDQVFHQGHQW DV µQRQ¶ RU µVXSHU¶ KXPDQ WKH ineluctable, can also 
figure, as Derrida suggests, as part of  µWKDWVWUXFWXUHRILQYLVLEOHLQWHULRULW\¶WKDWLVFDOOHG
LQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VVHQVHµVXEMHFWLYLW\¶ 
 
We should stop thinking about God as someone over there, transcendent 
[....] Then we might say; God is the name of the possibility I have of 
keeping a secret that is visible from the interior but not from the exterior. 
Once such a structure of conscience exists, of being-with-oneself, of 
speaking, that is, of producing invisible sense, once I have within me,  
thanks to the invisible word as such, a witness that others cannot see, and 
who is therefore at the same time other than me and more intimate with 
me than myself, once I can have a secret relationship with myself and not 
tell everything, once there is secrecy and secret witnessing within me, 
then what I call God exists, (there is) what I call God in me, (it happens 
that) I call myself God ± a phrase that is difficult to distinguish froP³
*RGFDOOVPH´IRU LW LVRQWKDWFRQGLWLRQWKDW,FDOOP\VHOIRU WKDW,DP
FDOOHGLQVHFUHW*RGLVLQPHKHLVWKHDEVROXWH³PH´RU³VHOI´ 94 
 
+RZHYHU V\PSDWKHWLF 'HUULGD PD\ EH WRZDUGV .LHUNHJDDUG¶V ZULWLQJV WKLV YLHZ RI
subjectivity, mystifying as it is, perhaps still presents God as almost thinkable. It offers 
VRPHWKLQJIRUWKHPLQGWRWKLQNDERXW7KHGLIILFXOW\RI.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSURSRVLWLRQLVWKDW
he is not only asking what it is possible to think and where the limits of thinking are, but 
also what it is possible to do. Abraham, despite the anguish and uncertainty of his decision, 
was able to suspend all of his doubts or suspicions (Was he mad? Was it voice of a demon 
that called him and not God?) in order to carry to his duty. He was not dragged in abject 
deference to do something against his will.  Instead, despite everything, at the most 
profound level of himself, he knew exactly what he was doing. That level of commitment to 
something unknowable is not a matter for thought alone, but, for Kierkegaard, it is a 
TXHVWLRQRIµEHFRPLQJVXEMHFWLYH¶DVWKHWDVNRIH[LVWHQFH 
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Chapter 4: Invisible 
 
 
 
$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQ WRREH\*RGZDVFDUULHGRXW LQVHFUHW ,Q WKH ODVWFKDSWHU , VDLG WKDW
Abraham, at some level, knew exactly what he was doing. However, for Kierkegaard 
ZKDWHYHULVWUXO\VXEMHFWLYHO\DSSURSULDWHGDQG$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQZDVLQGHHGWKDWRFFXUV
inwardly, in a hidden-ness so profound that even he could not speak of it.  How could 
$EUDKDPNQRZZKDWKHZDVGRLQJ LI VXFK µNQRZOHGJH¶GLGQot enter into thought at any 
OHYHO" ,Q WKLV FKDSWHU ZLOO ORRN DW ZKDW .LHUNHJDDUG PHDQV E\ µLQZDUGQHVV¶ DQG WKHQ
through the philosopher Michel Henry, I will explore the notion of radical subjectivity as 
the most fundamental locus of decision, that is decision in the sense that it has been used so 
far: something which has no quantifiable outcome but which is nonetheless a 
transformation.   
 
no sign 
Abraham performs the leap of faith. In that peculiar movement, he brings together 
paradoxical and contradictory elements and holds them within him in such a way that is 
both a turning inwards (in secret) and at the same time an opening up (to the ineluctable 
God).  
 
In A Confession, Leo Tolstoy comes to realise that the people he has seen in the world who 
are most at ease with their lot in life, who are indeed the happiest of human beings, are 
those who have faith. Tolstoy does not have faith and can see no way to get it other than by 
imitating the actions of those who do. In this way, bit by bit, he seems to manage it. The 
story of Abraham is read out in churches for people to be inspired by.  Yet, if we were to 
ORRNWR.LHUNHJDDUG¶VNQLJKWRIIDLWKWKHUHZRXOGEHQRWKLQJWRLPLWDWH7KLVLVQRWDERXW
bowing down in church and saying six prayers before bedtime. AEUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQWRREH\
Gods command and to do so through faith occurs in that secrecy which Derrida describes so 
well.  
  
This leap, the movement that is so radically transformative and so profoundly significant, is 
in fact the most un-dramatic thing frRP WKH RXWVLGH  7KLV YLJQHWWH IURP .LHUNHJDDUG¶V
diaries may tell us something: 
 43 
An ambulant musician played the minuet from Don Giovanni on some 
NLQG RI UHHG SLSH , FRXOGQ¶W VHH ZKDW LW ZDV DV KH ZDV LQ WKH QH[W
courtyard - and the druggist was pounding medicine with his pestle, and 
the maid was scouring in the yard  [there is a footnote addition: and the 
groom curried his horse and beat off the curry-comb against the curb, and 
from another part of town came the distant cry of a shrimp vender]  etc, 
and tKH\ QRWLFHG QRWKLQJ DQG PD\EH WKH SLSHU GLGQ¶W HLWKHU DQG , IHOW
such well-being.95  
 
This everyday scene is described by Kierkegaard as though those people were in a trance, 
but they are not hypnotised, they are turned inwards, indeed so profoundly inwards that they 
seem not to be even be conscious of what they are doing themselves. And yet, they are 
perfectly attuned to their task. Who could be so resolute?   $EUDKDPµV OHDSRI IDLWKZDV
performed with such inwardness. From the outside it would be impossible to tell that his 
task was any different to those mundane ones described in the vignette.  
 
Such inwardness is such a profoundly interiority that it seems to move beyond what might 
be thought of as subjectivity.  It is radical subjectivity. Inwardness is also hidden-ness, a 
state which is the opposite in every way from exteriorisation. Not only in the most obvious 
sense of the direction of such a movement, but in the sense that whatever is made visible 
through exteriority becomes subject to discourse and calculation. Inwardness removes that 
possibility. In inwardness nothing occurs as such, in any tangible or quantative way. If it 
can be said that something occurs then whatever that is conceals itself. I previously 
VXJJHVWHGWKDW$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQZDVPDGe at the very point where he did not yet know 
what he was being asked to do, and also, at the point where he no longer knew what he was 
doing. Such inwardness seems to occur at this point where there is an absence of conscious 
knowledge,  thought or any foUPRIPDQLIHVWDWLRQZKDWVRHYHU&DQGHFLVLRQµRSHUDWH¶VRWR
speak, at such a level? 
 
What Kierkegaard means by inwardness and hidden-ness is exemplified in an essay from 
Works of Love FDOOHGµ0HUFLOIXOQHVV$:RUNRI/RYH(YHQ,I,W&DQ*LYH1RWKLQJDQGIs 
$EOHWR'R1RWKLQJ¶,QWKLVHVVD\.LHUNHJDDUGUH-WHOOVZLWKµDVOLJKWSRHWLFFKDQJH¶WKH
Biblical parable of the poor woman who gives her last penny as alms and a rich man who 
gives hundreds of pounds. Christ says that the poor woman has given more than the rich 
man. What if, asks Kierkegaard, the woman had saved up two pennies, which she had 
wrapped up in a cloth and was going to put in the alms box. She did not realise that a thief 
had stolen the cloth with the two pennies in it and had replaced it with an empty cloth which 
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she then put in the box. Would Christ still say that she gave more than the rich people? 
Kierkegaard takes this parable to its furthest possible conclusion. There are people in the 
world, he says, who have no means whatsoever to be merciful; people who Kierkegaard 
describes as being so devastated by life that their suffering has crushed any capacity to do 
anything; they are not even able express sympathy in any way whatsoever. Such people, he 
says, are usually the object of mercifulness but should their misery be added to by denying 
them the capacity to be merciful? Indeed, the less able you are to give, the more capable 
you are of mercifulness. Mercifulness may even be at its peak not only when you can do 
nothing, but when you do not even know that you are being merciful. Temporality sees the 
RXWFRPH VD\V .LHUNHJDDUG LW KDV D µEXVWOLQJ FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH QHHG DQG DOVR D VHQVDWH
FRQFHSWLRQRIWKHVL]HRIWKHJLIWDQGRIWKHDELOLW\WRGRVRPHWKLQJWRUHPHG\WKHQHHG¶96 
However, from the point of view of eternity, says Kierkegaard, the most important thing is 
that mercifulness is practiced, not what the outcome is. Mercifulness is the how of giving, 
not the what. He says if you want to see the movement of a stone in water, do you throw it 
into a waterfall or a quiet pond? The same goes for mercifulness. Wealth and power may 
effect evident changes in the world for the good of humanity. You could be amazed, says 
.LHUNHJDDUGEXWLI\RXDUHWKHQµLWLVQRWPHUFLIXOQHVV\RXDUHVHHLQJ¶ 
 
[...] mercifulness does not arouse amazement; it stirs you; just because it 
is inwardness, it makes the deepest inward impression upon you. But 
when is inwardness more clear than when there is nothing external at all , 
or when the external by its very lowliness and insignificance is rather like 
an opposition and from the sensate point of view is actually a hindrance 
to seeing the inwardness? And when this is the case with regard to 
mercifulness, we do indeed have the mercifulness that this discourse has 
been about , the mercifulness that is a work of love even if it has nothing 
to give and is able to do nothing.97 
 
Mercifulness, then, in its purest form is a strangely impotent activity according to the 
measures of the world. Its value is not as a means to an end, but rather it is valuable in itself, 
perhaps in the way that an intention towards something can be said to be valuable in its own 
right.  
 
This example of mercifulness in its total absence of visibility or quantifiable outcome, can 
tell us something aERXW$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQ:KDWZDVHIIHFWHGLQKLV OHDSRI IDLWKZDVD
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ ZKLFK LV DOZD\V KLGGHQ IURP WKH RXWVLGH $EUDKDP¶V OHDS GHVSLWH DOO WKH
apparent drama of it, his anguish and the magnitude of his decision, took place in the most 
profound hidden-ness. Not only the decision and the leap itself, but also that part of him, as 
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the subjective agency which enacted the decision, was like that µ VHFUHW ZLWQHVVLQJ¶ RI
Derrida and seemed to be hidden from Abraham himself. This absolute invisibility means 
that whatever is exteriorised, whatever is said about it, can never come close to the thing 
itself. 
 
of life  
It is always the ambivalence of language that it can only approach from afar the thing that it 
tries to describe. Nowhere is this more true than in the realm of radical subjectivity. 
Nonetheless, the philosopher Michel Henry writes about radical subjectivity. His writing 
RIIHUVDZD\WRSHUKDSVJHWFORVHUWRGHVFULELQJWKLVµHQWLW\¶RUPRYHPHQWRUVWDWH"+HQU\
(who recently died in 2002), like Kierkegaard, was a Christian philosopher, but came from 
WKHPXFKPRUHUHFHQWWUDGLWLRQRISKHQRPHQRORJ\+HZULWHVDERXWWKHµSKHQRPHQRORJ\RI
WKHLQYLVLEOH¶7KHLQYLVLEOHLVZKDWHYHUWDNHVSODFHLQZKDWKHFDOOVµ/LIH¶ 7KH&ODVVLFDO
(i.e. Greek) conception of man, he says is that he is more than a living. Man is endowed 
with Logos UHDVRQDQGODQJXDJHDQGµ/LIH¶LVOHVVWKDQPDQ7KH&KULVWLDQYLHZKRZHYHU
LVWKDWµ/LIH¶LVPRUHWKDQPDQPRUHWKDQLogosµ/LIH¶LVPRUHWKDQDOLYLQJDQG*RGLV 
LQFOXGHGLQWKLVFDWHJRU\RIµWKHOLYLQJV¶+HQU\DOVRPDNHVWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµ/LIH¶
DQGµZRUOG¶ZKHUHDVWKHZRUOGLVDSODFHZKHUHWKLQJVDUHVKRZQµ/LIH¶GRHVQRWDSSHDULQ
the world. The world is the place where things (phenomenon) show themselves as empty 
EXWµ/LIH¶LVZKHUHPDQLIHVWDWLRQPDQLIHVWVLWVHOI,QI am the Truth: Towards a philosophy 
of Christianity, Henry talks of OLIHLQWHUPVRILSVHLW\DVDµ«DVHOI-movement that is self-
experiencing and never ceases to be self-experiencing in its very movement - in such a way 
that from this self-experiencing movement nothing is ever detached; nothing slips away 
from it, away from this self-PRYLQJ VHOI H[SHULHQFH«¶ +H VD\V WKDW WKH µWKHHVVHQFHRI
,SVHLW\¶LVWKHLGHQWLW\µEHWZHHQH[SHULHQFLQJDQGZKDWLVH[SHULHQFHG¶98   
 
This brief account already introduces quite a few complicated terms. In order to get behind 
their meaning, I am going to explore them through an earlier work entitled The Essence of 
Manifestation which sets out the gURXQGVIRU+HQU\¶VWKLQNLQJDQGPXFKRIKLVODWHUZRUN 
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Ipseity is far from an evident concept. According to JoKQ7D\ORULWLVµ«QRWVXSSRVHGWRDULVHE\VRPH
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and Consciousness Review 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4XDOLDUHIHUVWRWKH felt 
or phenomenal qualities associated with experiences, such as the feeling of pain, seeing of colour etc.  
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« 
7KHGLVFXVVLRQRQ0LFKHO+HQU\¶V(VVHQFHRI0DQLIHVWDWLRQFRQWLQXHV LQD'9'HQWLWOHG
Reading Michel Henry, which you will find in a sleeve attached to the back cover of this 
text. It is a video diary of my reading of the text which took place in Summer 2005. The 
running time is approximately 56 minutes. When you have finished watching the DVD, you 
may like to read reading the Supplement on p.135 which gives some background to the 
making of this DVD.  I have put a coloured dot at the top of this page so that you can find 
your place in the text again easily. 
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Conclusion to Part One 
 
The first section of the thesis examines the concept of decision, understood in the 
uncompromising and transformative sense that Kierkegaard proposes, through the figure of 
$EUDKDP DQG KLV µOHDS RI IDLWK¶ 'HFLVLRQ KHUH EHFRPHV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW LV LPPHQVHO\
GLIILFXOWWRGHILQHDQG\HWDOVRLPPHQVHO\VSHFLILF7KHILUVWFKDSWHURQµWKHOHDS¶VKRZHG
how faith was not only instUXPHQWDOLQ$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQEXWZDVDOVRWKHRXWFRPH:KHQ
*RGFDOOHG$EUDKDPWRFDUU\RXWKLVFRPPDQG$EUDKDP¶VWHVWZDVWRGLVFRYHUZKHWKHURQ
WKHEDVLVRI IDLWKDORQH WKDW LVRQµWKHDEVXUG¶RUXQNQRZDEOHKHZDVDEOH WRGHFLGH+H
succeeded in renewing his faith as the basis of each decision that he makes before God. He 
is, therefore, both free and unfree, determined and determining and as such the embodiment 
of the paradox that Kierkegaard talks of as pertaining to every existing human being.  
 
TKH FKDSWHUV RQ WKH µH[FHSWLRQ¶ DQG µREHGLHQFH¶ ORRNHG DW KRZ $EUDKDP KLPVHOI
FRQVWLWXWHGDQGZDVFRQVWLWXWHGE\*RG¶VFRPPDQGDVWKHORFXVRIGHFLVLRQ6XFKDORFXV
was seen as the threshold where external command or law and subjective assent coincide.  
 
7KH ODVW FKDSWHU RQ WKH µLQYLVLEOH¶ H[DPLQHG WKH QDWXUH RI VXFK D ORFXV DV SURIRXQGO\
inward, as radical subjectivity. The main part of this examination was conducted through 
the video diary Reading Michel Henry. 
 
7KLV VHFWLRQ LQ JHQHUDO ORRNV DW WKH µZKDW¶ RI GHFLVLRQ WKH SODFH RU WKH ORFXV LQ ZKLFK
GHFLVLRQWDNHVSODFH3DUW7ZRZLOOORRNDWWKHµKRZ¶,QZKDWZD\GRHVWUDQVIRUPDWLRQWDNH
place? 
 48 
 
 
PART TWO 
H 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then after Eden, 
Was there one surprise? 
O yes, the awe of Adam 
At the first bead of sweat. 
 
Derek Walcott 
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Preface 
 
 
 
After reading The Essence of Manifestation by Michel Henry, I felt encouraged to return to 
Kierkegaard with a renewed dedication.  However, when I did, I found that his writing 
pulled me in all directions once more.  Everything I read reminded me of another text and 
each idea or concept span off into a multitude of associations. My desk was piled high with 
books and articles: Kierkegaard, Agamben, Derrida and Henry, some half read, most half 
understood.   
 
I was awash with ideas, forever distracted with new thoughts or discoveries and forgetting 
ZKDW,KDGDOUHDG\ZRUNHGRQ,KDGWULHGWRXQGHUVWDQG$EUDKDPDVWKHµORFXV¶RIDPRVW
radical decision, one that he made through faith. I had looked at the category of the 
µH[FHSWLRQ¶ LQ $JDPEHQ µREHGLHQFH¶ LQ %DOLEDU DQG QRZ KDG FRPH WR 0LFKHO +HQU\¶V
radical subjectivity. I was still no closer to discovering what it meant to make a decision. 
$OWKRXJKDWWKHWLPH,EHOLHYHG,KDGVRPHFOHDUµPRGHO¶WRZRUNIURPDQGIURPZKLFKWR
continue the research, I had in fact reached a point where it all became totally ungraspable. I 
wondered if it really was like this and I had foolishly been trying to catch a cloud of bubbles 
in a lasso.  
 
I found it hard to keep my bearings, feeling much as Kierkegaard described when he 
became lost on Jutland Heath: 
 
I lost my way; in the distance loomed a dark mass which undulated to 
and for like a continual unrest. I thought it was the forest. I was quite 
surprised since I knew there was no forest in the area apart from the one I 
had just left. Alone on the burning heath, surrounded on all sides by the 
most consummate uniformity except for the undulating sea straight 
ahead, I became positively seasick and desperate at being able to come no 
closer to the woods for all my strenuous walking. I never got there either, 
for when I came to the main road to Viborg it was still visible, only now 
with the white road as a starting-point I saw that it was the heathered 
slopes on the other side of Viborg Lake. Simply because one has such a 
wide vista out on the beach, one has nothing at all to measure with; one 
walks and walks, objects do not change, since there actually is no ob-
MHFW«1 
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An experience of reading Kierkegaard, as Reidar Thomte comments in the introduction to 
The Concept of AnxietyFDQEH µUHOHQWOHVVDQGRYHUZKHOPLQJ¶EXW DV VXFK LV H[DFWO\ WKH
NLQG RI PRRG UHTXLUHG E\ .LHUNHJDDUG LQ RUGHU WKDW ZH UHDFK D µPXOWLGLPHQVLRQDO
DZDUHQHVV¶RIWKHFRQFHSWVSKLORVRSKLFDORUWKHRORJLFDOSUHVHQWHGLQWKHZULWLQJ2 In some 
senses, I could be reassured then that my reading of Kierkegaard must have had the desired 
result. 
I had believed that the seemingly more systematic approach of Henry would provide some 
VROLG JURXQG RQ ZKLFK WR SURFHHG EXW WKH µ.LHUNHJDDUG HIIHFW¶ KDG WDNHQ KROG Rf me in 
ways that I had not foreseen. 
, ZDV VWLOO IDVFLQDWHG E\ WKH XQFRPSURPLVLQJ QDWXUH RI .LHUNHJDDUG¶V LGHDOV DQG HYHQ
strived to have qualities of courage, individuality and resoluteness myself. I had tried to 
learn from Abraham, but like most of KierNHJDDUG¶VFKDUDFWHUVKHSURYHG LQVFUXWDEOH ,Q
any case what would I have in common with any of them, never mind Kierkegaard himself?  
My subsequent efforts to understand radical subjectivity in philosophical terms, by going on 
this journey with Henry, did serve to educate me through experience. Trying to understand 
subjectivity in this way made me realise that no matter how seamless the exterior appears to 
be, the interior will be in turmoil, most of the time; the mind swinging from one state to 
another, between various moods, from certainty to uncertainty or from ecstatic confidence 
to paralysing doubt and everything in between. 3HUKDSVP\VWUXJJOHZLWK+HQU\¶VWKRXJKW
was all in vain. I had been frustrated with the sense that if only I could inhabit his mind (or 
that of someone like him, of his philosophical calibre so to speak), then I would understand 
it just like him but perhaps he too had been confused and in turmoil.  
I reached a point where I did not know how to go on. I had taken a few wrong turnings, 
including starting to write a monologue on the death penalty (that should have told me 
VRPHWKLQJZKLFKGLGQRWZRUNRXW%HFRPLQJSUH\WR.LHUNHJDDUG¶VVWUDWHJ\PHDQWWKDW,
had been seduced into following numerous diversions so that I no longer knew what my 
starting point was.  
I did not overtly discuss the extent of my uncertainty with my supervisors, but it must have 
been evident as one of them asked if I had read The Crisis and Crisis in the Life of an 
Actress, which, as it happened, I had not. He thought that it might be useful. I was so 
grateful for some precise instruction, for some point of focus that right there and then, 
before I had even set eyes on the article, I decided that it would be a main reference in my 
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project. I was aware at the tLPH WKDW WKLV GHFLVLRQ LQ µIDLWK¶ DQG µREHGLHQFH¶ ZDV
completely appropriate for my project but I was not aware that I had already been in the 
process of deciding, in the very sense that I had always intended.   
What I realise in retrospect is that in faFW ,ZDVµSHUIRUPLQJ¶ WKHUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQLWVHOI
Here I was, an individual overwhelmed by the possibilities that presented themselves, 
unable to decide.  In brief, I was in crisis. When the idea of reading this article was 
suggested to me by someone else (someone of authority!), I could at least make one 
decision and that was not only to accept the suggestion to read it but to put all my faith in 
this suggestion without even knowing what it might lead to. I might not be Abraham, but 
this situation gave me the opportunity of performing a leap of sorts. 
In the terms of this task, I turned out that the article had another advantage in that very little 
is written about it and so I could not rely too much on the scholarship of others to help me.  
What follows is an exploration of themes which came to light through the reading of The 
Crisis and Crisis in the Life of an Actress.  The first few times that I read it, I felt almost 
disappointed. 7R P\ PLQG LW ODFNHG WKH ZLW RU LQWHUHVW RI PDQ\ RI .LHUNHJDDUG¶V RWKer 
works. It appeared quite ordinary, but at the same time curiously impenetrable.  Gradually, I 
realised that just as the discussion of Abraham had allowed me to focus on the what, this 
article allowed me to concentrate on the how.   
« 
In 1847, in the theatre of Copenhagen, Johanne Luise Heiberg, a prominent Danish actress 
SHUIRUPHGWKHUROHRI-XOLHWLQ6KDNHVSHDUH¶VRomeo and Juliet.  This performance is what 
prompted Kierkegaard to write The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress. 3  Like Fear 
and Trembling, the article uses the example of an individual in a particular situation and 
KHOSVWRPDNHFOHDUUDWKHUWKDQµH[SODLQ¶WKHSDUDGR[RIH[LVWHQFH,QWKLVFDVHWKHSDUDGR[
will be looked at not only in terms of what it consists of but also in how it is lived. Who 
knows if Abraham really existed but here in this article, the individual is someone whom I 
can be sure actually lived, a real person, who was not called by God (as far as I know) or 
asked to anything out of the ordinary. She simply had a job as an actress.  
                                                   
3
  S. Kierkegaard. Christian Discourses and the Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1997. Frau Heiberg also happened to be married to a prominent figure in 
literary circles of the day. Kierkegaard was keen on making an impression on her husband J. L. Heiberg, 
who was a very influential figure in the literary circles of Copenhagen and chiefly responsible for 
bringing Hegelianism into Denmark. Kierkegaard spend a lot of time and energy trying to get into 
+HLEHUJ¶V FLUFOH EXW HYHQWXDOO\ JDYH XS ZKHQ KH IRXQG KLV µRZQ YRLFH¶  For letters addressing Herre 
Heiberg see S. Kierkegaard. Fear and Trembling and Repetition. New Jersey : Princeton University 
Press, 1983. 
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Frau Heiberg is not directly named as the subject of Crisis, and it was not until Kierkegaard 
wrote to her three years after its publication disclosing that the actress in that article was 
indeed based on her, that she would know for sure. It is reported that she was delighted and 
felt that Kierkegaard had understood her predicament precisely. The subject of the article is 
VLPSO\FDOOHGµWKHDFWUHVV¶DOWKRXJKVKHLVVRPHWLPHVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKHJHQHULFµ-DQH'RH¶
For my purposes heUH,ZLOOVLPSO\FDOOHGKHUµ+¶4 
Crisis was completed in the summer of 1847 and eventually published in July 1848 in a 
newspaper called Fædrelandet [The Fatherland]. 
 
 
 
                                                   
4
 J.L. Heiberg was also pleased with the article. Christian Discourses and the Crisis and a Crisis in the 
Life of an Actress. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997.  p xvii.  
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Chapter 5: Passion 
 
Existence...names everything that I must experience (the body, matter, 
language, others, responsibility, love) ... 5 
 
 
 
Juliet 
Imagine, if you will, a woman, aged 30, in the dressing room of a theatre. She is an actress 
SUHSDULQJKHUVHOIWRJRRQVWDJHLQ6KDNHVSHDUH¶VJUHDWURPDQWLFWUDJHG\Romeo and Juliet: 
 
O for DIDOFRQHU¶VYRLFH 
To lure this tassel-gentle back again. 
Bondage is hoarse and may not speak aloud , 
Else would I tear the cave where Echo lies, 
And make her airy tongue more hoarse than mine  
:LWKUHSHWLWLRQRIP\5RPHR¶VQDPH5RPHR6 
 
It is not the first time that H has rehearsed these words. Some years earlier, as a 16 year old 
girl, she played the same role in the same theatre.  Since then H has become a woman of 
considerable standing in the community of Copenhagen, a famous and respected artist.  In 
the interim she has played many parts, but has never again played Juliet, until now.  The 
public may have memories of her that one time, as a 16 year old.   
 
,Q 6KDNHVSHDUH¶V RULJLQDO SOD\ WKH FKDUDFWHU RI -XOLHW ZDV ZULWWHQ E\ 6KDNHVSHDUH WR
represent a \HDUROGJLUOµQRWTXLWH¶ The vocabulary expressed by this child present 
no less of a conundrum than that a 13 year old should be represented by woman of 30. 
Indeed to read her lines, it would seem fitting that someone of maturity should play the role.  
Juliet is a young girl consumed by a powerful sexual desire. She is the seducer, inviting 
Romeo into her bedroom where, it is implied (but there is little doubt), that the two 
adolescents sleep together and that it is Juliet who, by morning, is still eager for Romeo to 
stay, despite the dangers of being caught. Even considering that the transition from 
FKLOGKRRGWRDGXOWPD\KDYHEHHQPRUHDEUXSWLQ6KDNHVSHDUH¶VGD\WKDQWKHSUHVHQWRQH
this Juliet was precocious.  If such libidinal demands were expressed by a 13 year old girl in 
D SOD\ LW ZRXOG KDYH VKRFNHG DXGLHQFHV LQ 6KDNHVSHDUH¶V .LHUNHJDDUG¶V DQG SHUKDSV
                                                   
5
 6\OYLDQH$JDFLQVNLµ$QRWKHU([SHULHQFHRIWKH4XHVWLRQ¶LQ&DGava, E., Connor, P. and Nancy, J. L 
(Eds). Who Comes After the Subject? London: Routledge, 1991.p.12. 
6
 Act 2 ,Scene 1, Romeo and Juliet, Wells, S. and Taylor, G. The Oxford Shakespeare : The Complete 
Works. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005. p.380.  
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especially, our own time. In this sense, a woman of maturity is more suited to play Juliet 
and could do so without comment.7 
 
Add to this WKHIDFWWKDWLQ6KDNHVSHDUH¶Voriginal company there were no women actors and 
that boys and young men played female characters, then the role of Juliet could be taken to 
its most absurd conclusion. Imagine a 30 year-ROGPDQLQ6KDNHVSHDUH¶V WLPHSOD\LQJ Whe 
part of Juliet, a pre-pubescent girl! The role of Juliet consists then, in both its artistic 
content and its theatrical history, a web of substitutions, impossibilities and contradictions. 
 
Romeo and Juliet is also a tale of first love, and the impossibility of its fulfilment. The 
SURWDJRQLVWV¶ IDPLOLHV DUH HQJDJHG LQ DQ DQWDJRQLVP WKDW LV ERWK PXUGHURXV DQG
intransigent.8 1RWRQO\GRERWK6KDNHVSHDUH¶V SURWDJRQLVWV GLH EXW WKH\GLH EHFDXVHRI D
tragic misunderstanding.  
 
This much detail on Shakespeare is necessary in order to try to understand, as H would 
have, exactly what was being asked of her as an actress.  Even before looking at the content 
RI WKH  µOLWWOH DUWLFOH¶9, which initially seems like a simple commentary on a theatrical 
production, a web of elliptical subjects is set up through the character of Juliet and as such 
is a demanding role for any actress at any time. However, on this occasion, the actress H 
playing the role of Juliet, provides an occasion for Kierkegaard to examine, once more, how 
VXEMHFWLYH H[LVWHQFH HIIHFWV WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ WKURXJK GHFLVLRQ ,Q $EUDKDP¶V FDVH WKH
transformation was a renewal of faith. In the case of H the transformation that she makes is 
what he will call metamorphosis:  µ:KDWLVRILQWHUHVWLVZLWKKHOSRIWKH psychological, to 
be able purely aesthetically to figure out the metamorphosis, or at least to be able to explain 
ZKHQLWKDVRFFXUUHG¶10 
 
It was not only that H underwent a metamorphosis, not even that she could do it, but the 
nature of the transformation and the way in which it was performed that is of interest here.  
+HU PHWDPRUSKRVLV ZDV DFFRUGLQJ WR .LHUNHJDDUG QRW RQO\ GLIILFXOW EXW DOVR ¶EHDXWLIXO
DQGVLJQLILFDQW¶ 11 This unique situation, a famous actress aged 30, returning to the role of 
                                                   
7
 Even in the play there is some discussion between her mother and the nurse as to when exactly Juliet 
ZLOO EH  DQ DJH WR PDUU\ -XOLHW¶V PRWKHU UHPLQGV KHU WKDW JLUOV \RXQJHU WKDQ VKH DUH PDUU\LQJ LQ
Verona, but this is probably not representative at that time. 
8
 7KHSOD\LWVHOILVDUHZRUNLQJRI$UWKXU%URRN¶VSRHPThe Tragical History of Romeus and Juliet 1562. 
The Capulets and the Montagues are the names of the families. 
9
 Kierkegaard called The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an ActressµWKHOLWWOHDUWLFOHµLQKLVMRXUQDOV 
10
 S. Kierkegaard. Christian Discourses and the Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1997. p.306. 
11
 Ibid p.306.  
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Juliet who she had played only once before at the age of 16, allowed Kierkegaard to 
examine the course of such a transformation.  
 
Inter et Inter 
The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress was written by Kierkegaard under the name 
of Inter et Inter. At the time, Kierkegaard had already resolved to write solely as a religious 
author under his own name. The fact that Crisis was written under a pseudonym meant that 
the decision to publish was fraught with indecision. 
 
In his journals, Kierkegaard weighs up the pros and cons. The argument for is that it will 
confound readers who may have believed that he had made the transition from the aesthetic 
to the religious once and for all.12  Becoming religious is something, he says, that people 
like to believe happens later in life, but he insists that he has always been religious from the 
outset.  An argument against publishing is that having resolved to write in his own name on 
WKHVXEMHFWRI&KULVWLDQLW\SXEOLVKLQJDµSRSXODU¶DUWLFOHDERXWDQDFWUHVVPLJKWXSVHWWKose 
who may take inspiration from him as a Christian author.  He felt that he had a 
responsibility to those people too.13  
 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSVHXGRQ\PRXVDXWKRUVKLSKLVµVSHDNLQJLQYRLFHV¶LVZKDWLVRIWHQUHIHUUHG
to as his dialectic. It is like the setting in motion of a conversation from different or even 
opposing points of views.  Amongst the cast of characters presenting themselves as 
µDXWKRUV¶ LW LVGLIILFXOW WRGLVFHUQDXQLILHGDQGFRQVLVWHQWSRLQWRIYLHZ7KLV IXQFWLRQRI
indirect authorship means that I, as reader, cannot rely on the author as authority and must 
GHFLGH IRUP\VHOI DERXW WKHPHDQLQJRI WKHZRUN.LHUNHJDDUG VD\V  µDV DZULWHU , DPD
rather odd kind of genius ± neither more nor less, with no authority and therefore constantly 
under LQVWUXFWLRQVWRDQQLKLODWHKLPVHOIVRDVQRWWREHFRPHDQDXWKRULW\IRUDQ\RQH¶7KLVLV
D UDUHTXDOLW\KHVD\VDGGLQJ WKDWKLV WKLQNLQJ LVDOVR µHVVHQWLDOO\ LQ WKHSUHVHQW WHQVH¶14 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSRO\SKRQLFPHWKRGSURMHFWV LQWRWKHZRUOGDVHULHVRIGLVSarate and elusive 
characters whose viewpoints could be quite different from those held by Kierkegaard 
himself (one is never quite sure).  Indeed, he often claimed that they were alien to him, as 
though they really were other people. 15    
                                                   
12
 .LHUNHJDDUGGLYLGHVKLVZULWLQJLQWRLQWRµVWDJHV¶± the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. 
However, these are not always consecutive or linear but can occur at the same time.   
13
  S.Kierkegaard, Papers and Journals: A Selection. London: Penguin Books, 1996, [48 I A 175] p.320.   
14
 Ibid, p.322. This echoes KierkegaaUG¶VWKRXJKWVWKURXJKRXWWKH$GOHUDIIDLU>VHH&KDSWHUWKLVWH[W@ 
15
 The term pseudonym usually means assuming a name of one who is not known. Just as many writers 
say that their novels were dictated to them by a voice, or that a character they are writing seemed to have 
ZLOORIWKHLURZQVR.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSVHXGRQ\PVPD\FRPHDERXWLQWKHVDPHZD\ 
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Kierkegaard felt that in his time, the significance and power of the individual was being 
swallowed up in the crowd, whose communal voice reduced everything in compromise and 
mediocrity. The cacophony of the group was not a suitable milieu for the development of 
the individual in any terms but most of all spiritually. The crowd turned itself to external 
concerns, whereas the individual (before God) sought an inner transformation which had no 
recognisable value in worldly terms: 
 
Earthly reward, power, honour, etc are not bound up with its proper use, 
for what are rewarded in the world are of course only changes, or work 
for change, in externals - inwardness is of no interest to the world, which 
is indeed externality.16 
  
Although what Kierkegaard terms inwardness is characterised by silence and 
XQUHSUHVHQWDELOLW\ KHKLPVHOIDVDSKLORVRSKHUVWLOOZDQWHGµWRVSHDN¶ WRSKLORVRSKL]H 17 
His  authorial strategies allows him to do so from more than one point of view and so 
introduces a dialectic which not only delivers the responsibility of interpretation over to the  
reader but also brings the reader into a productive relation with what Kierkegaard called 
µWKH XQLYHUVDO¶: µ>«@ LW LV RQ WKLV WKDW WKH SVHXGRQ\PV¶ FRPSXWDWLRQV UHVSHFWLQJ WKH
universal, the single individual, the special individual, the exception, turn, so as to identify 
WKH VSHFLDO LQGLYLGXDO LQKLV VXIIHULQJ DQG H[FHSWLRQDOLW\>«@¶18 µ7KHXQLYHUVDO¶ UHSUHVHQWV
something like the objective view, and as such is a perspective which does not account for 
the contradictions inherent in individual existence. 
 
The ideological forces that were taking root in Denmark 1848 all advocated collective 
WKLQNLQJ .LHUNHJDDUG¶V RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKHVH LQ DGGLWLRQ WR KLV SHUVRQDO VLWXDWLRQ19, 
determined him to pursue the issue of the single individual with more fervour than ever. 
7KH QRWLRQ RI µWKH VLQJOH LQGLYLGXDO¶ SLWWHG DJDLQVW WKH FROOHFWLYH PD\ EH VXJJHVWLYH RI
narcissism or solipsism, for which Kierkegaard has been sorely criticised to this day 
(perhaps especially in this day) and for which, undoubtedly, there are some grounds. 
However, for him, the mentality of the crowd, or any collective kind of thinking encouraged 
an avoidance of personal responsibility and an insidious kind of self-gratification.  Not only 
                                                   
16
 S.Kierkegaard, Papers and Journals: A Selection,  London: Penguin Books, 1996, [J&P 48 IX B 63:8] 
p.351. 
17
 For more discussion on this point see P.Ricouer. µ3KLORVRSK\ DIWHU .LHUNHJDDUG¶ LQ J.Rée and J. 
Chamberlain (Eds). Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. 
18
 S.Kierkegaard, Papers and Journals: A Selection. London: Penguin Books, 1996, [49 X1A 130] p.372. 
Here he also says that Fear and Trembling, Repetition and Either/Or are all commentaries on the category 
RIµWKHVLQJOHLQGLYLGXDO¶   
19
 %RWKWKHVLWXDWLRQLQJHQHUDO LQ'HQPDUNDQG.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSHUVRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVZLOOEHGLVFXVVHG
later in more detail. 
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that but a move towards such thinking was the severest kind of self-deception; it denied the 
reality, difficulty, contradictions and indeed the full span of experience that is human 
existence. 20   It also quells difference and dissent: 
 
The sparrows rightly peck to death the sparrow which is not like the 
others, for here the species is higher than the specimens, i.e. sparrows are 
animals, no more, no less. In respect of what characterizes the human, 
each is meant on the contrary not to be like the others, to have it 
peculiarity. 
Yet human beings forgive every crime except for that of being what in 
their view is to be unhuman - namely to be a human being.21 
 
7KHVLQJOH LQGLYLGXDOIRUKLPLVPRUHWKDQDQLGHDO LW LVD µFDWHJRU\RIDZDNHQLQJZKHQ
WKLQJVDUHFRPSODFHQWDQGRI³FRQFLOLDWLRQ´ZKHQWKLQJVDUHWRWWHULQJ¶ 
 
There was, therefore, for Kierkegaard, a great deal resting on his authorial strategies. 
Indirect communication which brings me, the reader into relation with the (authority and 
author-less) content of the works, compelling me to decide for myself as to its meaning and 
UHOHYDQFH IRU P\ OLIH DOVR DFFRUGLQJ WR .LHUNHJDDUG EULQJV µ«the category of the 
LQGLYLGXDOLQWRSOD\LQWKHLUUHODWLRQWRWKHFDWHJRU\RIWKHUHDGLQJSXEOLF¶.  This statement is 
a reminder that the activity of reading as the intellectual consumption of ideas situates each 
reader in a community of opinion-makers amongst whom I must be able to stand firm, form 
P\RZQRSLQLRQVDQGQRWVLPSO\DGRSWWKHPIURPUHFHLYHGRSLQLRQ7KHµUHDGLQJSXEOLF¶
after all, includes those students of scriptures and listeners of gospels at church who 
consume the edifying story of Abraham.   
 
Given these concerns, it seems entirely appropriate that Kierkegaard decided to publish 
once more under a pseudonym in the year of 1848.  µ,QWHUHW,QWHU¶WKHQDPHRIWKHDXWKRU
of Crisis, is also curiously apt.  The term Inter LV/DWLQIRUµEHWZHHQ¶ µ,QWHUHW,QWHU¶FDQ
WKHUHIRUH EH WUDQVODWHG DV µEHWZHHQ DQG EHWZHHQ¶22  This strange un-name-like name is 
suggestive of an interval or a waiting room rather than a person. Indeed, it is difficult to 
                                                   
20
 A small article in The Guardian, 3 Sept 2006,  re-affirms the significance of what Kierkegaard is 
saying, interestingly from a politician not a philosopher. In the article, Tony Benn discusses a painting 
called the (QJOLVK3HRSOH5HDGLQJ:\FOLIIH¶V%LEOH (1927) by George Clausen. He explains the history of 
the painting as follows: in 1401, a Heresy Act was passed in England which made it illegal for any person 
except a priest to read the Bible, in case ordinary people reached their own conclusions about what the 
Bible meant.  Some people defied the law and read the Bible out in their fields. The painting is an image 
of group of people doing just this. John Wycliffe was a translator of the Bible into English who was burnt 
at the stake in 1384.  
21
 S.Kierkegaard, Papers and Journals: A Selection.  London: Penguin Books, 1996, [48 IX A 80] p.311. 
22
 Inter et Inter is also reminiscent of aut/aut, the Latin translation of either/or, as Howard and Edna Hong 
point out in their Historical Introduction, S. Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses and the Crisis and a 
Crisis in the Life of an Actress, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997, p.xvi. 
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GHVLJQDWHHYHQLQLPDJLQDWLRQWKHQDPHµ,QWHUHW,QWHU¶ZLWKDQLGHQWLW\DVµKH¶RUµVKH¶RU
DQ\ NLQG RI SHUVRQ ZKDWVRHYHU 7KH µOLWWOH DUWLFOH¶ Crisis, then, both as an anomaly in a 
sequence of religious works and authored by this incognito, signals a work of ambivalent 
VWDWXVLQWKHERG\RI.LHUNHJDDUG¶VZULWLQJ6XFKDPELYDOHQFHRQO\VHUYHVWRLQWHQVLI\WKH
dialectic set up by the use of any pseudonym. It provides an opening whereby I, as reader, 
become the point at which disparate (in this case unidentifiable, perhaps not even human) 
voices coincide. 
 
two places at once 
The story of the actress H, via the role of Juliet, written by this strange and amorphous Inter 
et Inter, means that the subject of Crisis elides, not seeming to exist in any single source. 
How then to discuss the metamorphosis of the actress which is, after all, the central concern 
of this article?  
 
For Kierkegaard, the single individual is of more significance than the universal. The 
universal which reduces existence, does not allow subjectivity to be lived in its full 
potential, that is as paradox.  7KHFRPSDULVRQEHWZHHQµXQLYHUVDO¶DQGµVLQJXODU¶H[LVWHQFH
is exemplified by Kierkegaard in Concluding Unscientific Postscript in a discussion about 
whether there is any possible knowledge of God. He says that, objectively, it is possible to 
FRQFOXGH WKDW DQ\ µNQRZOHGJH¶ RI*RGKDVEHHQ DWWDLQHG WKURXJK UHIOHFWLRQRUGHGXFWLRQ
Subjectively too, an individual can believe that they really are in relation with God 
UHPHPEHU$GOHU2QZKLFKVLGHLVWUXWKKHDVNV"+HJHOµWKHSURIHVVRU¶, he says, would 
FODLP WKDW LW LV RQ QHLWKHU VLGH EXW UDWKHU LQ WKH µPHGLDWLRQ¶ 0HGLDWLRQ LV D WHUP IURP
Hegel, which can be used to suggest a connecting link or a relationship between two things. 
The thing that something is linked to may also be called a mediation. That is, if A is related 
to B and B to C, then B is a mediation between A and C. Something is constituted (partly or 
fully) by the totality of its mediations. 23  However, says Kierkegaard: 
 ...if only someone could say how an existing person goes about being in 
mediation, because to be in mediation is to be finished; to exist is to 
become. An existing person cannot be in two places at the same time, 
cannot be subject-object. When he is closest to being in two places at the 
                                                   
23
 2QWKHµXQLYHUVDO¶VHH6.LHUNHJDDUGFear and Trembling. London: Penguin Classics, 1985, p99 and 
elsewhere.  µ3URIHVVRU¶LVKRZ.LHUNHJDDUGXQGHUWKHname of Johannes Climacus, refers to Hegel and his 
IROORZHUVµ:KHQ&KULVWLDQLW\HQWHUHGWKHZRUOGWKHUHZHUHQRSURIHVVRUVRUDVVLVWDQWSURIHVVRUVZKDWHYHU
± WKHQLWZDVDSDUDGR[IRUDOO«¶LQ6.LHUNHJDDUGConcluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical 
Fragments, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1974. p.220. 
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same time, he is in passion; but passion is only momentary, and passion 
is the highest pitch of subjectivity. 24 
 
Existence, as becoming, seems to oscillate between subject and object, as neither one nor 
the other but in a continual movement between the two. However, in this statement from 
Concluding Unscientific Postscripts, Kierkegaard suggests that at some point it may be 
possible to break out of this flux, in a moment of passion. Once more the moment arises, in 
this case, not only as a transitional point but, in passion, as something more; a transcending 
of existence. It is possible only momentarily for an individual to inhabit this impossible 
JURXQGWKURXJKSDVVLRQµfor the existing person, passion is existence at its very highest ± 
DQGZHDUHDIWHUDOOH[LVWLQJSHUVRQV«LQSDVVLRQWKHH[LVWLQJVXEMHFWLVLQILQLWL]HGLQWKH
HWHUQLW\RILPDJLQDWLRQDQG\HWLVDOVRPRVWGHILQLWHO\KLPVHOI¶25 
 
In the light of the discussion on Abraham, it no longer seems strange to say that a person 
FDQ EH FORVH WR µEHLQJ LQ WZR SODFHV DW WKH VDPH WLPH¶  7KH PRPHQW RU WKH LQVWDQW RI
decision indicates through an a-temporal temporality, the what of such an existence.  
3HUKDSVµSDVVLRQ¶introduces the how. 
 
7KHZRUGµSDVVLRQ¶FRPHVIURPpassio  WKHODWH/DWLQPHDQLQJµVXIIHULQJ¶RUµEHLQJDFWHG
upon (from the Latin verb pati, to suffer). The sufferings of Christ are also called the 
µ3DVVLRQ¶ Passio DOVRPHDQV µGHYRWLRQ¶ RU µHQWKXVLDVP¶7KH/DWLQ URRW RI µWR VXIIHU¶ LV
sufferre, from sub (up) + ferre (to bear) meaning to submit, to endure, to feel or to undergo. 
Passion then, linked to the idea of suffering, is not (or not only) a helpless or pitiful state but 
something bestowed upon me and voluntarily borne and lived by me. It is a taking on of 
responsibility, freely and in freedom.  It is perhaps also a form of obedience, in the sense 
described by Balibar in Part One of this text.  Passion or suffering (the two now become 
inseparable), like obedience, is not a simple form of subservience. As Kierkegaard points 
RXWWKHZRUGµSDVVLYH¶LQ'DQLVKLV affect. It also means an uncontrolled emotional state or  
µa suffering of the mindµ 7KHZRUGµDIIHFW¶KHVD\VLVPRUHOLNHO\WRHYRNHµWKHFRnvulsive 
boldness which astounds us, and because of that we forget that it suffering¶26. Passion, then, 
is also to suffer, to be affected or changed by something. It is also an enthusiasm on the part 
of the individual so willing that, without being able to say how or why, it seems that they 
have taken it upon themselves to suffer. 
                                                   
24
 S. Kierkegaard.  Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 1974. p.19. 
25
 Ibid. pp.196 -197.  
26
 S. Kierkegaard. Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus. New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1985. p.49. 
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« 
3HUKDSV LW LV WUXH WKDW .LHUNHJDDUG¶V LQGLYLGXDO WKHLU LQZDUGQHVV KLGGHQ-ness and multi-
faceted character, corresponds to a psychoanalytical model that is familiar today. The 
notions of ego, subconscious and unconscious could provide models to work with when 
analysing his version of subjectivity. If there is such a comparison to be made,  I am sure it 
ZLOOKDYHEHHQGRQH6XFKDQDO\VLVPLJKWRQO\VHUYHWRµH[SODLQ¶.LHUNHJDDUG Kierkegaard 
XVHG WKH WHUP µSV\FKRORJLFDO¶ LQ VXEWLWOHV IRU H[DPSOH LQ  µ$ 9HQWXUH LQ ([SHULPHQWLQJ
3V\FKRORJ\¶ (Repetition RU µ $ 6LPSOH 3V\FKRORJLFDOO\ 2ULHQWLQJ 'HOLEHUDWLRQ RQ WKH
'RJPDWLF ,VVXH RI +HUHGLWDU\ 6LQ¶  Concept of Anxiety). However, the term 
µSV\FKRORJLFDO¶DV WKHHGLWRUV+RZDUGDQG(GQD+RQJVD\ZRXOGKDYHPHDQWVRPHWKLQJ
TXLWH GLIIHUHQW LQ .LHUNHJDDUG¶V WLPH  ,Q WKH th Century, psychology was part of 
philosophy and although Kierkegaard would have been aware of disciplinary developments 
in the area of psychology 27LQXVLQJWKHWHUPµSV\FKRORJLFDO¶KHZRXOGKDYHKDGLQPLQG
something quite different than just a scholarly idea: 
 
³3V\FKRORJ\´ DQG ³SV\FKRORJLFDO´ TXDOLI\ WKH LPDJLQDWLYH FRQVWUXFWLQJ
by adding an emphasis on the embodiment of a view or views of man in 
characters, events, relations, just as the poet makes the imaginative 
construction in palpable form, the idea made visible, a philosophy of man 
in concreto. 28 
 
(TXDOO\ SKLORVRSKLFDO LGHDV RI µWKH VXEMHFW¶ LQ WHUPV RI HVVHQFe, substance, presence or 
absence, indeed any metaphysical or ontological concern, tell us little about existence as 
µEHFRPLQJ¶ 7KH µEHFRPLQJ VXEMHFW¶ VXJJHVWV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW FKDQJHV DQG DV VXFK PXVW
something not endure in that change? Aristotle, for exaPSOH WKRXJKWRI µVXEMHFW¶DV ¶ILUVW
VXEVWDQFH¶hypokeimenon, an µXQGHUO\LQJWKLQJ¶ZKLFKSHUVLVWVZKHQRWKHUDVSHFWVFKDQJH
7KLV QRWLRQ RI µILUVW VXEVWDQFH¶ DVVXPHV D NLQG RI XQFKDQJLQJ HVVHQFH ,Q WKH FDVH RI
Kierkegaard it seems less and less likely that such a thing can be spoken of, at least as a 
unified entity.  However, it is evident that the actress H in Crisis is one and the same person 
at 16 as she is at 30.  What is it then that undergoes metamorphosis?  
                                                   
27
 )RUH[DPSOHDV+RZDUGDQG(GQD+RQJSRLQWRXW.LHUNHJDDUGKDG UHDG-RKDQQ((UGPDQQ¶V WH[W
Grundriss der Psychologie, which described the first three parts of psychology as philosophical 
anthropology. S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and Repetition. New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1983, p.xxii. 
28
 Howard and Edna Hong point out in a footnote to their Historical Introduction of Repetition that this 
can be found in Philosophical Fragments. I could not find it there but did find it elsewhere in S. 
Kierkegaard. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments,1974, New Jersey: 
3ULQFHWRQ8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVS+HUH.LHUNHJDDUGVD\VWKDWµEHLQJLVWKHDEVWUDFWSURWRW\SH¶RIZKDWLV
in concreto.  Hong reference can be found in S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and Repetition. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983, p.xxix. 
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What Kierkegaard calls the psychologicaO RU µWKH LPDJLQDWLYH FRQVWUXFWLQJ¶ WKDW FRPHV
DERXWLQµPDQLQFRQFUHWR¶, as subjectivity, is the embodiment of the paradox. The paradox 
ZKLFK LV DOVR WKH WUXWK DQG , UHSHDW ZKLFK HPHUJHV IURP µWKH SODFLQJ WRJHWKHU RI WKH
eternal and existing human beiQJ¶, could not be embodied and lived in its full paradoxical 
complexity, without subjectivity.  Without the existing human being, such truth would 
remain forever outside, like a phantom, unable to take form.   
 
The existing individual (again I repeat) is aOVRWKHµOHDUQHU¶WKHRQHZKRLVREOLYLRXVWRWKH
WUXWKDQGWKHUHIRUHLQµXQ-WUXWK¶RUVLQ$µOHDUQHU¶LVFDSDEOHRIpassion, that is, suffering, 
µEHLQJDFWHGXSRQ¶ in such a way that they are willing to be changed. Passion, the closest to 
being in two places at the same time, is the highest pitch of subjectivity. One who is in a 
state passion exists at the threshold of categories to which it both belongs and is excluded.  29 
Passion is subjectivity at its most profound. Jean Wahl puts it like this: 
 
La paVVLRQV¶DOOXPHDX[FRQWUDGLFWLRQVGXSDUDGR[HHWG¶DXWUHSDUWF¶HVW
elle qui fait la tension du paradoxe. Elle est cause et effet du paradoxe. 
Elle est le paradoxe même. 
 
Passion is ignited through the contradictions of the paradox [which also] 
create the tension of the paradox. It is the cause and effect of the paradox. 
It is itself the paradox.30 
 
To come into existence as existant, as the single individual, is to suffer existence in all its 
paradoxical glory.  Looked at it from this point of view, passion as suffering is very far 
from being a state of subjection in an impotent sense, but is rather a state in which I deliver 
myself wholeheartedly to the paradox of life.  Whatever subjectivity may be, and with every 
attempt at description it lends itself less and less to description, and whatever part it may 
play in such a movement, it seems less appropriate than ever to think of it as an essence or 
substance.  Any sense of what this impassioned subjectivity could be, what it could feel like 
or where it can be found, seems just as enigmatic as the mysterious and somewhat 
intransigent kind of radical subjectivity posited by Michel Henry. It begins to seem more 
OLNHDQHQHUJ\RUIRUFHWKDQDQ\µWKLQJ¶RUSHUVRQSHUPHDEOHPXWDEOHDQG\HWSURIRXQGO\
instrumental. 
 
 
                                                   
29
 It is perhaps like occupying that exceptional state that Agamben describes. See p26 of this thesis 
30
 J. Wahl. Etudes Kierkegardiennes. Paris: library philosophique J. Vrin , Paris. 1949. p.359. All 
translations of Wahl are my own as there is no available English translation of it, to my knowledge. 
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the actor 
As the discussion progresses, the notion of subjectivity becomes less distinguishable from 
those other subjects of discussion: passion, the moment, the paradox, the exception and so 
on. In order to move away from this potential conceptual quagmire it might be useful to, 
once again, call upon Étienne Balibar, whose explication of subjectivity in the example of 
Abraham was so helpful. Balibar helps to provide a structure through which to think this 
paradoxical subject, one which is not only conceptual but also social and political; in brief 
VRPHWKLQJZKLFKLVZKLOVWMXVWDVFRPSOH[SHUKDSVHDVLHUWRUHODWHWRDVµPDQ LQFRQFUHWR¶
as one embodied, or embedded in the world and not only as an abstract object of reflection. 
For Balibar the French Revolution, a turning point in the history of Western Democracy 
ZLWK ZKLFK WKH DJH RI µWKH FLWL]HQ¶ EHJDQ VLJQDOV D UXSWXUH LQ WKH LGHD RI µVXEMHFW¶ 7KH
origin of the subject is not the beginning, he says; the subject comes after man. The citizen 
is neLWKHUµLQGLYLGXDORUFROOHFWLYHQHLWKHUSXEOLFQRUSULYDWHEHLQJ¶EXWWKHVHFRQFHSWVDUH
VD\V %DOLEDU SUHVHQW LQ WKH FRQFHSW RI FLWL]HQ DV µVXVSHQGHG¶, that is not firmly aligning 
WKHPVHOYHVWRHLWKHUµFLWL]HQ¶RUµQRQ-FLWL]HQ¶31  
 
The citizen cannot be thought of as an isolated individual, says Balibar, but neither is he 
DQG RQFH PRUH WKH FLWL]HQ PXVW EH UHIHUUHG WR DV µKH¶ FRPSOHWHO\ DEVRUEHG LQWR WKH
collective.32  The citizen, as concept and as individual,  can only exist if there is a separation 
EHWZHHQSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHUHDOPVERWKRIZKLFKKHRFFXSLHV µ+HLVGHILQHGDVDSXEOLF
DFWRU¶VD\V%DOLEDUEXWKLVµSULYDWH¶H[LVWHQFHLVQRWKHOG¶LQUHVHUYH¶7KHSODFHZKHUHKH
is at home, that is no longer in the public role is oikos, or dwelling, a realm which is both 
private and transparent. His non-SROLWLFDOUHODWLRQVRUUROHVLQYROYHLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKµQRQ-
FLWL]HQV¶ ZRPHQ FKLOGUHQ VHUYDQWV HPSOR\HHV DQG VR RQ  Stepping from his role as 
citizen in the public domain as an active participant and servant of the polis, he comes home 
                                                   
31
 In 1789, the Declaration of Human Rights of Man and the Citizen became law in France. See Balibar in 
Cadava, E., Connor, P. and Nancy, J.L. (Eds). Who Comes After the Subject? London: Routledge, 1991.  
pp.35 -36 
32
 'HUULGD,Qµ(DWLQJ:HOO¶VD\VWKDWWKHµIHPLQLQHFRQGLWLRQ¶UHDFKed its worse moment in the 
Declaration of rights. See Derrida in Cadava, Eduardo, Connor, Peter and Nancy, Jean-Luc (Eds). Who 
Comes After the Subject? London: Routledge, 1991. p.114 
According to Balibar, the notion of the citizen is the antithesis to the organistic idea of corpus mysticum. 
6DLQW3DXOV¶ILUVWHSLVWOHWRWKH&RULQWKLDQVVXJJHVWVVXFKDµERG\¶µ)RUDVWKHERG\LVRQHDQGKDWK
many members... so also is Christ.... And the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee: nor 
again the head to the feet, I have no need of you...Now ye are the body of Christ and members in 
SDUWLFXODU¶,&RULQWKLDQV-27).  Love (agap) between the members unifies the body (I Corinthians 
6:15-16).   
33RLNR9, oikos, meaning of uncertain affinity; a dwelling (more or less extensive, literal or figurative); by 
implication, a family (more or less related, literally or figuratively); home, house(-KROG 6HH 6WURQJ¶V
Greek dictionary at 
http://www.htmlbible.com/sacrednamebiblecom/kjvstrongs/FRMSTRGRK36.htm#S3624 
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to take on his decidedly more intimate role as father, patron, householder and husband. At 
KRPH KRZHYHU KH LV µPDVWHU¶ DQ µRWKHU¶ WR KLPVHOI DV FLWL]HQ DQG RWKHU WR WKRVH µQRQ-
FLWL]HQV¶DPRQJVWZKRPKHDELGHV2Qe can see why, in more than one sense, this is what 
%DOLEDUFDOOVWKHFLWL]HQ¶VµPDGQHVV¶34  
 
7KH LGHD RI µUROH¶ LV ERXQG XS ZLWK WKH KLVWRU\ RI µSHUVRQD¶ VD\V %DOLEDU HOVHZKHUH
Referring (once again) to 4th Century BC Roman law, he makes the link between µSHUVRQ¶
DVERWKµSHUVRQD¶DQGµVXEMHFW¶In Roman times, the term µSHUVRQ¶IURPWKH/DWLQpersona, 
ZRXOGKDYHPHDQWVHYHUDOWKLQJV,WFRXOGPHDQDQDFWRU¶VPDVNXVHGWRLGHQWLW\WKHYDULRXV
characters (in Greek and Roman times the same actor often played several roles). The actor 
ZRXOGSURMHFWKLVYRLFHDJDLQLWZRXOGKDYHEHHQµKH¶E\PHDQVRIDPHJDSKRQH-shaped 
mouth thus giving the meaning SHU«VRQDE\VRXQG7KHWHUPµSHUVRQ¶ZDVDOVRXVHGDVD
legal term. In ancient (and modern) Roman law jus personarum would not mean a law or 
rights of persons but of status. (the example of homo sacer showed how someone could be a 
man but not a person). Status was something that could be granted through natural 
occurrences such as whether one was male, female, child, sane, insane and so on as well as 
FLYLOVWDWXV$µSHUVRQ¶LQMXGLFLDOWHUPVWKHQKDGQRUHDOLGHQWLW\DVDQLQGLYLGXDOKXPDQEXW
rather as the representative of a particular status. 35 
 
It may be spurious to place together observations from BalibaUWKDWGRQRWµEHORQJ¶WRWKH
same argument, so to speak. Nonetheless, they do address the same question; how to the 
WKLQN RI µWKH VXEMHFW¶ DQG LQGHHG LQ %DOLEDU¶V FDVH when to think of the subject, as 
something which precedes or follows another socio-political category of individual). 
Bringing these insights, however briefly, to bear on Kierkegaard indicates just how 
complicated is the system into which an individual enters at birth. The ancient idea of 
persona to the more recent idea of the citizen gives form to the externals which coincide in 
individual existence: relations of power, juridical obligations and requisite roles. 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VVLQJXODULQGLYLGXDOLVHTXDOO\LQYROYHGLQVXFKUHODWLRQVThe characters that 
DSSHDULQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VZRUNDUHDGPittedly theatrical. He makes room for all kinds, from 
buffoons to heroines, but even if they do not resemble creatures of this world they 
QRQHWKHOHVVDSSHDULQWKHµSXEOLF¶GRPDLQ$EUDKDPWKURXJKWKHKLVWRU\RIWKHFKXUFKWKH
                                                   
34
  Balibar in Cadava, E., Connor, P. and Nancy, J.-L.(Eds). Who Comes After the Subject?. London: 
Routledge, 1991. p.52 Balibar.   2QFHDJDLQ,PXVWVD\µKH¶DVDZRPDQFDQQRWEHGHILQHGDVFLWL]HQLQ
WKLVFRQWH[WQHLWKHUFDQVKHEHIXOO\HPEUDFHGLQWKHWHUPµKXPDQ¶6KHZLWKRWKHUVUHPDLQVRXWVLGHRI
the protection granted to the human , citizen and man. 
35
 (%DOLEDU&DVVLQ%DQGGH/LEHUD$9RFDEXODULHVRI(XURSHDQ3KLORVRSKLHV3DUW µ6XEMHFW¶ LQ
Radical Philosophy, Vol 138, 2006, p.35. Some of this detail on Roman law came from a website: 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09079a.htm 
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contemporary Christian in Christendom and the actress H in 19th Century Demnark in the 
world of popular entertainment.36 
 
the role 
,Q UHDGLQJ WKH QRWLRQ RI VXEMHFWLYLW\ LQ .LHUNHJDDUG WKURXJK %DOLEDU¶V persona, I do not 
mean to suggest that it is like a series of costumes worn for a time and then discarded. As 
Balibar shows through the category of the citizen, the idea of taking on roles introduces 
divisions in the subject. The individual playing out these roles straddles the domain of 
public and private, unable to settle once and for all in either, but nonetheless existing, 
somehow, between the two. Such existing may be like WKDWµPDGQHVV¶RIWKHFLWL]HQZKRP
Balibar talks of, but in Kierkegaard this is exactly how it is for every existant. The singular 
individual is produced at the dislocation of those innumerable roles.  
 
It seems appropriate then, not to think of subjectivity as a specific entity, located at any 
point in time or space but rather as a kind of vehicle or catalyst, albeit one whose external 
form mutates throughout KierkHJDDUG¶VWH[WV$EUDKDPWKHPRQROLWKLFLPSHQHWUDEOHIDWKHU
of faith; H, in the role of Juliet, effervescent, ardent and elliptical;  the stoic figure of Christ, 
bloody and sorrowful on the cross. All of these are like motifs of subjectivity. In the same 
way that forks of lightning directs an electric current to a particular destination and clouds 
of all shapes transport water to distant lands, so these forms seem to be a conduit for a 
transforming energy or passion. Precisely what occurs behind those screens, and precisely 
how it happens, remains concealed but that is not to say that nothing can be detected. I can 
watch the dancer in admiration and wonder how she performs her movements with grace 
and apparent ease.  Or, I can try to dance myself:   µThe mass of humans live disheartened 
lives of earthly sorrow and joy, these are the sitters-RXWZKRZLOOQRWMRLQLQWKHGDQFH¶37   
 
                                                   
36
 Christendom is Kierkegaards name for the way in which the church has developed institutionally, that 
is away from it truly spiritual function. 
37
  µ,W LVVDLGWKDW WKHGDQFHUVKDUGHVWWDVNLVWROHDSVWUDLJKW LQWRDGHILQLWHSRVLWLRQVRWKDWQRW IRURQH
second does he have to catch at the position but stands there in it in the leap itself. Perhaps no dancer can 
do it - but that knight does it. The mass of humans live disheartened lives of earthly sorrow and joy, these 
are the sitters-out who will not join in the dance. The knights of infinity are dancers too and they have 
elevation. They make the upward movement and fall down again, and this too is no unhappy pastime, nor 
ungracious to behold.  But when they come down they cannot assume the position straightaway, they 
waver an instant and the wavering shows they are nevertheless strangers in the world.  This may be more 
or less evident, depending on their skill, but even the most skilled of these knights cannot hide the 
YDFLOODWLRQ2QHGRHVQ¶WQHHGWRVHHWKHPLQWKHDLUone only has to see them the moment they come and 
have come to earth to recognise them. But to be able to land in just that way, and the same second to look 
as though one was up and walking, to transform the leap in life to a gait, to express the sublime in the 
pedestrian absolutely - that is something only the knight of faith can do - and it is the one and only 
PDUYHO¶6.LHUNHJDDUGFear and Trembling. London: Penguin Classics, 1985. p.70.  
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It cannot be forgotten that no matter how theatrical Kierkegaard's style may be and no 
matter how many guises his characters or authors adopt, everything leads back to the 
question of subjective decision made on the basis of an external unknown authority, God. 
What is really at stake in the notion of the single individual, for Kierkegaard, is how to 
decide to be a Christian. That iVKRZ WR IROORZ WKHH[DPSOHRI&KULVW $Q µLPLWDWLRQRI
&KULVW¶ LVKRZHYHU OLNH WKH LPLWDWLRQRI$EUDKDP&KULVWZDVDQH[DPSOH LQ WKHVXSUHPH
sense but also an exception in every way imaginable.  In Christian terms (and for 
Kierkegaard there are essentially no other) Jesus of Nazareth himself was also playing a 
UROH WKH µXOWLPDWH UROH¶ WKDW RI D KXPDQ EHLQJ  *RG VHQW KLV VRQ ZKR ZDV DOVR *RG
himself!) to earth to live as a man born of lowly origins and destined to be ostracised and 
ridicule. This man was to be the saviour of human kind, offering them a way out of their 
suffering and a means to eternal life.  He knew that he would die on the cross for trying to 
carry out his work on earth, but he also knew that he would be resurrected.  However, he 
had to live as a human being would, with a human body, mind and heart. Even though he 
ZDVDOVR*RGKLVOLIHGLGQRWJLYHKLP*RG¶VSULYLOHJH+LVIDLWKZDVWULHGKLVKHDUWDFKHG
his body was in pain.  He accepted existence in its entirety. When, after abject humiliation 
and torture, he hung on the cross, his outcast friends around him and two thieves on either 
side, he cried out those well-NQRZQ ZRUGV µ2K *RG ZK\ KDYH \RX IRUVDNHQ PH¶
Although, he had known that he would be resurrected, at that moment he knew nothing; 
everything became possible, even that he was not the son of God. He may only have been 
an ordinary human being who had heard voices, he may have been a madman.  
 
Jesus of Nazareth knew the script of his life from a young age, and yet it did not protect him 
from suffering. He did all of it willingly. Through his subjection, according to Christianity, 
he also brought the divine onto earth and the possibility of human relation with the divine.   
  
In that astonishing logic of the incarnation, Christ relinquished his divine privilege in order 
to inhabit his earthly existence whilst never ceasing to be divine. He sacrificed himself and 
at the same time became the sacrificial object, which his father offered to the world.  What 
does it mean to sacrifice oneself?  In Part One, I suggested that decision is also a sacrifice. 
$EUDKDP LQ KLV GHFLVLRQ WR REH\ *RG¶V FRPPDQG WRRN RQ WKH UROH RI µIDWKHU RI IDLWK¶
without knowing in advance what such a role would entail. His decision was also a sacrifice 
of himself, in the sense that he willingly gave up all certain ground for his own subjective 
decision or agency, indeed for his existence as a whole. In assuming the responsibility of 
that role he started to exist in two places at once.  Can it be said that the actress H, in 
playing the role of Juliet also sacrificed herself, albeit in a seemingly less remarkable story, 
IRUWKHVDNHRIDµEHDXWLIXODQGVLJQLILFDQW¶PHWDPRUSKRVLV"6KHSOD\HGWKHUROHRI-XOLHWD
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subject so unlikely and idealised that she would never truly know her.  H herself is not 
µDEROLVKHG¶ LQ WKHSURFHVVEXW UHPDLQVDVKHUVHOIZKLOH WKLVRWKHUH[LVWVVLPXOWDQHRXVO\ LQ
her. Here, that other is not only the one fictitious Juliet, but her past 16 year old self as 
Juliet.  These personae: the 16 year old and the 30 year old H along with Juliet in all her 
guises, are like reflections in a hall of mirrors but they are not a simple re-doubling.38 They 
are more like different aspects which co-H[LVW LQ RQH ERG\ ZKLOH WKH µUHDO¶ + KRYHUV
between tKHPMXVWOLNH%DOLEDU¶VFLWL]HQUHWXUQLQJKRPH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
38
 )RU H[DPSOH LQ 'RVWRHYVN\¶V XQIRUWXQDWH FKDUDFWHU *RO\DGNLQ where he discovers that a complete 
replica of himself has come into existence, taken his job and so on. F. 'RVWR\HYVN\ µ7KH 'RXEOH¶ LQ
Notes from the Underground and The Double. London: Penguin, 1972. 
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Chapter 6: Metamorphosis  
 
 
 
 
Kierkegaard says that what is of interest to him in Crisis is the metamorphosis of the 
actress. However, it is by now clear that whatever undergoes metamorphosis is not a  
definable entity existing as or within the actress H, as self or subject. What then is the 
metamorphosis of the actress and in what does the metamorphosis in question consist?  
 
When a chrysalis changes into a butterfly, it actually changes species; a butterfly is in no 
ZD\ HVVHQWLDOO\ WKH VDPH DV D FKU\VDOLV 7KH PHWDPRUSKRVLV RI .DIND¶V KHUR *UHJRU
Samson, is like this. His external appearance changes suddenly from human to insect and 
then, as he starts to behave like an insect too, his internal metamorphosis takes place. 
Metamorphosis is a total transformation of either appearance or character, perhaps both.  It 
suggests that something comes into existence that was not there before. In that coming into 
existence, the first thing is overtaken by the second. Although metamorphosis is a 
transformation in stages, this kind of change is one which involves substitution rather than 
evolution. The actress in Crisis undergoes a metamorphosis, says Kierkegaard. The 
question is whether the meaning of metamorphosis that has just been outlined is what 
Kierkegaard means by the term.  
 
The metamorphosis of the actress is possible because H, at the age of 30, takes on the role 
of Juliet, having once before played the same part when she was 16.  Evidently, these two 
RFFDVLRQVPD\LQGLFDWHVWDJHVRIPHWDPRUSKRVLVWKHILUVWµ\RXWK¶DQGWKHVHFRQGµPDWXULW\¶
Does the metamorphosis then consist in a change from youth to maturity over a period of 
WLPH"3HUKDSVEXW WKH µ\RXWK µ DQG µPDWXULW\¶ LQ TXHVWLRQDUHFKDUDFWHULVWics of the same 
individual which suggest evolution rather than transformation.  
« 
 
Juliet, says Kierkegaard, is the most significant assignment for any actress. Whoever 
XQGHUWDNHV WR SOD\ WKH UROH QHHGV WR EH DEOH WR FDUU\ WKH µZHLJKW RI -XOLHW¶V LQWHQVH
cRPSOH[LW\¶In order to represent Juliet µDQDFWUHVVPXVWKDYHGLVWDQFHRIDJH¶.LHUNHJDDUG
VD\VµQR\HDUROGFRXOGSOD\KHU¶  Yet the actress H did play Juliet when she was aged 
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16.  What she did at 16 was not only to relate herself to the DXWKRU¶VZords as any actress 
could do, EXW UHODWHV µKHUVHOI WRKHUVHOI LQ WKH VRPHWKLQJPRUH WKDWYHU\SURSHUO\PD\EH
called resonance in relation to the lines and consonance in relation to the whole character.¶39   
 
At 16, says Kierkegaard, the actress could play Juliet because there was already in her an 
µHVVHQWLDOJHQLXV¶ZKLFKUHODWHGLWVHOIWRZKDWKHFDOOVµWKHLGHD¶RIµIHPLQLQH\RXWKIXOQHVV¶
7KH µLGHD¶ of \RXWKIXOQHVV LV TXLWH GLIIHUHQW IURP WKH µH[WHUQDOLW\¶ VD\V .LHUNHJDDUG. 
µ<RXWKIXOQHVV¶ KHUH GRHV QRW seem to be something that everyone would have had even 
originally  µ)HPLQLQH\RXWKIXOQHVV¶ LQ WKHVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGVHQVHRIEHLQJD\RXQJJLUORI
LVDµVLPSOH\RXWKIXOQHVV¶ZKLFKWLPHZLOOGHVWUR\,IKRZHYHUWKHUHH[LVWVDQDELOLW\WR
relate to the idea RI  µIHPLQLQH \RXWKIXOQHVV¶ WKHQ WKLV LV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW WLPH FDQQRW
GHVWUR\ ,QWKLVFDVHWKHSDVVLQJRIWLPHZKLFKGHVWUR\VµVLPSOH\RXWKIXOQHVV¶introduces 
the possibility of a dialectical relation to the idea RI\RXWKIXOQHVVµ6LPSOH\RXWKIXOQHVV¶LV
only one life and as such is inherently undialectical.  It is the additional life provided by the 
relation to the idea which introduces the dialectic.   What time makes manifest is µWKH
GLDOHFWLFDOLQKHULQWKHPHWDPRUSKRVLV¶40 The dialectic in tuUQZLOOµPDNHWKHJHQLXVPRUH
DQG PRUH PDQLIHVW¶41  7KH QRWLRQ RI µJHQLXV¶ HPHUJHV RQFH PRUH DQG WKLV WLPH DQ
interpretation from The Concept of Anxiety seems closer to the mark. Here, Kierkegaard 
UHODWHVWKHQRWLRQRIµJHQLXV¶WRWKDWRIVXEMHFWLYLW\LQWhe same sense that Hegel does, as the  
µSDUWLFXODU QDWXUH RI D PDQ ZKR GHFLGHV KLV DFWLRQV DQG GHVWLQ\¶42  ,I µJHQLXV¶ LV WLHG to 
subjectivity then it cannot exist or become manifest without it.  Through the actress, genius 
becomes manifest and the subjectivity through which it does so is not that of H alone but H 
via the role of Juliet.  
 
Kierkegaard had a long-standing interest in theatre and would be aware of the difficulties in 
casting Juliet.  It would have been no surprise to him that an older actress would do it. For 
Kierkegaard to make something of the fact that H, when she played the part of Juliet for the 
second time was aged 30, is not simply a play with numbers or amazement at an age-
defying feat. It is not that the actress really believes she is Juliet, even temporarily or to 
prove that an older woman understands the intricacies of youth more than any girl. No, the 
challenge for H is to play Juliet, as though for the first time, at 30 years of age.  It is as 
though that previous self becomes contemporaneous with her 30 year-old self: 
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6KHZLOO QRW ORQJ IRU WKHEOD]LQJRIZKDW KDV YDQLVKHG«SXUH FDOPHG
and rejuvenating recollecting, like an idealized light will trans-illuminate 
the whole performance, which in this illumination will be completely 
transparent.43 
 
This lack of nostalgia, the regard which is not backward looking but which brings 
something forward from the past, is a peculiar kind of movement. What Kierkegaard calls 
WKLV µUHMXYHQDWLQJ UHFROOHFWLQJ¶ GRHV QRW DGYRFDWH VRPH NLQG RI WLPH WUDvel or a literal 
turning back of the years. It is not simply a return, but a renewal and an intensification of 
WKH LQLWLDO VWDWHZLWKRXWPRYLQJEDFNZDUGVRU IRUZDUGV LQDQ\TXDQWDWLYHDOWHUDWLRQ µ6KH
will not be young again in superficial sense but in relation to ideality she will be younger 
DQG\RXQJHU¶44   
 
The metamorphosis of the actress, then, seems to consist in revealing something that existed 
from the beginning.  How can this be metamorphosis?  Whatever constitutes metamorphosis 
µPXVWEHSUHVHQW IURPWKHEHJLQQLQJ¶VD\V.LHUNHJDDUGEXW LW LV µQRWGHFLVLYHO\XVHGDQG
does not decisively make its appearance before some time has passed ± precisely this is the 
PHWDPRUSKRVLV¶45 
 
µ$WWKHPHWDPRUSKRVLVLVVXFFHVVIXO¶VD\V.LHUNHJDDUG46  By then H is an actress who 
FDQJLYHDµSHUIRUPDQFHLQWKHHPLQHQWVHQVH¶$QDFWUHVVDVVKHJHWVROGHUFDQSHUIHFWKHU
craft and take on roles in accordance with her age.  This, says Kierkegaard, is 
µSHUIHFWDELOLW\¶DQGWKHUHLVQRWKLQJZURQJZLWKWKDW+RZHYHUZKDt is of concern in Crisis 
is not µSHUIHFWDELOLW\¶ EXW  µSRWHQWLDWLRQ¶  µ3RWHQWLDWLRQ¶ is precisely the µmore intensive 
UHWXUQWRWKHEHJLQQLQJ¶$WZKHQ+LVJLYLQJWKHHPLQHQWSHUIRUPDQFHWKH\HDUROG
H asserts herself via the role of Juliet, not intruding upon, eclipsing nor overtaking the older 
and all. The older allows the younger to exist within and through her without loss or gain.   
 
The notion of potentiality, from Aristotle, means that beings can potentially act or be acted 
upon.  Such potentiality is either inborn or learned. The eyes for example, have the innate 
SRWHQWLDOIRUVLJKWDQGZKDWHYHULVVHHQLVVRPHWKLQJZKLFKµDFWVXSRQ¶VLJKW7KHUHIRUHWKH
SRWHQWLDOLW\ RI VLJKW LV WR µEH DFWHGXSRQ¶  %HLQJ DEOH WR GUDZ LV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW can be 
learned through practice and so the ability to draw is the potentiality to act. Actuality is the 
aim (telos), the end of potentiality. As such actuality itself is the ultimate fulfilment of the 
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potential of any act (or acting upon).  For Aristotle, if potentiality had the ability not to pass 
over into the actual, then it also had to be im-potentiality. Strangely, it could be said that im-
potentiality, that which belongs to potential itself, far from being im-potence or powerless-
ness is in fact a kind of power:  the power of a being not to actualise itself or to be able to 
withold from actualisation. The reasoning becomes extremely complicated and perhaps 
distracting to go into in great detail here,  but in relation to Kierkegaard it makes sense of 
whDW KH UHIHUV WR DV µWKH PHWDPRUSKRVLV RI SRWHQWLDWLRQ¶ DV µD PRUH DQG PRUH LQWHQVLYH
UHWXUQWRWKHEHJLQQLQJ¶7KLVNLQGRISRWHQWLDWLRQLVSHUKDSVFORVHUWR im-potentiality as it 
somehow retains a potentiality of its own and involves a decisive movement which does not 
end in its own abolition.47 The metamorphosis of the actress then, in part,  seems to consist 
in that return to the beginning; a beginning which becomes re-charged with an ever more 
concentrated potential. The potential for transformation and perhaps even in what this 
potential consists will already be present at the beginning.  
 
the first 
I began by trying to define the progression of the metamorphosis. Now I find that what I 
perceived to be two discrete stages, actually collapse into each other as though they are 
either one and the same or are concurrent. However, Kierkegaard does try to define the 
qualities of the actress from the outset and if there is a first stage at all, even if it also 
reappears in the second, it may be found in his description.   
 
Whatever the actress H is able to do aged 30, she was already able to do in her debut.  She 
KDGZKDW.LHUNHJDDUGFDOOVDQµLQGHILQDEOHSRVVHVVLRQ¶a quality of extreme rarity which H 
already had at 16. At 30 she still had it. Did anything change in that time? In an effort to 
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GLVFXVVWKLVHOXVLYHDVSHFWRI+¶VFKDUDFWHU.LHUNHJDDUGGRHVQRWDEVXUGO\WU\WRGHILQHµWKH
LQGHILQDEOH¶EXWQRQHWKHOHVVSUHVHQWVVRPHSRLQWHUVE\GHJUHHVRISUR[LPDWLRQ 
 
Firstly, he says, that the quality that H had IURPWKHEHJLQQLQJLVVRPHWKLQJµZKLFKDVVHUWV
LWVHOIDQGLVXQFRQGLWLRQDOO\REH\HG¶EXWZKLFKDWWKHVDPHWLPHLVµDWKHUEHFNDQGFDOO¶,W
LVKHUµJRRGIRUWXQH¶ZKLFKKHJRHVRQWRVD\LVKHUµ\RXWKIXOQHVV¶EXWQRWLQDµVWDWLVWLFDO
µ VHQVH  ,W LV DOVR WKH µUHVWOHVVQHVV RI LQILQLW\¶ DQ µLQYLJRUDWLQJ KHDOLQJ MR\RXV
LQGHIDWLJDEOH¶ HQHUJ\ WKH µILUVW ILHULQHVV RI HVVHQWLDO JHQLXV¶ 7KLV JUHDW OLYHOLQHVV DQG
energy, however, has the effect of calming rather than stimulating the spectator who 
becomes lulled into surrender to the spectacle.  This energy seems to have contradictory 
TXDOLWLHVVXFKDVµWUXVWZRUWKLQHVV¶DQGµURJXLVKQHVV¶ZKLFKYLHZLWKHDFKRWKHULQDQLQQHU
activity (and in joyous exuberance) not visible to the audience. On the face of it, everything 
appears calm. 48 
 
.LHUNHJDDUGWKHQVD\V WKDW WKLVµLQGHILQDEOHVRPHWKLQJ¶ LV WKHµH[SUHVVLYHQHVVRIVRXO¶DQ
µXQUHIOHFWLYHLQZDUGQHVV«HVVHQWLDOO\LQKDUPRQ\ZLWKLGHDOLW\¶ Finally, and it would seem 
that this is the closest that he can get tR GHVFULELQJ LW KH VD\V WKH DFWUHVV LV µin proper 
UDSSRUWZLWKWKHRQVWDJHWHQVLRQ¶2QVWDJHWHQVLRQKHUHLVWKHµZHLJKWRIDOOWKRVHH\HV¶WKH
public who are waiting expectantly and who sit in judgement. 49   
 
The qualities that the actress had from the beginning remain mysterious. However, in the 
way that Kierkegaard describes them, something like a transforming activity seems to take 
place within or through the actress. It is as though there is an internal compounding of 
disparate elements into a seamless appearance.   Energy and exuberance are transformed 
into an external calm which draws the audience into the performance.   
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7KH\RXQJDFWUHVVLVµLQKHUHOHPHQWLQWKHWHQVLRQRIWKHVWDJHSUHFLVHO\WKHUHVKHLVOLJKW
DV D ELUG¶50 The transformation or compounding of all of that internal activity into a 
seamless and tranquil exterior occurs only when there is this tension onstage. According to 
Kierkegaard, what is made manifest is not this tension but lightness. The movement of 
pressing down, he says, pushes something else upwards. One becomes light by means of 
weight.51  It is often said that it is the casting off of burdens that make us light says 
.LHUNHJDDUGEXWLQµKLJKHU¶VHQVHWKHRSSRVLWHLVWUXH 
 
The celestial bodies, for example, hover in space by means of a great 
weight; the bird flies by means of a great weight; the light hovering of 
faith is precisely by means of an enormous weight; the highest soaring of 
flight of hope is precisely by means of hardship and the pressure of 
adversity. But the onstage illusion and the weight of all those eyes are an 
enormous weight that is laid upon a person. Therefore, where this 
fortunate rapport is lacking, not even proficiency to an ever so high 
degree can entirely conceal the weight of the burden, but where this 
fortunate rapport is present, the weight of the burden continually 
transforms itself into lightness.52 
 
7KH µILUVW WLPH¶ WKH DFWUHVV FRXOG IO\ OLNH D ELUG UHO\LQJ RQ WKH JUDYLW\ RI WKH ZRUOG WR
support her and to lift her up into flight. The second WLPHµWKHZHLJKWRIDOOWKRVHH\HV¶ZDV
not on her. Her performance became more difficult, not because the audience had high 
expectations, but precisely the opposite. Over the years, the actress had gained acclaim and 
recognition for both her art and her social standing. In that time, says Kierkegaard, it has 
become a µQDWLRQDO GXW\¶ WR DGPLUH KHU53  7KH FURZG¶V DGPLUDWLRQ FDQQRW EH VXVWDLQHG
through years of familiarity; habit means getting used to even the most extraordinary things 
and consequently always wanting something new.   Kierkegaard talks about people in the 
public eye making rare appearances, or taking a long time to write novels in order to give an 
illusion of rarity and worth.  This actress, however, appeared often to the crowds in 
Copenhagen and her constant availability was in danger of undermining their admiration.54 
Kierkegaard paints an image of the crowd not like a blood-thirsty mob, wishing her 
downfall, but rather as a weary and well-PHDQLQJORWZKRIHHOµV\PSDWKHWLF¶WRKHUJHWWLQJ
older but also slightly awkward that their enthusiasm for her is simultaneously waning: 
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3HRSOH GR ZLVK KHU ZHOO«WKH\ DUH UHDOO\ DQJU\ ZLWK WLPH WKDW LW ZLOO
make her older now when they have cosily settled down into the 
DGPLUDWLRQ¶V KDELW RI WKLQNLQJ WKDW VKH should always remain eighteen 
\HDUVROG«DQGQR-one considers that this whole thing may be balderdash 
that is totally out of place, at least in esthetics, since her era will really 
begin with the metamorphosis.55 
 
Habit, says Kierkegaard, may deceive us but LWFDQQRWµGHIUDXGWKHRULJLQDO¶7KHµIUDXGRI
KDELW¶LVWKDWDOWKRXJK,VHHPWREHWKHVDPHDQGHYHQVD\LQJWKHVDPHWKLQJVLQIDFW,DP
very changed. It is not what is said but how it is said that changes; it no longer retains the 
same enthusiasm or expectation. The habit of the crowd in admiring the actress changes 
nothing of her qualities, says Kierkegaard, but it makes her metamorphosis more difficult. 
7KH µRQVWDJH WHQVLRQ¶ LV OHVV WKDQ LW KDG EHHQ DW WKH EHJLQQLQJ 56  $W  WKH FURZG¶V
admiration was guaranteed but at 30 it is not. Nonetheless, H freely and willingly subjected 
herself to their tepid admiration. This very difficulty is what made the metamorphosis 
possible.57 
 
I will recall once more the statement from Kierkegaard about being close to being in two 
SODFHVDWRQFH LQ WKDWPRPHQWDU\SDVVLRQZKLFK LV µWKHKLJKHVWSLWFKRIVXEMHFWLYLW\¶)RU
Wahl such a moment is also the point at which tension reaches it limit that a level of 
reconciliation is possible:  
 
3DU OHSDUDGR[H O¶H[LVWDQWVH trouve au degré extrême, au degré le plus 
DLJXGHO¶H[LVWDQFH3OXVODWHQVLRQDXJPHQWHSOXVDXJPHQWHO¶LQWpULRULWp
«&¶HVW j FH PRPHQW TXH O¶LQWpULRULWp DWWHLQGUD VRQ SOXV KDXW SRLQW 
TXDQG XQH O¶LQWpULRULWp SDVVLRQQpH VHUD HQ FRQWDFW DYHF XQH LQFHUWLWXde 
REMHFWLYHFKRLVLUDO¶REMHFWLYHPHQWLQFHUWDLQHWOHULVTXHVHGpFKLUHUDVXU
la croix du paradoxe et y trouvera sa paix. 
 
Through the paradox, the existing individual finds himself at the extreme 
point, the highest pitch of existence. The greater the tension, the greater 
WKHLQZDUGQHVV«,WLVDWWKHPRPHQWZKHUHLQZDUGQHVVUHDFKHVLWVKLJKHVW
point, when passionate inwardness comes into contact with objective 
uncertainty, that it will, in choosing what is both objectively uncertain 
and dangerous, tear itself down from the cross of the paradox and find its 
peace.58 
 
The second time, the actress could not rely on the crowd to produce the tension on which 
she would rest. She had to create it herself. She did this through that inward movement, 
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through passion. At the point where she was the least supported by the crowd, when they 
least believed that she could still play Juliet and where she found herself entirely alone, only 
then could she surpass herself.  
« 
What the actress did in order to succeed in her metamorphosis was to make a decision 
ZKLFKOLNH$EUDKDP¶VZDVDµSULYDWHXQGHUWDNLQJ¶7KHUHZDVQRH[WHUQDOVLJQRILW,Q
Crisis, the subject who decided, who took upon herself to both produce and to bear the 
weight of the onstage tension, in order to effect the metamorphosis, was neither the actress 
H, nor Juliet. She was neither 16 nor 30. She seems to exist nowhere. In the same way, it is 
difficult to say precisely where or when the transformation took place. It was effected not in 
the usual sense of metamorphosis as a passage through distinct stages. It is as though the 
decisive moment of the metamorphosis, that is its inception, was already present in the 
DFWUHVVDW$WZKHQLWZDVµGHFLVLYHO\¶DFWHGXSRQWKHUHLVDQRWKHUPRPHQWRI
decision. The actress H, via the role of Juliet made the metamorphosis by virtue of a 
GHFLVLRQZKLFKDJDLQOLNH$EUDKDP¶VOHDSVHHPHGWRµWDNHSODFH¶QRWDWRQHGHILQDEOHSRLQW
EXWUDWKHULQWKDWVWUDQJHWHPSRUDOLW\RUPRYHPHQWWKDWKDVEHHQFDOOHGµWKHPRPHQW¶LQ
relaWLRQWR$EUDKDP,WZDVOLNH$EUDKDP¶VOHDSDµPRUHLQWHQVLYHUHWXUQWRWKH
EHJLQQLQJ¶$WWKHVDPHWLPHLWZDVDWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
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Chapter 7: Repetition 
 
 
 
 
What has been described so far in relation to metamorphosis, can also apply in many ways 
to Abraham: the containment of turmoil within a seemingly hermetic exterior, the peculiar 
temporality of the instant of decision and the more intensive return to the beginning.  
Abraham was only asked once to do what he did (he could only be asked once) and, as far 
as I know, no one else has ever been asked to do the same thing.  The actress H, however, 
was able to determine whether she could do the same thing twice. The second time was 
clearly not any simple reduplication of the first. The first and the second time would appear 
WREHZKDW.LHUNHJDDUGZRXOGFDOODµUHSHWLWLRQ¶EXWDVLVFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIKLPQRWLQDQ\
straightforward sense of the word. What is at stake in the repetition is nothing less than 
IUHHGRPRQHZKLFKUHTXLUHVWKDWWKHDFWUHVVFDQµREWDLQVXIILFLHQWZHLJKW¶XSRQKHUVHOI,WLV
RQO\ µXQGHUSUHVVXUH WKDWVKH LV IUHHDQGKDVJDLQHGIUHHGRP¶7KHILUVW WLPHVXFKZHLJKW
was more or less guaranteed for the young actress but the second time it was not.   
 
In order to examine further what Kierkegaard means by this category of repetition and what 
its implications are for an investigation into the metamorphosis of the actress, I will firstly 
turn to a text called appropriately Repetition. 
« 
 
$ERRN¶VWLWOHPD\UHYHDOVRPHWKLQJRIWKHFRQWHQW+RZHYer, the title of Repetition, with its 
subtitle: a venture in experimenting psychology, written under the name of Constantin 
Constantinius, gives little away.  After reading the book, I felt that it was myself, the reader, 
who was the subject of this experimenting.  It is not until the end that I realised that if I had 
H[SHFWHGWRGLVFRYHUZKDWµUHSHWLWLRQ¶PHDQVE\UHDGLQJWKLVERRNWKHQ,KDVEHHQHQWLUHO\
PLVWDNHQ  .LHUNHJDDUG VD\V WKDW KH GRHV QRW ZDQW WR LQVXOW WKH UHDGHUV¶ LQWHOOLJHQFH E\
explaining it. 
 
,QRQHVHQWHQFHZKLFKLVDVQHDUWRDGHVFULSWLRQDV,IRXQGKHWHOOVXVWKDWµ5HSHWLWLRQDQG
recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for what is recollected 
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has been, is repeated backward, whereas genuine repetition is rHFROOHFWHGIRUZDUG¶59  The 
term repetition, then, has some relation to the Greek notion of recollection.  In the light of 
this investigation into the metamorphosis of the actress, this holds some promise. Perhaps 
WKHQRWLRQRIµUHFROOHFWLRQIRUZDUG¶FDQEH related to that peculiar temporality discussed in 
the previous chapter.  
 
7KHLGHDRIµUHFROOHFWLRQ¶LVSUHVHQWHGLQ3ODWR¶VGLDORJXHPhaedo where Socrates discusses 
the problem of the acquisition of knowledge: if we seek the truth about that which we do 
not know, then how do we recognise truth when we find it? The only possibility is if we 
already know it already but have forgotten it. If a person seems to know something without 
having been taught it in this life then that knowledge must come from a previous life.   
+RZHYHULIDSHUVRQNQRZVVRPHWKLQJDOUHDG\WKHQWKH\KDYHQRQHHGWROHDUQLW3ODWR¶V
WKHRU\RIUHFROOHFWLRQDLPVWRRYHUFRPHWKLVLPSDVVH3ODWR¶VGLDORJXHVSUHVHQWWKH6RFUDWLF
method of knowledge acquisition through questioning, called thH µPDLHXWLF¶ PHWKRG 60  
Through dialogue, both parties would further their understanding and draw out innate but 
forgotten knowledge. The maieutic method encouraged the individual not to look outside 
themselves for answers but within. The form of dialogue also allowed for contradictory 
voices and opinions to be presented, leading the reader, again, to think for him or herself.   
 
Although the Socratic method and the dialectical strategy appealed strongly to Kierkegaard,  
for him truth could not be the product of either recollection or historical accumulation, 
where the past was preserved in the present as a retrievable source.  Instead, the discovery 
of truth was only possible in a complete transformation of understanding, one which 
constituted a total break IURPHYHU\IRUPRINQRZOHGJHSUHYLRXVO\UHOLHGRQµ7KHPRPHQW¶
that category of transition, which has such radically decisive potential, is the point at which 
such a break can occur.  
 
What Kierkegaard is concerned with in Repetition is how such change is possible. The 
entity which effects or undergoes such transformation is the existing individual and as such 
there must be some kind of continuity in that entity otherwise, he says, life would dissolve  
µLQWRDQHPSW\PHDQLQJOHVVQRLVH¶61   
 
 
                                                   
59
 S. Kierkegaard. Fear and Trembling and Repetition. New Jersey Princeton University Press. 1983. 
p.131. 
60
 Giving birth to knowledge by guiding it into life as a midwife does with a child. 
61
 S. Kierkegaard. Fear and Trembling and Repetition. New Jersey Princeton University Press. 1983. 
p.149. 
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experiment 
The author of Repetition decides to conduct an experiment. He attempts to duplicate a trip 
to Berlin that he had previously made. Travelling in a stagecoach for 36 hours, he says the 
conditions were so cramped and uncomfortable that the occupants seemed to EH µZRUNHG
WRJHWKHULQWRRQHERG\µ+HWKRXJKWWRKLPVHOI µ*RGNQRZVLI\RXFDQHQGXUHLWLI\RX
actually will get to Berlin, and in that case if you will ever be human again, able to 
disengage yourself in the singleness of isolation, or if you will carry a memory of your 
EHLQJDOLPERQDODUJHUERG\¶62. On arriving in Berlin, he went to the lodgings that he had 
stayed in previously and describes them as follows 
 
One climbs the stairs to the first floor in a gas-illuminated building, 
opens a little door, and stands in the entry. To the left is a glass door 
leading to a room. Straight ahead is an anteroom. Beyond are two entirely 
identical rooms, identically furnished, so that one sees the room double in 
the mirror. The inner room is tastefully illuminated. A candelabra stands 
on a writing table; a gracefully designed armchair upholstered in red 
velvet stands before the desk. The first room is not illuminated. Here the 
pale light of the moon blends with the strong light from the inner room. 
Sitting in a chair by the window, one looks out on the great square, sees 
the shadows of passers by hurrying along the walls; everything is 
transformed into a stage setting. A dream world glimmers in the 
background of the soul.63 
 
Some things had changed since last time (his landlord, for instance, had married) but 
nevertheless, he went to the theatre and did all of the things he had done before but realised 
that even though he tried to repeat everything exactly as before, what he thought of as 
UHSHWLWLRQ ZDVQ¶W SRVVLEOH; it was a different experience. He still held out hope that his 
return home could offer a repetition of sorts but instead he discovered his house in a state of 
upheaval; his servant who had been spring-cleaning in his absence had not expected his 
prompt arrival.  The problem was, he concluded, that he had been prey to a confusion; 
repetition must be found not externally but within the individual. 64  He could quite well 
have stayed in the same place and effected a repetition as go to all that trouble. In a 
supplement to Repetition D GUDIW RI .LHUNHJDDUG¶V ZULWLQJ IRU Johannes Climacus), 
remarks: 
In reality as such, there is no repetition. This is not because everything is 
different, not at all. If everything in the world were completely identical, 
in reality there would be no repetition, because reality is only in the 
moment.65 
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 Ibid. p.150-151. 
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 Ibid p.151. 
64
 Ibid . [supplement] p.304. 
65
 As is pointed out in the footnotes, the term moment here is used in the way that Hegel would use it, as a 
vanishing element, factor, or particular in a whole. Ibid  [Supplement] p.275. 
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Neither does repetition occur in what Kierkegaard refers to as µLGHDOLW\¶. Ideality is 
whatever is expressed in language and, no matter how eloquent it does so, it can never be 
the actuality that it attempts to describe.  It may appear to repeat itself and if the same thing 
occurs repeatedly at different moments of time, then it is easy to assume that it is, in fact, 
repeating itself. However, the fact that it appears more than once is sufficient to say that it is 
not the same; those instances are differentiated through time as the first, second, third and 
so on.   
 
It is natural to assume that in repetition there would be an occasion or action that can be 
WKRXJKW RI DV µWKH ILUVW¶ DQd as such is without precedent. The second time would, by 
FRQYHQWLRQDO ORJLF UHO\ RQ WKH ILUVW WR LQIRUP LW ,Q .LHUNHJDDUG¶V WHUPV KRZHYHU D
UHSHWLWLRQLVQRWµWKHVHFRQG¶RUWKLUGRUIRXUWKLQWKHXVXDOVHQVH,QVWHDGLWLVDUHWXUQWR
the first state. Such a return retains the originality of the first, indeed it is as if for the first 
time, not as a simple reduplication but as that more intensive return to the beginning.   This 
is what constitutes change as qualitative, that is a change in kind,  rather than quantitative. It 
is like a revolution in perspective, a radical break not constituted by a progression, the 
passage of time, amassing of knowledge and so on, but rather like the movement which 
6DUWUH FDOOV µD IROGLQJ EDFN¶ D PRYHPHQW ZKLFK KH Vays, determines subjectivity for 
Kierkegaard: 
 
>«@knowledge cannot register this obscure and inflexible movement  by 
which scattered determinations are elevated to the status of being and are 
JDWKHUHG WRJHWKHU LQWR D WHQVLRQ ZKLFK FRQJHUV RQ WKHP«D V\QWKHtic 
meaning;  subjectivity is temporalization itself; it is what happens to me, 
what cannot be but happening. It is myself in so far as I can only be born 
WRDGYHQWXUH>« ]66  
 
$ UHSHWLWLRQ WKHQ LQ .LHUNHJDDUG¶V WHUPV FDQQRW UHO\ RQ WKH ILUVW WR LQIRUP LW. It must 
always, if it truly is to be a repetition, be as though for the first time. The actual first time is 
DFRPLQJLQWRH[LVWHQFHRIVRPHWKLQJWKDWGLGQRWH[LVWEHIRUH,WLVWKHµEHJLQQLQJ¶DQGDV
such is of concern to Kierkegaard specifically in Philosophical Fragments (along with 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments).  In these texts, he 
questions how history can inform us on doctrines of Christianity that are underpinned by 
such paradoxical notions as the incarnation or the resurrection. He sets out to propose that 
knowledge must be discovered not only theoretically but practically, in life as it is lived 
subjectively.  
                                                   
66
 'DYLG:RRGTXRWLQJ6DUWUHLQµ7KLQNLQJ*RG LQWKH:DNHRI.LHUNHJDDUG¶LQ-5pHDQG-
Chamberlain (Eds). Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. p 60. 
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In a chapter of Philosophical Fragments FDOOHG µ,V WKH 3DVW 0RUH 1HFHVVDU\ WKDQ WKH
Future?, Kierkegaard DVNVµ:KDWLVWKHFKDQJHRIFRPLQJLQWRH[LVWHQFH"¶%HWZHHQWKLV
FKDSWHUDQGWKHODVWZKLFKKDGEHHQDERXW-HVXV&KULVWVD\V.LHUNHJDDUGµ1843 years have 
SDVVHG¶   What change does the passage of time comprise of?  Conventional wisdom would 
say that time brings a great deal; that knowledge is gained through progress. History can tell 
whether Christ existed as a real person, but no matter how thorough the research it cannot 
uncover whether or not he really was the son of God.   
 
In Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard says that if, for example, a plan is made and when 
it comes into existence it is changed then it is not the original plan that comes into existence 
but another one.  However, even if the plan is realised exactly as it was made, seemingly it 
would come into existence unchanged. But, says Kierkegaard, the very process of coming 
into existence means that is not the same plan. The change of coming into existence is a 
change from not existing to existing:  a change not of essence but of being. The 
transformation of non-being to being is the transition from possibility to actuality. However, 
DOO SRVVLELOLW\ ZKHWKHU WDNHQ XS RU QRW µWXUQV RXW WR EH QRWKLQJ WKH PRPHQW LW EHFRPHV
DFWXDOIRUSRVVLELOLW\LVDQQLKLODWHGE\DFWXDOLW\¶:KDWHYHUFRPHs into existence therefore 
cannot be necessary for if it was it could not be annihilated.  Not only that but what is 
QHFHVVDU\ GRHV E\ GHILQLWLRQ QRW FRPH DERXW WKURXJK IUHHGRP DQG IRU .LHUNHJDDUG µDOO
FRPLQJLQWRH[LVWHQFHRFFXUVLQIUHHGRP¶ 
 
All coming into existence is suffering and the necessary cannot 
VXIIHU«FDQQRW VXIIHU WKH VXIIHULQJ RI DFWXDOLW\ 7KH FKDQJH RI FRPLQJ
LQWR H[LVWHQFH LV DFWXDOLW\ WKH WUDQVLWLRQ WDNHV SODFH LQ IUHHGRP«7KH
future has not occurred as yet, but it is not, because of that, less necessary 
than the past, inasmuch as the past did not become necessary by having 
occurred, but on the contrary, by having occurred, it demonstrated that it 
ZDVQRWQHFHVVDU\«WKHSDVWKDVLQGHHGFRPHLQWRH[LVWHQFHFRPLQJLQWR
existence is the changHLQIUHHGRPRIEHFRPLQJDFWXDOLW\«67  
 
Freedom then, precedes actuality.  Freedom, the infinite possibility of decision, is 
annihilated in assuming the responsibility that freedom bestows on us. To suffer is to come 
into existence as subject, that is determined, not free, and yet to do so out of freedom. 
 
To come into being out of freedom is to exist as though for the first time, unhindered by 
FRQYHQWLRQ+RZHYHU LW LVDOVRWREHZLWKRXWJXLGDQFHRUDQFKRU7RIROORZLQDQRWKHU¶V
                                                   
67
 S. Kierkegaard. Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus. New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1985. p.72 .  In the Historical Introduction, Tennemman states that the transition from possibility to 
DFWXDOLW\LVFKDQJHVRPHWKLQJWKDW.LHUNHJDDUGDOVRUHIHUVWRDVDµTXDOLWDWLYHOHDS¶ p.ix. 
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footsteps is, after all, reassuring and many would prefer such predictability to the danger of 
setting off into the unknown, no matter how thrilling that prospect may be.  The author 
Johannes Climacus, attempts such an unknown journey when he reappears in a text which is 
entitled Johannes Climacus DVZHOODVEHLQJµDXWKRUHG¶E\KLPLQ WKH WKLUGSHUVRQ7KLV
text has the subtitle de omnibus dubitandum est  (one must doubt everything). Johannes 
Climacus tries, as Descartes did, to rid himself of all preconceived knowledge and to start 
from scratch like an apprentice philosopher learning his trade.   
 
how to begin? 
Johannes Climacus continues a thread of discussion from Philosophical Fragments which 
LV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH µEHJLQQLQJ¶ or the original as the highest and best. 68  Johannes is 
troubled with the question of how philosophy begins. How does a philosopher know that it 
is with him that philosophy or a philosophy begins? How does he know when he has 
EHFRPHDSKLORVRSKHU"$WZKDWSRLQWGRHVKHNQRZHQRXJKWRVD\µQRZ,DPJRLQJto start 
WRWKLQNE\P\VHOILQP\RZQRULJLQDOWKRXJKWV"¶,QVKRUWKRZLVLWSRVVLEOHWREHJLQDWDOO" 
 
Johannes Climacus describes how he tries to discover what the task for his thinking would 
be, if he is to be a thinker at all.  Eventually he discoverVD WKHVLVZKLFKµZRXOGFRPHWR
play a decisive role in his life. The thesis became for his life what in other respects a name 
IUHTXHQWO\LVLQDSHUVRQ¶VKLVWRU\± everything can be said in all brevity by mentioning this 
QDPH«:KDWPDGHKLPHYHQPRUHHQWKusiastic was the connection usually made between 
WKLVWKHVLVDQGEHFRPLQJDSKLORVRSKHU¶$OWKRXJKWKHWKHVLVLVQRWRYHUWO\PHQWLRQHGLWLV
indicated that it is µ(YHU\WKLQJPXVWEHGRXEWHG¶:KDWIROORZVLQWKHWH[WLVDGLVFXVVLRQRI
three statements that he had heard repeatedly in relation to his thesis: (1) philosophy begins 
with doubt; (2) in order to philosophise one must have doubted and (3) modern philosophy 
begins with doubt. 69 
 
7KH PLGGOH VWDWHPHQW µLQ RUGHU WR SKLORVRSKLVH RQH PXVW KDYH GRXEWHG¶, sums up the 
difficulty. In order to doubt I must already have enough knowledge to exercise that doubt 
upon, (I must have already philosophised) and yet in order to start philosophising I must 
begin with doubt. 
 
In what appears to be a conclusion, Johannes says: 
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, FDQQRWNQRZHYHQZKHWKHUGRXEWLQJ LVDSUHSDUDWLRQ >«@ , DPOHIW WR
myself; I have to do everything on my own responsibility. Even though I 
could have wished to remain a minor for yet a while longer, even though 
I could have wished that there would be someone to give me orders so 
that I might have the joy of obeying, even though I anxiously feel that I 
have come of age too soon, even though I feel like a girl who marries too 
young - well, so it must be. The thesis de omnibus dubitandum est has 
once and for all been brought into my consciousness, and I shall 
endeavour to think it to the best of my ability, to do what it says with all 
my passion. Come what may, whether it leads to everything or nothing, 
makes me wise or mad, I shall stake everything but shall not let go of the 
thought. My visionary dreams about being a follower have vanished; 
before I was allowed to be young, I became old; now I am sailing on the 
open sea. The prospects I once conjured up about the relation of this 
thesis to philosophy have been blocked. I do not know a thing about the 
relation of this thesis to anything else. I can only follow its path; like the 
one who rows a boat, I turn my back toward the goal.70 
 
7KLV µFRQFOXVLRQ¶KRZHYHUZDVQRW LQ IDFW WKH ODVWZRUGRQ-RKDQQHV. There is a second 
part, Pars Secunda, where he tries to think propros auspiciis RQ KLV RZQ EHKDOI µde 
RPQLEXVGXEXWDQGXPHVW¶7KLVVLQJOHVKRUWFKDSWHUFDOOHGµ:KDWLVLWWRGRXEW¶FRQVLVWVRI
DQ LQWURGXFWLRQ LQZKLFK-RKDQQHV µEDGH WKHSKLORVRSKHUV IDUHZHOO IRUHYHU¶DQGYRZHG WR
µPDNHHYHU\WKLQJDVVLPSOHDVSRVVLEOH¶+HUHKHH[DPLQHV SKLORVRSKLFDOO\ WKHTXHVWLRQ
that if it is possible to arouse doubt in another through discourse, then is it not also possible 
to arouse faith in the same way? If doubt did not exist as a possibility within human 
consciousness already, then there would be no way of evoking it. Is it then possible to put 
doubt completely outside of consciousness?  Consciousness, however, is always in relation 
to something that it is not. Consciousness of truth for example is always in relation to 
untruth.  An immediate experience of truth would cancel both truth and untruth as they can 
only exist through reflection as duality. 
 
Consciousness is the relating factor in what Johannes calls a triad of consciousness. It is not 
however the same as reflection.  Reflection is the possibility of a relation and as such is 
dichotomous. Consciousness is the relation and as such is trichotomous in nature: 
µimmediacy is reality; language is ideality; consciousness is contradiction. The moment I 
PDNHDVWDWHPHQWDERXWUHDOLW\FRQWUDGLFWLRQLVSUHVHQWVRZKDW,VD\LVLGHDOLW\¶71  
 
How then, asks Johannes, does consciousness discover the contradiction? The question of 
recollection once more is raised; how can consciousness discover something that it does not 
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already know?  Johannes proposes that the idea of recollection must also be a contradiction; 
it is neither ideality nor reality, but ideality and reality that have been.  This, he says, is a 
double FRQWUDGLFWLRQVLQFHQHLWKHU LGHDOLW\QRU UHDOLW\FDQ µKDYHEHHQ¶ WKH\DUHQRW LQ WKH
past, over and finished with.   Consciousness emerges through the collision of ideality and 
UHDOLW\ DQG VXFK D FROOLVLRQ LV UHSHWLWLRQ QRW UHFROOHFWLRQ µ$V VRRQ DV WKH Tuestion of a 
UHSHWLWLRQDULVHVWKHFROOLVLRQLVSUHVHQW¶ 72 Just as ideality cannot be repeated, neither can 
reality: 
 
:KHQLGHDOLW\DQGUHDOLW\ WRXFKHDFKRWKHU WKHQWKHUHSHWLWLRQRFFXUV«
That the external is, that I see, but in the same instant I bring it into 
relation with something that also is, something that is the same and that 
also will explain that the other is the same. Here is the redoubling 
[Fordobling]; here is a matter of repetition. Ideality and reality collide ± 
in what medium? In time? That is indeed an impossibility. In eternity? 
That is indeed an impossibility. In what , then? In consciousness ± there 
is the contradiction. 73 
 
 
So repetition is as if for the first time. It is this collision of ideality and reality that Johannes 
talks about. A collision is not something that is normally anticipated, prepared for nor is it 
desired. Who would not prefer to watch from the stalls as an acrobat performs gravity-
defying tricks fifty feet in the air without a net, than to be in that persons position, not 
knowing if their next move will end in a fall?  However, to take up such a precarious 
position is, for Kierkegaard, exactly what is needed in order for a repetition to be 
successful.  Repetition is like that momentary passion in which I leap out of existence. Only 
by being the first, or acting as though I am the first can I make such a move.  
 
In Repetition, Kierekgaard says that, for the Greeks, recollection: 
 
>«@PDQLIHVWHGLWVHOIDVIUHHGRP¶VFRQVRODWLRQRQO\LQUHFROOHFWLRQDQG
by moving backward into it did freedom possess its eternal life. The 
modern view, on the other hand, must seek freedom forward, so that here 
eternity opens up for him as the true repetition forward. 74 
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µ6HHNLQJIUHHGRPIRUZDUG¶PHDQVQRWVHHNLQJUHDVVXUDQFHIURPSDVWFHUtainty but heading 
straight for the collision with no assurance: µZKHQKDSSLQHVVFHDVHVZKHQWKHFULVLVFRPHV
IUHHGRPPXVWSUHVVIRUZDUGQRWUHWUHDW¶ 75  
 
When ideality and reality collide, says Johannes, repetition occurs. This collision then, is 
the scene of decision. It is like that paradoxical moment where, through passion, I transcend 
H[LVWHQFH,QRUGHUWRµSUHVVIRUZDUG¶DV.LHUNHJDDUGVD\VLQWKDWµVHHNLQJRIIUHHGRP¶D
decision is necessary which looks towards the future as uncharted territory. It is, as such, a 
decision based on faith, that is, it is grounded in the unknowable. It is also a return to the 
beginning, a starting again in life, as though for the first time. This movement of repetition, 
describes, like the leap of faith, a decision which involves a transformation, the introduction 
of something completely new in that more intensive return to the beginning.   
 
5HWXUQLQJ WR WKH DFWUHVV RQ ZKRVH µEHKDOI¶ WKLV GLVFXVVLRQ RQ UHSHWLWLRQ ZDV EHJXQ LV LW
now possible to say that her metamRUSKRVLVZDVDDOVRUHSHWLWLRQLQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VVHQVH",W
ZDVRQO\ZKHQ+ UHWXUQHG WR WKH UROH RI -XOLHW IRU WKH VHFRQG WLPH WKDW VKH µEHFDPH¶DQ
actress, as though this were the beginning of her career, not the end µa woman does not 
become an actress in her 18th \HDU LI VKHEHFRPHV WKDWDWDOO LW¶V LQKHUth \HDU¶76 says 
.LHUNHJDDUG,WZDVDOVRWKHQVD\V.LHUNHJDDUGWKDWWKHµLPSRUWDQWGHFLVLRQ¶ZDVPDGH77 
7KHVHFRQG WLPHSURYLGHGDQRSSRUWXQLW\ IRU WKH µFXOPLQDWLRQ¶RI WKH µVHUYLQJ UHODWLRQ WR
thHLGHD¶RIµ\RXWKIXOQHVV¶78  $RU\HDUROGVD\V.LHUNHJDDUGLVERWK¶WRRFRQILGHQW¶
DQGµWRRFR\¶DQGWRRFRQFHUQHGZLWKZKDWLVJRLQJRQWKHRXWVLGHWREHDEOHWRXQGHUWDNH
VXFKDµVHUYLQJUHODWLRQ¶6KHPD\EHGLVWUDFWHGE\µWKHDFFLGHQWDOV¶:KDtever is accidental 
LV VRPHWKLQJ LQDGGLWLRQ WRZKDW LV µHVVHQWLDO¶7KRVHDFFLGHQWDOVDUHTXDQWDWLYHDGGLWLRQV
that can be discarded without affecting the nature of an entity. What the actress was able to 
GR LQ KHU PDWXULW\ ZDV µD FRQVFLRXV VHOI-submissioQ XQGHU WKH LGHD¶ ,Q WKDW µVHUYLQJ
UHODWLRQ¶ VD\V.LHUNHJDDUG µWKH DFFLGHQWDO LVPDGH FRPSOHWHO\ LPSRVVLEOH¶79 The actress 
was not concerned with externals, but performed her role with complete inwardness: 
µZKROO\ WR VHUYH LV LQZDUGQHVV¶ VD\V .LHUNHJDDrd. 80 Her metamorphosis, then, did not 
allow any addition brought about through the passage of time. It was not RQO\µDUHWXUQWR
WKHILUVWVWDWH¶EXWDWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIKHUVHOIµLQDQHPLQHQWK\SRVWDVLV¶ 81 Hypostasis is a 
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telling term for Kierkegaard to use here. It refers to the effect of gravity on the flow of 
blood in the body, but also in theological terms it refers to the single person of Christ, as 
opposed to him as a duality (both human and divine).  This return to the beginning the 
actress re-grounding herself as a singular individual and as such was the instigation of 
something that was not originally present in the youthful H. What came about in that 
metamorphosis was a µUHMXYHQDWLQJ UHFROOHFWLQJ¶ DQG DV VXFK ZDV QRW D UHWURJUHVVLYH
movement but one which re-invested that beginning with more potential than before. She 
ZDVQRW µKDSS\¶ LQ WKHVHQVHRI WKDW\RXQJJLUO VKHFRXOGQRW ORRNIRUFRQVRODWLRQ LQ WKH
SDVW  6KH WRR KDG WR µSUHVV IRUZDUGV¶ $W WKH VDPH WLPH LW ZDV DV WKRXJK GHVSLWH WKH
passage of time, in her metamorphosis, she had not grown older but re-inhabited her 
younger self with a renewed perspective, one whose gaze was fixed without wavering on 
that inward movement towards the point where ideality and reality collide. 
 
It is the contradiction that is inherent in every task in life that one does for the first time. 
(YHQ LI WKRXVDQGVKDYHGRQH LW EHIRUHPH ,ZLOO KDYHP\ µILUVW WLPH¶ DQG WKHUHIRUHEHD
pioneer in my own life. However, through habit I might forget what that first entailed. 
5HSHWLWLRQ LQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶V WHUPV KDVQRWKLQJ WRGRZLWKKDELW EXW DV WKDW UHWXUQ WR WKH
beginning, as though for the first time, I must forget everything I knew and discard 
everything I thought I could rely on. This is clear in the example of the acrobat. No matter 
how many times she climbs the ladder, she cannot trust that this time she will not fall. The 
danger is present every time and yet she goes up there and performs in mid-air. 
 
 85 
 
Interlude 
 
 
 
 
Fourteen years of life provides a lot for a woman to both enjoy and endure. This living, 
which H has undergone (and continued to undergo), we can know little about. It will have 
left its residue on her countenance; a nuance of expression, illumination of the eyes or in 
small creases that are beginning to form in her skin through habits of personality. Has she 
borne the pain of childbirth or has she borne the opposite pain, of not giving birth when she 
wanted to or even of losing a child? Is she loved by friends and fulfilled in her work? Does 
she love her husband? Is she secretly in love with someone else? Has she lost her parents? 
Whatever H has lived through in those years, despite any external signs, we will not know 
just by looking at her 82 
 
So here she is, the 30 year-old H in her dressing room, getting ready to appear on stage as 
the 13 year old heroine.  She is touching up her make-up and repeating her lines. She has 
learnt some relaxation techniques and uses then now, breathing deeply, trying to keep 
thoughts of disaster at bay. It would be right to wonder what delusion possessed her to 
believe that, relying merely on the fragile suspension of disbelief afforded by theatricality 
and artifice, she can realise such a retrogressive transformation.  How can she carry such a 
ludicrous task off?  It is a well-known trick in pantomime to have an older person 
pretending to be a child or the deluded sister who thinks she is as young and pretty as 
Cinderella, but these are the grotesques of theatre! 
 
Why make such a commotion? Everyone knows that Juliet is supposed to be 13 and is never 
played by a 13 year old. The part demands an actress of experience and the audience will 
think nothing of it.   
 
Despite her experience, she is always nervous before a performance, but never as much as 
this time.  Several thoughts come to mind: 
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       i 
She has her curtain call. The stage-hand comes to her dressing room to find her, he 
sees her slumped over the chair. She has fainted and feels ill, too ill to go on. She 
FDQ KDUGO\ VSHDN«6KH LV D JRRG DFWUHVV EXW LV VKH JRRG at deception? And then 
what? The next night and the next, would she do the same?  
ii 
6KH FRXOG JR RQ WR WKH VWDJH FRXUDJHRXV DQG XSULJKW DQG VD\  ³ /DGLHV DQG
Gentleman, I have something to tell you.  I am very sorry that I am unable to 
perform for you this evening. From this moment on I will no longer be an actress. A 
statement will be released where I will explain all. I thank you all most sincerely for 
DOORI\RXUVXSSRUW3OHDVHDVNDWWKHER[RIILFHIRUDUHIXQG´ 
iii 
Her understudy! Of course, she can do it. She can take over, right now. She will go 
and ask her to do it this moment.  She can then just disappear and let her take over. 
6KHLVQHDUHU-XOLHW¶VDJHDQ\ZD\DQGSUHWWLHUWKDQ+$OWRJHWKHUDPRUHFRQYLQFLQJ
Juliet. I will be doing the public a favour. 
iv 
H has an actress friend, one who is close in age and physique to her, perhaps a little 
fairer and more voluptuous but with make up and lighting and good corsetry she 
FRXOGSDVV6KHNQRZV-XOLHW¶VOLQHVRIIE\KHDUW6KHKDVORQJZLVKHGWRSOay that 
part but has lost all hope of doing so especially now that Luise has been asked do it. 
7KHUHLVRQO\URRPIRURQH-XOLHWLQ&RSHQKDJHQ¶VWKHDWUH6KHLVQRWDWDOOMHDORXV
RIKHU IULHQG¶VVXFFHVVEXWTXLWH IDVFLQDWHG WRVHHKHUDFW6KH LVVXUH WR be in the 
audience now. This could be her chance at last. What a wonderful solution, and an 
act of generosity to boot.83 
 
It is possible that such notions went through the mind of the actress whilst she was in her 
dressing room, one after the other, even all at once. Who can say? The scenarios above are 
merely my own fictitious imaginings. I was merely trying to put myself in her place.  
 
The most anxiety-provoking thought of all is to carry on.   And yet, somehow, to carry on it 
is also the most calming thought; for H to play Juliet as though she is totally happy to do it, 
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as though she herself is Juliet, and has never been anyone else. This, it seems, is what she 
does. 
 88 
Chapter 8: Anxiety 
 
/¶H[LVWDQWSRVVède ce que les hommes de notre temps ont si rarement: le 
caractèrHG¶DXWKHQWLFLWé, de jeunesse sérieuse. Il y a en nous une source 
MDLOOLVVDQWHGRQ¶WQRXVSRXYRQVHQWHQGUHOHOéger bruit - léger et profound 
- quand le reste de création fait silence; dans le doux et invincible 
bruissement de cette source réside Dieu. 
 
The one who exists possesses that which men of our times have so rarely; 
the character of authenticity, a serious youthfulness. There is a source 
which flows in us and in which, when the rest of creation falls silent, a 
faint sound is audible - soft and deep; in the gentle and invincible 
murmur of this source resides God. 84 
 
 
In the last chapter, it was concluded that the metamorphosis of the actress was effected 
through repetition, in the very particular sense that Kierkegaard uses the term. It was said 
WKDWUHSHWLWLRQLV WKDWµFROOLVLRQ¶RI LGHDOLW\DQGUHDOLW\+RZLV LWSRVVLEOH WRµSUHSDUH¶IRU
such a movement? If subjective decision is involved at all, and from the last chapter alone, 
it is apparent that in the case of the actress it is, then this collision does not simply occur 
without warning. The subject must in some way apprehend the collision. She (the actress) 
must understand that the direction she must take is forward into this unknown and that she 
cannot retreat. In this chapter, I will look at the state of anxiety as a preparation for such a 
move. Kierkegaard presents anxiety as privileged above all other subjective states in that it 
DORQHHQDEOHV WKH LQGLYLGXDO WRPRYH WRZDUGVDQG WKURXJK WKH µFROOLVLRQ¶DQG LQGRLQJ VR
bring about fundamental transformation.  
 
The prerequisite of decision, in the sense that I have been using the word (as the leap of 
faith, repetition and so on), is anxiety. Remember that Kierkegaard says that it was the 
DQJXLVKZKLFKZDVVRLQVWUXPHQWDOLQ$EUDKDP¶Vtrial. For Kierkegaard, however, anxiety is 
what the individual seeks to avoid in any decision and as such avoids decision in the real 
sense, that is an irrevocable turning around. 85 
 
in the wings 
On the few occasions that I happen to mention to someone that I am reading Kierkegaard, 
the response is sometimes a barely repressed shudder, sometimes a pitying look.  I have 
heard tales of people going mad through reading him and once saw a film where students of 
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Kierkegaard became vampires.86  For a long time, I could understand intellectually at least 
why such a response might come about but did not experience it myself. I thought that the 
various challenges I had faced in life had made me resilient, so that I had a certain kind of 
courage.  Perhaps this was true for some situations but it was only when I finally read The 
Concept of Anxiety that I realised I was ill prepared for the kind of ordeal that Kierkegaard 
had in mind. I understood then why the mention of his name struck fear into the sturdiest of 
souls.  
 
$Q[LHW\VD\V.LHUNHJDDUGLVµQRWMXVWSUH-sentiment ± DOOH[LVWHQFHPDNHVPHDQ[LRXV¶,W
is not an infirmity to be cured by rest or therapy. I am born into it and it is part of me. 
Anxiety does not derive from anything but is always present, even in a latent form.  ,WLVµD
WKUHDWWRWKHIRXQGDWLRQDQGFHQWUHRIRQHVH[LVWHQFH¶DQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHfor Kierkegaard, 
a privileged emotional state which can encourage transformation of the highest kind. 87 
 
I can dream of a life containing all the wonderful things imaginable (no-one ever plans for 
disasters) but nonetheless with this dreaming comes malaise. What if something goes 
wrong? If something specific presents itself, such as an interview for a job, then I may well 
become anxious in the ordinary sense. What Kierkegaard means by anxiety, however, is not 
in relation to anything in particular. In the productive and privileged sense that he employs 
the word, anxiety must be in the face of all possibility; everything that is both imaginable 
and unimaginable, the terrible along with the good.  This infinite possibility is also nothing; 
it has no name and there exists no means to describe it. 88 
 
In anxiety then, I do not discriminate. I do not select from amongst those possibilities the 
one that I wish to see as my own potential but see all of existence as possibility.  A state of 
DQ[LHW\ PD\ HYRNH LGHDV WR UHO\ RQ VXFK DV D PHPRU\ RI SDVW H[SHULHQFH RU µIDWH¶ DQG
VXFKOLNH EXW QR VRRQHU KDV LW GRQH VR WKHQ VD\V .LHUNHJDDUG LW ZLOO µHUDGLFDWH SUHFLVHO\
what it EULQJVIRUWK¶89  While anxiety takes all certainty away, it does not, however, produce 
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the paralysis of indecision but rather, through anxiety, the subject moves towards the 
decisive moment. 
 
,QDQ[LHW\,DPFRQIURQWHGZLWKWKHµGL]]LQHVVRIIUHHGRP¶DIUHHGRPZKLFKLVµHQWDQJOHG¶
says Kierkegaard. After all, an individual in freedom is free to decide but unable to exercise 
that freedom except by deciding. Through decision, I freely subject myself to bearing the 
weight of responsibility of that decision, with all of its, as yet, unknown consequences. 
Freedom, then carries out its own execution, by cutting off its own infinite possibility, it 
becomes limited and finite. The idea that possibility is light is often heard, says 
Kierkegaard, but possibility iVWKHµZHLJKWLHVWRIDOOFDWHJRULHV¶ 
 
The actress in Crisis VD\V .LHUNHJDDUG LV DQ[LRXV µLQ WKH ZLQJV¶ RU ZKHQ VKH LV  µEDFN
KRPH LQ KHU VWXG\¶  7KHUH KH VD\V VKH KDV µQR ZHLJKW XSRQ KHU¶ She knows from 
experience that she will be happy onstage and this time should be no different but she still 
has to step out of the wings: µthe very weight gives her lightness, and the pressure gives her 
WKHVRDULQJIOLJKW7KHUHLVQRWDWUDFHRIDQ[LHW\«¶90 
 
2QVWDJHVKHZLOOEHDUWKHµZHLJKWRI-XOLHW¶VLQWHQVHFRPSOH[LW\¶91WKHµZHLJKWRIDOOWKRVH
H\HV¶92 but it is there also µXQGHUSUHVVXUHWKDWVKHLVIUHHDQGKDVJDLQHGIUHHGRP¶93. The 
second time the crowd did not help her, they made the metamorphosis more difficult. She 
was no longer like the Court Chaplain in Berlin who, by giving a sermon only once in a 
while, could guarantee a hoard of people stampeding each other to get a seat in the 
audience.94 This performance of Juliet would secure her future, it would be what made an 
actress of her.  And yet, the crowd was ready to abandon her. 
 
If the actress was anxious in an ordinary sense before her performance it is only to be 
expected; actors need to feel anxious before their performance.  If not, they may be 
overtaken by nerves in front of the audience and the whole thing will fall apart. This time 
however when H was about to go on stage as Juliet was not going to be just any 
SHUIRUPDQFHEXW WR UHSHDW.LHUNHJDDUG¶VZRUGV µDSHUIRUPDQFH LQ WKHHPLQHQW VHQVH¶ LW
ZLOO PDNH WKH µJHQLXV¶ PDQLIHVW )RU VXFK JHQLXV anxiety is different from the ordinary 
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DQ[LHW\ RI OLIH ,W PD\ IHHO WKH VDPH EXW LWV UHODWLRQ WR µGDQJHU¶ LV WKH LQYHUVH µ2UGLQDU\
PHQ¶VD\V.LHUNHJDDUGIHHOVHFXUHXQWLOWKHPRPHQWRIGDQJHU7KHQWKH\DUHDQ[LRXV$V
soon as the danger has passed, they are no longer anxious. The genius, by contrast, becomes 
anxious before and after the moment of danger. The moment itself makes the genius strong: 
 
>+HU@ DQ[LHW\«OLHV LQ WKH PRPHQW EHIRUH DQG DIWHU WKH GDQJHU WKDW
trembling moment when [she] must converse with the great unknown, 
which is fate. [Her] anxiety is perhaps greatest precisely in the moment 
after, because the impatience of certitude always increases in inverse 
ratio to the brevity of the distance to victory, since there is more and 
more to lose the nearer one comes to victory, and most of all in the 
moment of victory, because the consistency of fate is precisely its 
inconsistency. 95 
 
The second time the danger was greater than the first for the actress and so was the anxiety 
which preceded it. Anxiety though, is like a constant state of anticipation, as soon as the 
GDQJHULVSDVWLWUHWXUQVLQSUHSDUDWLRQIRUWKHQH[WWLPH7KHVLWXDWLRQZDVµGDQJHURXVµIRU
the actress because the crowd were nonchalant. If she had failed, it may even have 
confirmed their expectations and thus made them more content. H had to go against 
H[SHFWDWLRQLQRUGHUWRVHFXUHKHURZQIXWXUHDVDQDFWUHVVWKDWLV¶WREHFRPH¶DQDFWUHVV 
« 
By assuming the responsibility of freedom, the individual succumbs to existence. This 
VXUUHQGHULQJRFFXUV LQDQLQZDUGPRYHPHQW LQµWKHKLJKHVWSLWFKRIVXEMHFWLYLW\¶ WKURXJK
SDVVLRQ,IWKHUHLVDZKROHKHDUWHGVXUUHQGHUZLWKQRUHVHUYHWRµWKHHYHU\WKLQJ¶ZKLFKLV
also nothing), then the choice is made.  In passion, I allow the whole of existence to bear 
down on me.  This deep level of inwardness is also a place where a quietening of all 
competing voices takes place.96  In surrender, in suffering, in the bearing of existence, there 
is the movement: down and further down until there is a rising up again:  resurrection:  
 
In actuality, no one ever sank so deep that he could not sink deeper, and 
there may be one or many who sank deeper. But he who sank in all 
possibility ± his eyes became dizzy, his eyes became confused, so he 
could not grasp the measuring stick that Tom, Dick, and Harry hold out 
as a saving straw to one sinking; his ear was closed so he could not hear 
what the market price of men was in his own day, did not hear that he 
was just as good as the majority, He sank absolutely, but then in turn he 
emerged from the depth of the abyss lighter than all the troublesome and 
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terrible things in life... I will not deny that whosoever is educated in 
SRVVLELOLW\ LV H[SRVHG WR GDQJHU«>EXW@ WKH DVVDXOWV RI DQ[LHW\ HYHQ
though they be terrifying will not be such that he flees from them. The 
Anxiety enters into his soul and searches out everything and anxiously 
torments everything finite and petty out of him, and then it leads him 
where he wants to go.97 
 
I cannot say that I have ever had such courage, the kind that Abraham undoubtedly had.  
The actress H, though, was not being asked to kill her son; neither was she going to be 
crucified. She was only performing a role in the theatre!  Nonetheless, she was anxious, 
says Kierkegaard; she too was µHGXFDWHG LQ SRVVLELOLW\¶ FDSDEOH RI XQGHUJRLQJ
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ1HYHUWKHOHVVFDQLWUHDOO\EHVDLGWKDWKHUFRXUDJHLVHTXDOWR$EUDKDP¶V" 
 
altered 
7KHZRUGµGDQJHU¶VHHPVWREHDQH[DJJHUDWLRQKHUH7KHPHWDPRUSKRVLVRIWKHDFWUHVVLVD
change involving an irreversible movement towards an unknown future, but given the 
situation, how can such a thing be considered truly dangerous?  
 
In a footnote in The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard remarks that there is a Danish word 
IRU µDOWHUDWH¶ZKLFK LVXVHG LQ WKH sense of changing, or bringing out of its original state. 
Another related word in Danish, alteretet  µWR EHFRPH DOWHUHG¶ DOVR PHDQV µEHFRPLQJ
IULJKWHQHG¶98  There is at least an etymological relation between anxiety and transformation 
and The Concept of Anxiety takes this relation further. The meaning of conversion in 
Christianity is becoming aware of the fact of being a sinner. Adam, the first sinner, altered 
his status in the most profound sense; through sin he became man when once he was an 
angel. Adam became separated from God because he succumbed to physical desire. In 
becoming human he also becomes animal.  The human being says Kierkegaard µis a 
V\QWKHVLVRIWKHDQJHODQGWKHEHDVWDQGWKHUHIRUHFDQEHLQDQ[LHW\¶99  
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SDUWLFXODU WLPH+H WKRXJKW WKDW-HVXVUHDOLVHG WKDWKHZDV WKHVRQRI*RGZKHQKHUHDFKHGµWKHDJHRI
UHDVRQ¶P\IDWKHUDQGDQRWKHU&DWKROLFIULHQGWKDW,DVNHGDOVREHOLHYHGWKLV7KH0RQVLJQRUDVNHGP\
father why I wanted to know (he had never seen me at Mass!) and he told the Monsignor that I was 
VWXG\LQJ SKLORVRSK\ µ$K¶ VDLG WKH 0RQVLJQRU µWKHQ VKH RXJKW WR JR DQG DVN WKH WKHRORJLDQV LQ
%URPSWRQ2UDWRU\¶,WVHHPHGREYLRXVIURPWKLVWKDWIRUSUDFWLFLQJ&KULVWLDQVGDtes and facts are of no 
real consequence to their practice. Someone who knows the theory of how Titian painted his great 
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Through his own actions, Adam bestowed upon himself a life where he would be 
LUUHYRFDEO\VHSDUDWHGIURP*RG$GDP¶VVLQDVRULJLQDOVLQLVVRPHWKLQJWKDW&KULVWLDQV
say all human beings inherit but it is not something to be worn like a family heirloom. For 
Kierkegaard,  it is something that I must take responsibility for, as though I am Adam.  This 
realisation of sin, of my individual responsibility for it and for my own earthbound 
existence which separates me from God, is conversion. Conversion means, in effect, to 
become a sinner. Just as Adam would have contemplated his future on a previously 
uninhabited earth, true conversion is a turning around to face the future, the unknown that 
awaits me: 
 
The difference between Adam and the subsequent individual is that for 
the latter the future LVUHIOHFWHGPRUHWKDQIRU$GDP«>IRUZKRP@«WKH
future seems to be anticipated by the past or by the anxiety that the 
possibility is lost before it has been.100   
 
:KDW$GDPJDLQHGWKURXJKVLQLVIUHHGRPµWKHSRVVLEOHLVWKHIXWXUHDQGWKHIXWXUHLVIRU
tiPHWKHSRVVLEOH¶101   
 
,QFRPPLWWLQJWKHµ2ULJLQDO6LQ¶$GDPIRUJHVKLVGHVWLQ\LQIUHHGRPWREHDEDQGRQHGWRD
life as a limited and finite being who does not know the source of his existence. The 
moment of Original Sin, says Sartre, restores meaning to µRULJLQDOEHLQJ¶,I%HLQJZDVWKH
contradictory unity of finite and infinite, the contradiction in this unity remained concealed. 
Sin not only makes this contradiction re-appear but is what constitutes and determines it: 
µWKH6HOIDQG*RGDSSHDU¶VD\V6Drtre: 
 
>«@ZKDWKH.LHUNHJDDUGFDOOHGVLQLV«WKHVXSHUVHVVLRQRIWKHSUH-
Adamite) state by the advent of freedom and the impossibility of retreat. 
Thus the wit of subjective life ± what he calls passion, and Hegel calls 
pathos ± is nothing other than the freedom that institutes the finite and is 
lived in finitude as inflexible necessity.102 
 
The acknowledgement of sin for Kierkegaard puts us into a relation with God as the source 
of salvation from earthly existence and for this reason becoming conscious of sin is a 
                                                                                                                                                     
masterpieces does not necessarily make a great painter. Likewise, artists do not necessarily make great 
theorists of their art.  Still, it seems strange that cultures may be built on ideas that are only vaguely 
understood, if they are understood at all by the population, either in practice or theory.  
100
 Ibid. p.91. 
101
 Ibid. p.91. 
102
 J.P. 6DUWUHµ.LHUNHJDDUG7KH6LQJXODU8QLYHUVDO¶LQBetween Existentialism and Marxism , London: 
New Left Books, 1974. p.160. 
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SRVLWLYHVWHS,I WKHUHZDVQRHOHPHQWRIµVSLULW¶ LI WKHUHZDVRQO\ZKDW.LHUNHJDDUGFDOOV
µSDJDQLVP¶ WKHQLWZRXOGEHLPSRVVLEOHWRVLQ&RQVFLRXVQHVVRIVLQ LV WKHUHFRJQLWLRQRI
absolute difference from God, whom I now turn and face rather than look away in 
ignorance, even if I do not know what I am looking for or at what I am looking.  
  
Nevertheless, anxiety does not come from the ability to decide between good or evil, but 
from the fact of being able to decide, or having to decide at all.  ,W LV WKH µhow¶ RI WKH
GHFLVLRQ WKDW WDNHV SUHFHGHQFH RYHU WKH µwhat¶ )RU H[DPSOH .LHUNHJDDUG VD\V WKDW LW LV
EHWWHUIRUDµSDJDQ¶WRSUD\µLQWUXWK¶WRDµIDOVH¶*RGWKDQIRUD&KULVWLDQWRSUD\LQµXQWUXWK¶
WR WKH µWUXH¶ *RG ,I WKH µKRZ¶ is accomSOLVKHG WKHQ WKH µwhat¶ ZLOO FRPH  ,Q D ORJLFDO
system says Kierkegaard, possibility passes over to actuality without anxiety; potentiality 
goes towards its end without resistance just as a seed will grow into a plant if it is not 
disturbed. Freedom does not belong to such a system, he says, but instead belongs to 
existence.   
 
%HLQJDEOHWRGHFLGHPHDQVEHLQJDEOHWRUHIXVHRUDFFHSWRQHSRWHQWLDORQH¶VµHQG¶RUtelos 
LQOLIH7KLVEHLQJDEOHWRGHFLGHUHTXLUHVDQµLQWHUPHGLDWHWHUP¶VD\V.LHUNHJDDUGEetween 
SRVVLELOLW\ DQG DFWXDOLW\ DQG WKLV LV µDQ[LHW\¶ 7KH LQWHUPHGLDWH WHUP WKDW KDV VR IDU
SXQFWXDWHGWKLVZKROHGLVFXVVLRQKDVEHHQµWKHPRPHQW¶2QFHDJDLQLWDSSHDUVLQDQRWKHU
IRUPµ$Q[LHW\LVWKHPRPHQW¶VD\V.LHUNHJDDUGµLWSRLQWVWRZDUGVZKDWIROORZV¶103   
 
Anxiety, then, like passion, is the momentary, present at the most extreme point.  This point 
ZKLFKLVDOVRWKHWXUQLQJSRLQWZKHUHLWLVQRWSRVVLEOHWRµVLQNGHHSHU¶WKHPRPHQWZKHQ
WKHDFWUHVVILQGVKHUVHOIFRPSOHWHO\DORQHDWµWKHKLJKHVWSLWFKRIVXEMHFWLYLW\¶ 
 
)LJXUDWLYHO\ , FDQ WKLQN RI µDQ[LHW\¶ OLNH D ORFN RQ D FDQDO ZKLFK LW LV QHFHVVDU\ WR JR
through in order to take a boat to another level and to continue on an otherwise inaccessible 
route. Anxiety is not only this mechanism but provides the force or the momentum with 
which to turn it.  In reality though, nothing could be detected as a medium of change in the 
metamorphosis of the actress. No-one could say from the outside if she really had passed 
through it and if indeed she was set on a new path once and for all.  What can be said is that 
in the moment of danger itself, onstage, the actress did not give a backwards glance to 
DOUHDG\ UHKHDUVHGFHUWDLQWLHV6KHKDGH[SHULHQFHG WKHDQ[LHW\ µLQ WKHZLQJV¶DQGKDGQRW
tried to avoid it. Instead, through assuming of the weight of onstage tension (which she 
herself produced), she arrived at the moment of danger where all anxiety dissipated.  She 
                                                   
103
  S. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981 p.49 and p.81. 
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played the role of Juliet at the age of 30 as though for the very first time.  No director could 
have instructed her. She must have arrived, through her own efforts at that more intensive 
return to the beginning.  She faced the crisis of decision, and in doing so decided her own 
destiny. She did this freely, out of freedom. Thus she prepared for her metamorphosis in 
anxiety, and through anxiety she effected this transformation that has been called a 
repetition or the leap.  This much and more indicates how she gave her remarkable 
performance.  
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Chapter 9: Crisis  
 
 
 
 
 
The actress H effected a metamorphosis in the way that has been described, through the role 
of Juliet, as repetition, in anxiety and passion. This performance, to which Kierkegaard 
dedicated his article The Crisis and the Crisis in the Life of an Actress, was indeed a feat 
worthy of attention. However, even if this interpretation shows that is was quite an 
extraordinary event, it is still difficult to assign this performance with the same sense of 
XUJHQF\ WKDW$EUDKDP¶V WULDOHYRNHG7KH WLWOHRI WKHDUWLFOH LV WRGRZLWK µFULVLV¶ DQG DV
such, does it not suggest an event that is much more radically decisive than the performance 
RIWKHDFWUHVVFRXOGSRVVLEO\EH"7KHQDWXUHRIWKHµFULVLV¶DWWKHKHDUWRIWKHDUWLFOHDQGWKH
anguish that Kierkegaard put himself through in deciding whether or not to publish still 
remains unclear.  7KHWLWOHLQFOXGHVWKHZRUG¶FULVLV¶WZLFHDQG\HWQR-where in the article 
itself is a crisis as such referred to directly.  This chapter will examine what is really at stake 
LQWKLVµOLWWOHDUWLFOH¶IRU Kierkegaard. 
 
7KHILUVWµFULVLV¶RIWKHWLWOHUHIHUVWRDFULVLVLQJHQHUDO$VVXFKLWFDQEHDVVHUWHGWKDWZKDW
Kierkegaard means by this are the political and cultural changes that coincided with the 
writing and publication of Crisis in 1847-8.  At that time, there was a great deal of 
instability and change in Denmark. The French Revolution and its repercussions, including 
the Dano-Prussian War, prompted Kierkegaard to see his country as being in a state of 
disintegration and literally on the edge of downfall.  Political, religious and philosophical 
ideas which he felt to be profoundly antithetical to his thinking began to dominate the 
scene.  Political groups began to attempt to rally individuals together into collective struggle 
(it was in 1848, that Marx and Engels wrote The Communist Manifesto).  In Christianity too 
WKHSHRSOH¶VFKXUFKZDVWKULYLQJDVDFROOHFWLYHPHDQVRIZRUVKLS104 
 
Equally, German philosophy was beginning to dominate the intellectual landscape in 
Europe and subsequently in Denmark itself. Hegel began to have a huge influence in 
SKLORVRSK\+HJHO¶VVSHFWDFXODULQWHOOLJHQFHGLIILFXOW\DQGSURIXQGLW\DVDSKLORVRSKHUZDV
                                                   
104
 7KHFRPPHQWDU\LQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VMRXUQDOVPHQWLRQVWKDW.LHUNHJDDUGVDZWKLVSHUiod as an age of 
disintegration or of crisis. S. Kierkegaard, Papers and Journals : A Selection,  London: Penguin Books, 
1996. p.350. 
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not in doubt for Kierkegaard. The problem, for Kierkegaard,  was that he believed Hegel 
was trying to systematise existence and in doing so was attempting to stand outside of the 
system he himself had created, thus assuming an authority and objectivity that no human 
being can claim, not even the greatest of thinkers. 
 
With the increasing influence of Hegel, Kierkegaard feared for the fate of Danish 
philosophy which he said, was different from German philosophy. It did not seek 
H[SODQDWLRQ LQ WKH ZD\ WKDW *HUPDQ SKLORVRSK\ GLG EXW LQVWHDG EHJDQ ZLWK µ«the 
proposition that there are many things between heaven and earth which no philosophy has 
H[SODLQHG¶105  In another journal entry, he describes Danish philosophy as:  
 
>«@ KDYLQJ SHUKDSV GLVFRYHUHG WKDW WKHUH LV VRPHWKLQJ GLIIHUHQW DQG
something more, something it provisionally calls the innermost behind, 
or what lies behind innermost Being. As soon as it discovers what this is, 
or, as my barber more correctly put it as soon as it gets behind there, it 
will gain the European reputation which Niels Rasmussen had intended 
IRU LW 7KLV LQ P\ EDUEHU¶V RSLQLRQ RQH PD\ VDIHO\ Gare to hope, 
confident in the extraordinary powers of Danish philosophy.106 
 
,WLVIRUWKHVHUHDVRQVWKDW.LHUNHJDDUGZDVVRGHWHUPLQHGWRLQVLVWRQWKHµVLQJOHLQGLYLGXDO¶
DQG DV , VXJJHVWHG SUHYLRXVO\ WKDW KH ZDV FRQYLQFHG WR ZULWH RQFH DJDLQ LQ µLQGLUHFW¶
authorship at this time 
 
7KH VHFRQG FULVLV RI WKH DUWLFOH¶V WLWOH LV D FULVLV LQ SDUWLFXODU µWKH FULVLV LQ WKH OLIH RI DQ
DFWUHVV¶ &HUWDLQO\ WKHDFWUHVVHQGXUHGVRPHWKLQJZKHQVKH UHWXUQHG WR WKH UROHRI-XOLHW
and certainly it was ordeal for her but, despite all that has been described in relation to her, 
is what she went through a crisis in the true sense of the word? Why does Kierkegaard call 
WKH VLWXDWLRQ RI WKH DFWUHVV D µFULVLV¶ DQG QRW µPHWDPRUSKRVLV¶ VLQFH WKH ODWWHU LV ZKDW LV
ostensibly of concern in the article?  
 
The decision to publish the article, as I mentioned at the start of Part Two, threw 
Kierkegaard into a quandary but it was not the first time that the decision to publish or not 
to publish a particular work had this effect on him. The case of Crisis, however, illustrates 
quite clearly what rests on such a decision.107   
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 Ibid. [44 V A 46], p.181. 
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 Ibid. [III B 192], p.149. 
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 ,Q:DOWHU/RZULH¶V ,QWURGXFWLRQ WR Training in Christianity, he explains that the decision to publish 
WKDW WH[WZDVDOVRIUDXJKWZLWKµWKHDJRQ\RILQGHFLVLRQ¶.LHUNHJDDUGZDVVRWURXEOHGE\WKHQHZVWKDW
5HJLQH2OVHQ¶VIDWKHUKDGGLHGWKDWKHVXIIHUHGDXGLWRU\KDOOXFLQDWLRQVZKLFKLQWKHHQGGHFLGHGKLPWR
publish. /RZULH UHPDUNV WKDW .LHUNHJDDUG ZRXOGKDYHEHHQ VXIILFLHQWO\ DZDUH WKDW WKRVH µYRLFHV¶ ZHUH
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« 
In Pierre or the Ambiguities (published in 1852) Herman Melville, in a surreal and 
magnificent observation on the currents of thought and literary styles of the day, discusses 
KRZWKHµKHUR¶3LHUUHPDNHVYDULRXVIRUD\VLQWRUHOLJLRQZULWLQJDORYHDIIDLUDQGVRRQ
,QRQHVHFWLRQµ3LHUUHDV-XYHQLOH$XWKRU¶0HOYLOOHGHVFULEHVWKHYHU\DQ[LHWLHVWKDWEHVHW
an author on publishing their work:  
 
It is well enough known, that the best productions of the best human 
intellects, are generally regarded by those intellects as mere immature 
freshman exercises, wholly worthless in themselves, except as initiatives 
for entering the great University of God after death. Certain it is, that if 
any inferences can be drawn from observations of the familiar lives of 
men of the greatest mark, their finest things, those which become the 
foolish glory of the world, are not only poor and inconsiderable to 
themselves, but often positively distasteful; they would rather not have 
WKH ERRN LQ WKH URRP«/HW QRW WKH VKRUW-sighted world for a moment 
imagine, that any vanity lurks in such minds; only hired to appear on the 
stage, not voluntarily claiming the public attention; their utmost life-
redness and glow is but rouge, washed off in private with bitterest tears; 
their laugh only rings because it is hollow; and answering laugh is not 
laughter to them. 108 
 
This kind of insecurity, the schism between public opinion and private endeavour, seems to 
accurately depict the predicament that any author can find themselves in.  At the time of 
publishing Crisis, Kierkegaard would no doubt have suffered precisely from this effect, not 
only because he was an author who published frequently and so was always in the public 
eye, but because of a recent event in his life which would have still been extremely painful 
for him.   
 
In 1845,  Peder Ludvig Møller ZURWHDQHJDWLYHUHYLHZRI.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSXEOLFDWLRQStages 
RQ/LIH¶V:D\ (also published 1845).  Kierkegaard felt 0¡OOHU¶V critique to be unfair and ill-
conceived.  As Møller was also a contributor to The Corsair, a Danish satirical newspaper, 
.LHUNHJDDUG ZURWH WZR UHVSRQVHV WR 0¡OOHU¶V DUWLFOH IRU WKH SDSHU The Activity of a 
Travelling Esthetician, which ridiculed Møller and Dialectical Result of a Literary Police 
Action where he vehemently attacked the paper and openly invited the editor to satirize him. 
The Corsair took him up on his challenge by publishing a series of deeply personal attacks 
on Kierkegaard.  As a result, he was ridiculed in the streets of Copenhagen wherever he 
                                                                                                                                                     
part of him but they were nonetheless so terrifying for him that he felt compelled to do as they said.  S. 
Kierkegaard. Training in Christianity. New York: Vintage Books, 2004. p 1.1. 
108
  H. Melville. Pierre or the Ambiguities. London: Penguin, 1996. p.258 . 
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ZHQW  µ7KH &RUVDLU $IIDLU¶ UHVXOWHG LQ KLP VWDWLQJ WKDW WKH HQWLUH HSLVRGH KDG PDGH KLP
decide to give up his indirect authorship and that he was doing so of his own free will, not 
because he was being forced to by anyone else. 
 
Obviously then, for Kierkegaard to publish an article about an actress, under the pseudonym 
µ,QWHU HW ,QWHU¶ LQ D SRSXODU QHZVSDSHU ZDV OD\LQJ KLPVHOI ZLGH RSHQ WR FULWLFLVP DQG
comment. At the same time, it must have been a risk of great significance for him; the very 
act of publishing itself seems to embody the whole question that is of concern in his 
discussion of the metamorphosis of the actress. The actress becomes an actress only in her 
30th year: µDW  WKH PHWDPRUSKRVLV LV VXFFHVVIXO¶. The question can be posed of any 
µEHFRPLQJ¶ $W ZKDW SRLQW GRHV .LHUNHJDDUG become religious? At what point does 
Johannes become a philosopher or indeed do I become anything in life?  The 
metamorphosis of the actress was complete at 30; this was not the end but the starting point, 
where she could actually begin to be an actress, beginning in the full sense that Kierkegaard 
proposes. 
 
In Crisis .LHUNHJDDUGPHQWLRQVWKHH[DPSOHRIDµ\RXQJPDQ¶µ:KHQZLOOKHSURGXFHKis 
EHVWO\ULFDOSRHWU\"¶DVNV.LHUNHJDDUG 
 
>«@ LQKLV WZHQWLHWK\HDU"%\QRPHDQV+LVEHVW O\ULFVZLOOFRPHDWD
somewhat older age, when time has taken away the fortunate accidentals 
of his youthfulness so that he now relates himself to his idea purely 
ideally and thereby, serving, also relates himself in a profound sense to 
his idea. 109 
 
,W LV KDUG WR DYRLG WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW WKH µ\RXQJ¶ PDQ LQ TXHVWLRQ KHUH LV .LHUNHJDDUG
KLPVHOI<HWZKDWKHVD\VLQUHODWLRQWRWKLVµ\RXQJPDQ¶LVDOPRVWDFRPSOHWH replica of 
his statements about the actress.  
 
In journal entries around the time of publishing Crisis, Kierkegaard relates that he has been 
continually haunted by the thought that he would soon die and that the article may be 
published after his death.  In 1848, Kierkegaard was 33, the age when his father had 
predicted all of his children would die.110 Kierkegaard feared that if he reneged on his 
UHVROYH WR µVSHDN¶ LQ GLUHFW FRPPXQLFDWLRQ WKHQ *RG PD\ DEDQGRQ KLP  It is easy to 
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 S. Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses and the Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press,199. p.320 
110At the age of twenty-IRXU.LHUNHJDDUG¶VIDWKHUUHYHDOHGWRKLPWKDWRQFHDVDVWDUYLQJVKHSKHUGER\RQ
Jutland heath, he had cursed God for his miserable situation. Although his fortunes quickly turned around, 
his father was haunted by the belief that all of his children would die by the age of 33, the age at which 
Christ died on the cross. Of his seven children only Peter and Søren survived beyond that age 
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imagine that for Kierkegaard, believing as he did that he was in such spiritual and mortal 
danger, there was an immense amount at stake in publishing what otherwise might seem 
TXLWH DQ LQVLJQLILFDQW DHVWKHWLF µOLWWOH DUWLFOH¶  +H KDG KRZHYHU ZULWWHQ LW XQGHU D
pseudonym for good reasons and he knew he had to be true to himself.  He also wanted to 
dispel any idea that the attacks he had suffered through the Corsair Affair had made him 
µVDLQWO\¶DQGWXUQHGKLPWRZDUGV&KULVWLDQLW\+HLQVLVWHGWKDWKHKDGDOZD\VEHHQUHOLJLRXV
from the beginning and wanted to oppose the idea that it was something a person turned to 
only in adversity or old age. 
 
Publishing Crisis meant that Kierkegaard was also facing the prospect of his very own 
UHSHWLWLRQ+HKDGµDQQRXQFHG¶WKHHQGRIKLVLQGLUHFWcommunication and that he was going 
to write under his own name as a religious author. Having reverted in Crisis to indirect 
communication he would have to become, once again, a religious author. 7KLVµOLWWOHDUWLFOH¶ 
then, was not only an occasion to talk about his admiration for the actress but, through her, 
WRH[DPLQHKLVRZQGLOHPPDRIµEHFRPLQJ¶DXQLTXHO\UHOLJLRXVDXWKRU7KLVGHFLVLRQZDV
QRW RQO\ DQ DHVWKHWLF RQH EXW DV D &KULVWLDQ LW PHDQW WR GHFLGH µEHIRUH *RG¶ Such a 
decision would also be a sacrifice of any remaining chance for Kierkegaard to increase 
recognition and respect as a literary persona. A religious author no doubt had much less 
appeal than an aesthetic one. Indeed, as Walter Lowrie comments in his introduction to 
Training in ChristianityµWRGHFLGHIRU&KULVW¶ZDVDOVRWREHFRPHDµFXOWXUDODOLHQ¶111  
 
However, becoming religious (becoming anything) does not happen once and for all.  Sartre 
said that Kierkegaard taught him what was entailed in calling oneself an atheist. 
Kierkegaard does this, says Sartre, through tracing through his writing the passage back 
µIURPVSHHFKWRVSHDNHU¶6XFKµYHUEDODOOLDQFHV¶KHVD\VDUHµQRWLQWHOOLJLEOH¶:  
 
When we encounter his words, they immediately invite us to another use 
of language, that is WRVD\RIRXURZQZRUGV«.LHUNHJDDUG
VWHUPVUHIHU
us to what are now called , in accordance with his precepts, the 
µFDWHJRULHV¶ RI H[LVWHQFH«:LWKLQ HDFK RI XV KH RIIHUV DQG UHIXVHV
himself, as he did in his own lifetime; he is my adventure and remains, 
for others, Kierkegaard, the other - a figure on the horizon testifying to 
the Christian that faith is a future development forever imperilled, 
testifying to myself that the process of becoming-an-atheist is a long and 
difficult enterprise.112 
 
The character of Juliet via the actress H, authored by Inter et Inter, produces such a chain of 
VXFKXQLQWHOOLJLEOHµDOOLDQFHV¶DQGWKHWUDMHFWRU\WKDWWKHUHDGHUIROORZVLQCrisis is back to 
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both Kierkegaard and ourselves as readers. Who is this actress if she is not every single 
LQGLYLGXDO WKH LQGLYLGXDO LQ JHQHUDO DV WKH µSXEOLF¶ RU WKH UHDGHU DQG WKDWYHU\SDUWLFXODU
individual, Kierkegaard himself?  The crisis of the actress is nothing less than the crisis of 
Kierkegaard and by extension it is also ours.  
 
Finally, despite his fears, Kierkegaard does publish the article, commenting in his journals 
WKDWKHZDVJODGEHFDXVHLIKHKDGGLHGZLWKRXWGRLQJVRKHZDVFHUWDLQµWKDWLQWKHIULJKWIXO
and frivolous conceptual confusion of our age people would have come out and babbled 
VRPHWKLQJDERXW>KLP@EHLQJDQDSRVWOH«¶113 
 
I can imagine Kierkegaard handing the manuscript over to the printers. The moment that he 
ZDONVRXWRIWKHSULQWHU¶VGRRULWPD\DOUHDG\EHWRRODWH114 What did he feel like waiting 
for it to appear in Faederlandt, going to buy his copy on that Monday morning of July 24th, 
1848? In fact the publication of the article created hardly a stir. Perhaps this fact, that the 
audience paid so little attention to it, was the very difficulty that made his transition 
possible, just as it did for the actress. 
 
7KHLGHDRIµJRLQJRQVWDJH¶FDQEHWDNHQWRPHDQDQ\NLQGRIGHFODUDWLRQRILQWHQWHYHQD
private one). It is a commitment to decision, assuming a role in life, the decision to become 
something, to begin. The PRPHQW,µJRRQVWDJH¶ZKHQWKHUHLVQRPRUHWLPHIRUUHKHDUVDO
,VWHSLQWRWKDWVSDFHZKHUHFRQVFLRXVQHVVHPHUJHVLQµWKHFROOLVLRQRILGHDOLW\DQGUHDOLW\¶
LQDOOLWVFRQWUDGLFWLRQV,WLVDOVRRQVWDJHWKDWWKHµGDQJHU¶VWULNHVDQGWKDW.LHUNHJDDUGWHlls 
us that the actress is at her happiest, where all anxiety disappears. To become in the sense 
that Kierkegaard proposes, is to produce my own momentum for change, to bear the full 
ZHLJKWRI UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRUP\GHFLVLRQDQG WR µJRRQ VWDJH¶ ULJKW LQWR WKH µGDQJHU¶ DQG
there in that moment where I cannot sink any deeper under all of that weight to allow 
myself to be transformed, in joy and tranquillity.  
 
,DPUHPLQGHGRI.DIND¶VVWRU\A Report for an Academy, where the narrator, an ape, tells 
the story of how he had been shot and taken into captivity. In a painful realisation he 
discovered that the only way out (he explicitly says he did not ask for freedom, only a way 
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out) was to cease to be an ape and so he set about learning how to be a human being.  He 
tells how he learned the habits of the men that he encountered: the handshake, the smoking 
of a pipe, the drinking of alcohol and so on.  He tells of how a decisive moment occurs 
when he utters his first words:  
 
,FULHGRXWDVKRUWDQGJRRGµ+HOOR¶Ereaking into human sounds.  And 
with this cry I sprang into the community of human beings, and I felt its 
echo ± µ-XVWOLVWHQ+H¶VWDONLQJ¶- like a kiss on my entire sweat-soaked 
body. 115 
 
)RUWKDWDSHRI.DIND¶VLWZDVDOLIHRUGHDWKVLWXDWLRQWKDWPDGHKLPGHFLGHWRµEHFRPH¶D
human being. Such a situation can quite rightly be called a crisis. For Kierkegaard, the 
danger was a matter of spiritual salvation (if he died) and of his own future as a religious 
author (if he lived).    
 
 
krisis 
A crisis occurs when things can no longer continue as before.  To remain in the crisis 
situation is unbearable and yet I am faced with a dizzying array of escape routes. Whatever 
decision I make, if decision is possible, no exit can be guaranteed as the right one.  In order 
to escape, however, retreat is no longer possible, and there no way out except through some 
radical means.   
 
In medical terms, an illness reaches crisis at the very worse point of the illness before the 
patient turns toward recovery or death. The term crisis comes from this medical source, 
from the Greek krisis ZKLFKPHDQV µGHFLVLRQ¶ IURP krinein µGHFLGH¶ µ7RGHFLGH¶ ,KDYH
already mentioned, is from decidere, [ de + caedere,  µRII¶µWRFXW¶@ Decidere also means 
µWRGHWHUPLQH¶DQDFWRIYROLWLRQ(W\PRORJLFDOO\ WKHQWKHZRUGVµFULVLV¶DQGµGHFLVLRQ¶
both come to mean the same thing: a turning point, or a point of renewal which is also a 
severance.  Crisis comes to mean not the cause of decision but rather crisis is decision itself.  
Crisis as decision is the cutting off or the rupture with continuity, with the accumulation of 
past knowledge and experience.  Such an act requires an agency of sorts, since it is an act of 
YROLWLRQ $QG \HW VD\V 'HUULGDµ2QH QHYHU PHHWV GHFLVLRQ RU H[SHULHQFHV it ± it is 
VRPHWKLQJZKLFKLQWHUUXSWVDQGWHDUVWKHIDEULFRIWLPH¶116 The locus of crisis becomes the 
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locus of decision through the cutting off of familiar or reliable routes. This cutting is also 
the leap of Abraham and the metamorphosis of the actress.  Crisis is not the end but a 
beginning, a rebirth. As such, it is also repetition, a more intensive return to the beginning.  
$OO GHFLVLRQ LV µURRWHG LQ VXEMHFWLYLW\¶ VD\V .LHUNHJDDUG  +RZHYHU KH VD\V VLQFH WKH
VXEMHFWLYHLQGLYLGXDOµZDQWVWRHYDGHVRPH RIWKHSDLQDQGFULVLVRIGHFLVLRQ¶WKHUHPXVWEH
QR µFDVH LQ SRLQW¶ SUHVHQW DW DOO LQ WKHPRPHQW RI GHFLVLRQ117  $ µFDVH LQ SRLQW¶ LV VRPH
objective thought that serves as a distraction; a way to think away from the situation at 
hand.   
A quantative leap would be achieved through objective reason in the accumulation of facts 
and knowledge, like the chain of logic in Climacus ladder.118  $EUDKDP¶V OHDS KRZHYHU
involves a qualitative transformation and as such cannot be demonstrated objectively, only 
performed subjectivity. In the same way that any attempt to demonstrate the existence of 
God in an epistemological way is futile, so is any attempt to perform the qualitative leap by 
basing it on externals: 
And how does the existence of the god emerge form the demonstration? 
Does it happen straight away? Is it not here as it is with the Cartesian 
dolls? As soon as I let go of the doll, it stands on its head. As soon as I let 
go of it ± consequently, I have to let go of it. So also with the 
demonstration. So long as I am holding on to the demonstration (that is, 
continue to be one who is demonstrating), the existence does not emerge, 
if for no other reason than that I am in the process of demonstrating it, 
but when I let go of the demonstration, the existence is there. Yet this 
letting go, even that is surely something; it is, after all , meine Zuthat [my 
contribution]. Does it not have to be taken into account, this diminutive 
moment, however brief it is- it does not have to be long, because it is a 
leap.  However diminutive this moment, even if it is this very instant, this 
very instant must be taken into account.119 
 
7KLVµOHWWLQJJR¶LQWKDWµGLPLQXWLYHPRPHQW¶VHHPVWREHOLNHUXEELQJWKHPDJLFODPSLQD
constant and continuous movement; done with total volition anGZLWKQRµEXWV¶120At some 
point in the movement I will forget everything except this action. The task at hand will 
subsume me completely and I will sink into it. This may only be for one moment, the 
infinitesimal blink of an eye. Perhaps that is the letting go. In such a letting go, which is 
neither recklessness not thoughtless, but a decision on my part to go forward without 
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knowing why, then something occurs. It will be difficult then to say of such an occurrence 
WKDWµ,¶PDGHLWKDSSHQRUDWZKDWSRLQWI did so.  
 
In order to leap, I need to become light by means of weight. When Derrida says that 
GHFLVLRQPXVWEH µKHWHURJHQHRXV WR WKHDFFXPXODWLRQRINQRZOHGJHRWKHUZLVH WKHUH LVQR
UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶WKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\KHLVUHIHUULQJWRLVSUHFLVHO\WKLV weight. 121 
 
Kierkegaard asks: How do you save the man who has filled his mouth so full of food that he 
cannot eat and will die of hunger? Of course, you must empty his mouth of food.  In the 
same way if a man complains that despite being very knowledgeable, his knowledge has 
lost all meaning for him, then a person who seeks to help him would not wish to give him 
HYHQPRUHLQIRUPDWLRQ+RZHYHULIµDFRPPXQLFDWRU¶ 
  
>«@ WDNHV D SRUWLRQ RI WKH FRSLRXV NQRZOHGJH WKDW WKH YHU\
knowledgeable man knows and communicates it to him in a form that 
makes it strange to him, the communicator is, as it were, taking away his 
NQRZOHGJH«,WLVEHWWHUWRXQGHUVWDQGWKDWVRPHWKLQJLVVRGLIILFXOWWKDWLW
simply cannot be understood than to understand that a difficulty is so 
very easy to understand. When in such an order of things the 
communication does not aim at making the difficulty easier , the 
communication becomes a taking away. The difficulty is invested with a 
new form and thus actually made difficult. This is communication to the 
person who already has found the difficulty so very easy to explain. 122 
 
If I need to become less knowledgeable in order to learn then this does not mean to be like a 
FKLOGDJDLQ)RU.LHUNHJDDUGZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVQHZNQRZOHGJHLVQRWµQHZ¶LQWKe sense that 
it is a previously unheard of piece of information, of which there are ten a penny.  What is 
new is the position from which I view and experience the original. It is as though, as a 
friend once said of an experience he had, that he had been looking at life through the wrong 
end of a telescope. When he turned it round he saw everything with a new perspective. 
« 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VZRUNFRQVLVWHQWO\H[DPLQHVZKDWLVDWVWDNHLQDVVXPLQJWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\RI
freedom as an existing human being. The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, like 
Fear and Trembling, expresses this concern. A decision, in this case to become an actress, 
but in a more general sense to become subjective, to become a Christian, atheist, 
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philosopher or even human being is a decision which involves an intense kind of 
preparation towards the moment of crisis. Crisis, as the decisive moment, takes place in that 
very collision which is also existence at its most paradoxical. Anxiety produces the 
momentum with which to move forwDUGV LQWR WKH µGDQJHU¶ DQG RQFH LW LV UHDFKHG DOO
anxiety dissolves. The decision has occurred. In the moment of conversion, I jump out of 
existence and land exactly on the same spot once more, except that I am turned around to 
face a view that I no longer recognise. Only from there can I proceed towards a future. 
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Conclusion to Part Two 
 
7KLVVHFWLRQRQµ+¶WKHDFWUHVVLQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VDUWLFOHThe Crisis and  a Crisis in the Life 
of an Actress,  looked at the mechanisms through which subjective decision, in its most  
UDGLFDO VHQVH  FDQ EH FDUULHG RXW  .LHUNHJDDUG¶V QRWLRQ RI WKH µPHWDPRUSKRVLV¶ RI WKH
actress facilitated a discussion on the various components that are necessary to go through 
with decision: passion as the highest pitch of subjectivity, repetition as  the more intensive 
return to the beginning and anxiety as the privileged preparatory state of decision. In this 
VHFWLRQ WKH µORFXV¶ RI GHFLVLRQ LV RQFH PRUH VXEMHFWLYLW\ EXW RQH ZKLFK UHIOHFWLQJ
$JDPEHQ¶VVWDWHRIH[FHSWLRQLQ3DUW2QHLs not locatable as a fixed entity. I looked at the 
idea of assuming roles or persona through Balibar as a way of formulating what the 
VXEMHFWLYHORFXVRIGHFLVLRQFRXOGEH7KHµVXEMHFWLYLW\¶LQTXHVWLRQLQCrisis is ostensibly 
that of the actress via the UROH RI -XOLHW EXW WKURXJK H[DPLQDWLRQ RI .LHUNHJDDUG¶V
GLDOHFWLFDODSSURDFKLWLVFOHDUWKDWµWKHDFWUHVV¶LVDOVRWKHVLQJOHLQGLYLGXDOLQJHQHUDODQG
Kierkegaard in particular.  
 
7KHTXHVWLRQRIZKDW LWPHDQVWRµEHFRPHDQDFWUHVV¶ LVH[WHQGHGWKURXJh Kierkegaard to 
what it means to become a Christian, a writer, a philosopher and eventually a subjective 
individual.  As Agamben says in The Coming Community, there is no vocation (historical, 
spiritual, biological and so on) that a human being must µenacWRUUHDOL]H¶ 
 
«LIKXPDQEHLQJVZHUHRUKDG WREH WKLVRU WKDWVXEVWDQFH WKLVRU WKDW
destiny, no ethical experience would be possible - there would only be 
tasks to be done. This does not mean, however, that humans are not, and 
do not have to be, something, that they are simply consigned to 
nothingness and therefore can freely decide whether to be or not to be, to 
adopt or not to adopt this or that destiny (nihilism and decisionism 
coincide at this point). There is in effect something that humans are and 
have to be, but this is not an essence nor properly a thing: It is the simple 
fact of one's own existence as possibility or potentiality.123 
 
The decision to becoming anything in particular may be made in freedom but the decision 
to exist, as such, has already been made before me. This idea of possibility or potentiality, 
rather than substance, is perhaps a more apt description of subjectivity than any substantial 
RU ORFDOL]DEOH µHQWLW\¶ DQ\ DFWXDOLW\ RU PDQLIHVWDWLRQ 5DWKHU WKURXJK WKH FLSKHU RI WKH
actUHVV ,KDYH WULHG WR VKRZ WKDW LI µGHFLVLYHQHVVDGKHUHV LQ VXEMHFWLYLW\¶ WKHQ VXEMHFWLYH
GHFLVLRQRFFXUVRQWKHEDVLVRIWKLVSDUDGR[LFDOµIDFWRIH[LVWHQFH¶ 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
,Q WKLV WKHVLV.LHUNHJDDUG¶V SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW DOOGHFLVLYHQHVV LV µURRWHG LQ VXEMHFWLYLW\¶ LV
XVHGDVWKHVWDUWLQJSRLQW,H[SORUHWKLVSURSRVLWLRQWKURXJKWZRILJXUHVIURP.LHUNHJDDUG¶V
work, Abraham from Fear and Trembling and the actress from The Crisis and a Crisis in 
the Life of an Actress. Each of these individuals enact a particular and radical kind of 
decision which results in subjective transformation. Through them and their situations, 
described by Kierkegaard, I explore the question of whether or not subjectivity can be said 
WREHWKHµORFXV¶RIGHFLVLRQDQGLIVRZKDWis the nature of such decision. 
 
In Part One, the focus is the Biblical parable where Abraham is called by God to sacrifice 
KLVVRQ,VDDF8VLQJERWK.LHUNHJDDUG¶VUHDGLQJRIWKHSDUDEOHLQFear and Trembling and 
'HUULGD¶V UHDGLQJ RI .LHUNHJDDUG , WUDFH WKH PRYHPHQW RI $EUDKDP¶V GHFLVLRQ WKURXJK
IDLWK WKDW LV D GHFLVLRQ PDGH RQ WKH EDVLV RI ZKDW .LHUNHJDDUG FDOOV µWKH DEVXUG¶ 7KLV
VHFWLRQH[DPLQHVVXFKDPRYHPHQWLQWHUPVRIµWKHPRPHQW¶DSDUDGR[LFDOEXWQRQHWKHOHVV
transitional category of temporalit\$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQRFFXUUHGLQµWKHEOLQNRIDQH\H¶
that moment which for Kierkegaard, is a coincidence of the here and the now and  
µHWHUQLW\¶ 
 
The figure of Abraham is then examined, with the aid of Agamben, through the category of 
µWKHH[FHSWLRQ¶DQGWKURXJKWKHILJXUHRIhomo sacer,  DVDQµH[DPSOH¶ZKRLVDWWKHVDPH
WLPH DQ µH[FHSWLRQ¶7KHGXDOLW\ RI WKH µH[DPSOH¶ DQG WKH µH[FHSWLRQ¶ FR-existing in this 
one figure of Abraham, suggests a subjectivity which exists at the threshold of categories 
OHJDO VRFLDO DQG VR RQ ,Q WKLV FDVH WKH µORFXV¶ RI GHFLVLRQ DV VXEMHFWLYH H[LVWHQFH LV
placed at the very limits of such categorisation.  
 
In the course of this research, as I noted in the Introduction, I have been developing an art 
practice that is also a form of philosophical investigation, whilst exploring new forms to 
SUHVHQW VXFK DQ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ 7KH GLVFXVVLRQ EHWZHHQ µ(OHQD &DUQHOO¶ DQG µ$QWKRQ\
0F(OYLOOH¶ DV KDV EHHQ PDGH FOHDU LV D VFULSWHG GLDORJXH EHWZHHQ WZR HPLQHQW EXW
fictitious philosophers played by actors. This dialogue (which as a work in itself I call 
µ2QORRNHUV¶H[SORUHVWKHIRUPVRISUDFWLFHWKURXJKZKLFKSKLORVRSK\LVPDGHSXEOLFDQG
 108 
the kind of knowledge that is enabled or disabled through such presentation.  The dialogue 
is intended to be presented in a Philosophy conference setting where the audience are not 
aware of the fiction.   I wanted the work to operate as an exploration of the nature of 
philosophical authority, the performance of philosophy, and of the activating of the question 
of decision in this particular arena.  In the context of the thesis, I hoped that I could situate it 
so that the reader could experience it in a similar way.  As well as this element of 
SKLORVRSKLFDOµSHUIRUPDQFH¶,ZDQWHGWKHIRUPWRUeflect upon the content of the dialogue. 
7KHLPSHWXVIRUWKHZRUNZDVUHDGLQJ$JDPEHQ¶VWH[WThe Open; man and animal. I was 
struck by the elliptical nature of the figures that Agamben refers to both here and elsewhere 
(feral children, non-citizens, homo sacer, people in comas etc).  The dialogue emerged from 
a desire to hear one of them, in this instance a feral girl, talk about her own experience 
rather than have it appropriated and translated by the philosopher. I wondered what she 
would say if she were in a position to address the philosopher in his own terms, that is 
within philosophical discourse.  I also wanted to imaginatively explore the threshold 
between the human and animal state that Agamben himself conceptualises as caesura, µDQ
HPSW\LQWHUYDO¶ QHLWKHUKXPDQQRUDQLPDOOLIHDQGZKLFKµSDVVHVILUVWRIDOOZLWKLQPDQ¶
This notion of caesura VHHPHGWRPHWREHDQRWKHUQDPHIRU WKHVXEMHFWLYH µORFXV¶ WKDW ,
was trying to describe.  There were several reasons why I devised the dialogue in the way 
that I did.  I wanted the responsibility of decision, that is deciding whether the speakers 
were genuine, whether Eleanor was an academic, a wolf-girl and so on, to be held as much 
as possible by the audience.  I also wanted the audience to be able to suspend disbelief, to 
HQJDJHZLWKWKHGLVFXVVLRQGHVSLWHUHDOLVLQJWKDWLWZDVµIDNH¶DQGHYHQWXDOO\WRHQMR\EHLQJ
part of the narrative.   The performance locates decision within subjectivity and puts into 
question the validity of those external categories in the context of the existing individual. 
For Elena, for example, it is of little consequence who or what decided her status as 
µKXPDQ¶ µDQLPDO¶ RU LQGHHG µSKLORVRSKHU¶ :KDW LV RI VLJQLILFDQFH IRU KHU DV RQH ZKR
occupies such uncertain ground, is her owQFDSDFLW\ WRGHFLGH µZKR¶RU µZKDW¶ VKHFRXOG
µEHFRPH¶SHUKDSVZLWKRXWUHDOO\µEHFRPLQJ¶RUDFWXDOLVLQJWKDWUROH 124  Or, perhaps she 
was always certain who she was ± an actress playing a part in a performance.  Even as the 
writer or creator of this character, I cannot say for sure what motivates her.  
 
$IWHUWKLV'9'µFKDSWHU¶,UHWXUQWR$EUDKDPH[DPLQLQJWKHQRWLRQRIµREHGLHQFH¶WKURXJK
(WLHQQH %DOLEDU DQG WKDW RI µWKH FDOO¶ WKURXJK 6WHLQHU +HUH WKH RULJLQ RI GHFLVLRQ LV
H[DPLQHGDVDµFRPPDQG¶from an unknowable source. Nonetheless, whoever hears such a 
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call to obedience is not placed in a relation of mere servitude to the one who commands, but 
rather enters into an agreement of mutual responsibility. Obedience is, in this sense, a 
decision made by the subject in relation to authority, not a case of subservience.  
Nevertheless, the origin of the call in the story of Abraham is the unknown and unknowable 
God, who must remain hidden. Abraham must decide firstly whether he or she is genuinely 
being called by God, and secondly whether to obey such a call. The place at which such a 
call is heard, and the place from which it is obeyed is interiorityRU WRXVH.LHUNHJDDUG¶V
WHUPµLQZDUGQHVV¶7KHVLJQLILFDQFHRILQZDUGQHVVLQFear and Trembling (and elsewhere 
LQ.LHUNHJDDUG¶VZRUNLVWKDWLWGHVFULEHVVXEMHFWLYLW\DWLWVPRVWLQWHULRUOLPLWWKHSODFHDW
ZKLFK$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQLQIDLWKDQGWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUKLVREHGLHQFHZDVPDGHKHUHLQ
the inward place,  profoundly hidden even from Abraham himself.  
 
,Q RUGHU WR WDNH WKH GLVFXVVLRQ IXUWKHU LQWR WKLV UHDOP RI µLQZDUGQHVV¶ , WKHQ H[DPLQHG
0LFKHO+HQU\¶VQRWLRQRIradical subjectivity through my own reading of an early work by 
Henry, The Essence of Manifestation125.  The reading was documented as a personal diary or 
reflection on my reading and as such, was also a document of my own subjective 
experience of decision; I had already committed myself (for myself) to reading the text to 
the end but had still to carry out the activity.  I could not predict what this would entail.  
7KHRXWFRPHZDVDQGVWLOOUHPDLQVXQTXDQWLILDEOHDQGWKHDFWLYLW\LWVHOIDVDµILUVWWLPH¶LQ
many respects is unrepeatable.126  
 
I am interested in philosophy as an embodied practice, and here, in the spirit of 
Kierkegaard, it seemed apt to try, in some way at least, to engage with ideas on an 
experiential as well as a theoretical or intellectual level.  Including the DVD works as I 
have, as part of the thesis, means that in order to get from the beginning to end of the text, 
the reader is asked to physically move and do something other than reading.  It is of course 
up to the reader whether they choose to do this in the order that I prescribed. However, this 
interruption of the reading and the different kind of receptiveness that sound and vision 
requires, hopefully offers another layer of interpretation and feeds back into the reading of 
the text. This was part of my intention in including the works in the way that I did. As well 
as this,  I am interested in whether contemporary philosophical work can be carried out in a 
way that is not solely text-based, that is, which does not depend on the printed word.  For 
this reason, I wanted to see whether it was possible to explore the research question through 
other forms of practice.  Although these works are still very much text-based, they do allow 
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a level of engagement with ideas that is not solely academic. Equally, making the work was 
in itself a research process, uncovering and displaying different levels of the research 
question and ways to address it.  In particular I was interested in how the written text and 
these other instances of practice feed off and echo each other in ways that were not initially 
obvious.  
 
The second part of the thesis was determined by another decision ZKLFK,PDGHµLQIDLWK¶VR
WR VSHDN , KDG UHDFKHG D SRLQW RI µFULVLV¶ WKURXJK WKH 0LFKHO +HQU\ SURMHFW DQG LQ WKH
research as a whole.  When one of my supervisors suggested that I read The Crisis and a 
Crisis in the Life of an Actress, I made the decision to use this as a primary source for the 
next stage of the research, despite the fact that I did not know anything about it. Although at 
WKHWLPH,ZDVDZDUHWKDWWKLVGHFLVLRQZDVDIRUPRIµOHDSRIIDLWK¶DQGDVVXFKHQWLUHO\LQ
line with the project, it was not, at the time, an overtly conscious enactment of the research 
question. In retrospect, it became clear that it was precisely that. I made the decision to 
commit to this reading although I did not know what it would yield and despite the fact that 
I found scarce reference to it in any other texts.  
 
Part Two of the thesis is a reading of that text. In this section,  I look at the character of the 
actress in CrisisZKR,FDOOµ+¶VLQFHWKHDFWXDOVXEMHFW-RKDQQH+HLEHUJLVQRWGLUHFWO\
named in the article.  Although the article poses as a simple newspaper review of an actress 
SODWLQJWKHSDUWRI-XOLHW LQ6KDNHVSHDUH¶VSOD\ LWEHFRPHVHYLGHQW WKURXJKWKHGLVFXVVLRQ
what exactly is at stake for Kierkegaard, both in writing and publishing this article. The 
article also allows the discussion of decision and locus of decision to be examined in 
different aspects. 
 
$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQZDVH[FHSWLRQDO MXVWDVKHDVDQLQGLYLGXDOZDVH[FHSWLRQDO ,WLVQRW
even possible to say whether he existed or not. 7KHDFWUHVVµ+¶GLGH[LVWLQUHDOLW\KRZHYHU
and as such seemed a more tangible model of subjectivity, to begin with at least.  
 
,Q3DUW7ZR,WDNHZKDW.LHUNHJDDUGFDOOVWKHµPHWDPRUSKRVLV¶RIWKLVDFWUHVVDQGH[DPLQH
in what way she effects such a metamorphosis. What is of concern here is, once again, the 
FRQFHSW RI GHFLVLRQ WKLV WLPH H[DPLQHG WKURXJK .LHUNHJDDUG¶V FDWHJRULHV RI SDVVLRQ
repetition and anxiety. The movement that the actress performs in metamorphosis is, I 
suggest, a repetition in the VHQVH WKDW .LHUNHJDDUG XVHV WKH WHUP ,W LV D PRUH µLQWHQVLYH
UHWXUQWRWKHEHJLQQLQJ¶DQGDVVXFKLVDOVRDUDGLFDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ 
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:KDWHPHUJHV LQ WKHH[DPLQDWLRQRI WKHDFWUHVV LVDVXEMHFWLYH µORFXV¶RIGHFLVLRQZKLFK
like Abraham, is not a single entity but rather like a congregation of satellites around a very 
precise but empty central point. An array of characters emerge through the actress: Juliet 
(who, in herself, is a set of elliptical subjects), the actress at 16 and at 30 years of age, 
KiereNJDDUG¶V SVHXGRQ\P DXWKRU RI Crisis µ,QWHU HW ,QWHU¶ .LHUNHJDDUG KLPVHOI DQG µWKH
VLQJOH LQGLYLGXDO¶7KHVH FKDUDFWHUV RYHUODS RU LQWHUVHFW DW RQH VLQJOH SRLQW ZKLFK DW WKH
VDPH WLPH LV D SRLQW RI GLVORFDWLRQ ZKHUH QR FKDUDFWHU µEHORQJV¶ DV VXFK 2QFH Pore 
$JDPEHQ¶V µH[FHSWLRQ¶ HPHUJHV WKURXJK WKH ILJXUH RI WKH DFWUHVV %DOLEDU¶V QRWLRQ RI
persona helps to envisage such a place through the LGHDRIµWKHFLWL]HQVXEMHFW¶ 
 
By extension, it is possible also to imagine at that point of intersection (and dislocation) 
$EUDKDP µWKH IDWKHU RI IDLWK¶ WKH FKDUDFWHU RI (OHQD &DUQHOO  -RKDQQHV &OLPDFXV µWKH
SUDFWLFLQJGRXEWHU¶DQGEHJLQQLQJSKLORVRSKHUP\VHOIDVWKHµUHDGHU¶RI0LFKHO+HQU\DQG
of Crisis; the audience in Crisis; the reader of Kierkegaard and so on into the multitudinous 
web of subjective relations, pseudonyms, readers, actors, spectators and so on that are 
presented in the thesis as a whole.  
 
6XFKDQH[XVRUµORFXV¶LVDWWKHVDPHWLPHWKHSODFHRIIUHHGRPRIµLQILQLWHSRVVLELOLW\¶
As such, it is also a source of anxiety.  In the chapter on anxiety, I look at how the actress 
takes it upon herself to assume the responsibility of deciding to perform Juliet for a second 
time. Despite the odds being against her, she makes that decision in the only way possible, 
through anxiety.  Her decision is made in order to effect the very transformation which will 
enable her to become an actress, as though for the first time. 
 
)LQDOO\ , VKRZKRZWKH µFULVLV¶RI.LHUNHJDDUG¶V WLWOH LVDOVRGHFLVLRQ LQ WKHPRVW radical 
VHQVH WKHDFWUHVV LQ WKHDUWLFOH LV OLNHDFLSKHU IRU.LHUNHJDDUG¶VRZQDQ[LHW\DQG IRUKLV
own personal crisis. The moment of crisis is also the point at which decision occurs (once 
again the various instances of crisis related in the thesis coincide in this one term:  
$EUDKDP¶V.LHUNHJDDUG¶VWKDWRIWKHDFWUHVVDQG-RKDQQHVDQGDOVRP\RZQ 
 
What is of concern in the notion of crisis is the idea of a beginning, a re-birth or conversion. 
In any beginning, there is always decision. Decision meanVµWRFXW¶DQGDVVXFKLQVWLWXWHVD
VFKLVP ,Q WKDW FXW LV WKH µQRWKLQJ¶ WKDW µDE\VV¶ RI LQILQLWH SRVVLELOLW\ $W WKH SRLQW RI
GHFLVLRQWKHVXEMHFWLQKDELWVDWHUULWRU\ZKLFKQRFRQFHSWFDQGHVFULEHLWLVWKDWµEHLQJLQ
WZRSODFHVDWRQFH¶ZKLFKLVWKH very condition of decision.  
 
 112 
Through the discussion, then, emerges a model of decision as a point of crisis. Crisis as the 
condition of decision, it is that collision of elements from which there is no retreat but 
which requires instead a movement through and out of it, towards the unknown. What 
.LHUNHJDDUG FDOOV µIDLWK¶ LV GHFLVLRQ DW WKLVPRVW UDGLFDO SRLQW WKHSRLQW RIQR UHWXUQ  ,Q
crisis, subjectivity provides the passageway out, passion the catalyst, repetition the mode 
and anxiety the medium. All of these are components of decision, which coincide at the 
peak of their power in the moment of crisis. Together they effect an irrevocable 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQDGHFLVLRQZKLFKLVDµQHZ¶EHJLQQLQJUH-charged and re-intensified with its 
own potential. 
 
Decision then, in the terms set out here seems to be a very unusual occurrence, requiring a 
particular set of circumstances. However, for Kierkegaard, this is not necessarily the case. 
As he makes clear in Concluding Unscientific Postscripts, I can never tell which moment 
PD\ EH WKH GHFLVLYH RQH )RU WKLV UHDVRQ , PXVW µPDNH LW FOHDU WR P\VHOI ZKHWKHU , DP
EHJLQQLQJ VRPHWKLQJ ZRUWK EHJLQQLQJ LI GHDWK VKRXOG FRPH WRPRUURZ«¶ 127 For 
Kierkegaard, every moment must be thought of as having the potential for transformation. I 
cannot wait to be called by God or to be given a part in a performance. The moment has 
arrived. 
 
                                                   
127
 S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1974. pp.166-67. 
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Supplement 1 
 
3RVWVFULSWRQGLDORJXHEHWZHHQµ$QWKRQ\0F(OYLOOH¶DQGµ(OHQD&DUQHOO¶ 
 
As I say in the Conclusion to the thesis, it will now be clear that the discussion between 
µ(OHQD&DUQHOO¶DQGµ$QWKRQ\0F(OYLOOH¶LVDVFULSWHGGLDORJXHEHWZHHQWZRHminent, but 
fictitious philosophers played by actors. This dialogue (which I wrote and which as a work 
LQLWVHOI,FDOOµ2QORRNHUV¶LVLQWHQGHGWREHSUHVHQWHGLQD3KLORVRSK\FRQIHUHQFHVHWWLQJ
where the audience are not aware of the fiction.  I wanted the documentation to function in 
a similar way in the context of this thesis. 
 
The reader may then have experienced an element of confusion or uncertainty as to what 
this dialogue was or why they were being asked to look at this DVD in the middle of the 
text.  I would apologise for this discomfort if it were not for the fact that it was intended to 
some extent.  I hope that the reader will now understand what the purpose of that interlude 
was and why I did not want to give a detailed introduction to that section of the thesis.  This 
HOHPHQWRIµWULFNHU\¶VHHPHGLQLWLDOO\WRPHWREHFUXFLDOWRWKHVXFFHVVRIWKLVZRUN1RZ,
feel that this is less central and that even if the audience is aware of being involved in a set-
up the dialogue still sustains itself and allows the audience to engage on different levels, 
suspending disbelief at times and at other times being reminded that they are watching a 
piece of drama unfolding.  
 
7KHWLWOHµ2QORRNHUV¶WKDW,JLYHWRWKHZRUNLVIURPDOLQHLQRQHRIWKHPDQ\Wranslations 
RI5LONH¶VEighth Duino Elegy,QWKHSRHPWKHZRUGµRQORRNHUV¶LVRIWHQDOVRWUDQVODWHGDV
µVSHFWDWRUV¶7KLVZRUNQHHGVWREHUHIUDPHGHDFKWLPHLQRUGHUWRVXLWWKHFRQWH[WLQZKLFK
it will be shown (for example, in this thesis). 
 
The DVD dRFXPHQWDWLRQRIWKHGLVFXVVLRQEHWZHHQµ$QWKRQ\0F(OYLOOH¶DQGµ(OHQD
&DUQHOO¶LQFOXGHGZLWKWKHWKHVLVLVIURPWKHILUVWSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKLVZRUN,WZDV
SUHVHQWHGDVSDUWRIDUHVHDUFKV\PSRVLXPHQWLWOHGµInterrupting, Connections: Performative 
InterveQWLRQV¶ at London College of Fashion November 2004. The event was organised by 
Hana Sakuma, Lawrence Sullivan and myself,  all of whom presented work along with 
Andrew Chesher at the symposiu. It was introduced and chaired by Professor Neil 
Cummings (all from Chelsea College of Art & Design, UAL). 
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µ2QORRNHUV¶ZDVDOVRSHUIRUPHGLQ-DQXDU\2005 at Goldsmiths College as part of a series 
of events called 'Contemporary Thought' run by Professor Howard Caygill.  Three artists 
presented work: Laura Cull, Lawrence Sullivan and myself and the event was billed as 
µDFWLYDWLQJDQGLQWHUURJDWLQJVRPHRIWKHLGHDVUDLVHGE\DQGUHODWLQJWRDphilosophy of the 
event¶ ZKLFK ZDV WKH WKHPH RI that Contemporary Thought programme.  Laura Cull 
organised and co-ordinated the event. 
 
The actors who performed it both times were Linda Large as Elena and Alastair Danson as 
Anthony. I am very grateful to them for their commitment to the project and for their skill 
in understanding and portraying the characters. The dialogue, which I wrote, is entirely 
scripted and rehearsed and the actors learned the lines verbatim. I have included the script 
overleaf which is presented in the same form that the actors received it. There was some 
discussion in the rehearsals and some minor changes were made to the script between 
performances. This is the last version of the script that was used and may differ slightly 
from the one that is documented on the DVD. 
 
The second performance was, to my mind, better. However, my efforts at having it 
documented were unsuccessful and I do not have footage of the entire performance.  I have 
included some photographs from the Goldsmiths presentation which can be found after the 
script. I intend to re-stage and re-document it properly in the near future. The 
documentation itself can then have a life of its own as  a work on film which will tour 
conferences or be shown in other contexts. 
 
  121 
6FULSWIRUµ7KH2QORRNHUV¶ 
 
The event is advertised on the programme as follows: 
 
Where is the manager?  
 
Anthony McEllville (philosopher) and Vanessa Brooks (artist and writer)  
 
One sticks a finger into the ground to smell what country one is in; I stick my finger into the 
world, it has no smell. Where am I? What does it mean to say: the world? What is the meaning 
of that word? Who tricked me into this whole thing and leaves me standing here? Who am I? 
How did I get into the world? Why was I not asked about it, why was I not informed of the 
rules...How did I get involved in this big enterprise called actuality? Why should I be involved? 
,VQ¶WLWDPDWWHURIFKRLFH"$QGLI,DPFRPSHOOHGWREHLQYROYHGZKHUHLVWKHPDQDJHU  To 
whom shall I make my complaint?  ( Soeren Kierkegaard: Repetition) 
 
7ZRFRQWHPSRUDU\WKLQNHUVZLOOGLVFXVVZKHUH³WKHPDQDJHU´LVLQWKHZRUOGRIDUWPDNLng, 
understanding and theorising.)    
 
 
 
I introduce the session: 
  
Good morning. The next session will stage a discussion between two contemporary thinkers. 
The dialogue is somewhat traditional in philosophy but in its live form somewhat unpredictable. 
We have experienced a bit of this unpredictability already today since we have just heard that 
RQHRIWKHVFKHGXOHGVSHDNHUV9DQHVVD%URRNVKDVKDGWRSXOORXWDWWKHODVWPLQXWH,W¶V
unfortunate and I know some of you will have been really looking forward to hearing her today. 
However, all is not lost. Elena Carnell, Professor in Philosophy of Science at University of 
*XHOSK2QWDULRKDVJHQHURXVO\YROXQWHHUHGWRVWHSLQDWWKHHOHYHQWKKRXUWRWDNH9DQHVVD¶V
place.  
Our other speaker is Anthony McEllville, ( $QWKRQ\UHDFWVVOLJKWO\«ORRNVDURXQG
uncomfortable, Reader in Philosophy and Aesthetics at Vanderbilt University. His work 
traverses various disciplines including anthropology, politics and cultural history. His 1997 work, 
which most of you will know³&URVVLQJWKH/LQHDQLPDOOLIHIURP6SLQR]DWR'HOHX]H´IURP
Suny series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy) brought him International acclaim. He 
FXUUHQWO\ZRUNLQJRQDQHZSXEOLFDWLRQ³&UHDWLQJWKH+XPDQDUWEUXWDOLW\PRGHUQLVP´
(Published E\6WDQIRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVWKLV\HDU9DQHVVD¶VDEVHQFHPD\PHDQDFKDQJHLQ
WKHRULHQWDWLRQRIWKHGLVFXVVLRQ:H¶OOVHH6RZLWKRXWIXUWKHUDGR,¶OOKDQGRYHUWRWKHVSHDNHUV 
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Anthony: (sounding a bit breathless and hesitant) Thank you Isobel. 
Elena, Good to meet you (shaking her hand,FDQ¶WWHOO\RXKRZUHOLHYHG,DPQRWWREHKDYLQJD
conversation with myself in public! Thanks very much for stepping in. 
Elena: (friendly, calm and collected,W¶VP\SOHDVXUH 
Anthony:  I must admit to suddenly becoming a bit nervous. Here we are thrown together by 
DFFLGHQWWRHQJDJHLQSKLORVRSKLFDOGLDORJXHDQG«,¶PDVKDPHGWRDGPLW(OHQDWKDW,¶PQRW
that IDPLOLDUZLWK\RXUZRUN« 
Elena: :HOORIFRXUVHWKLVGRHVQ¶WVXUSULVHPH<RXZRQ¶WIRULQVWDQFHKDYH read my work since 
,KDYHQ¶WZULWWHQDQ\'RHVDSKLORVRSKHUQHHGWRZULWH"QRW confrontational). Having said that 
,¶PJODGVRPHGRZULWHOLNH\RX2WKHUZLVH,ZRXOGQ¶WKDYHKDGWKHSULYLOHJHRINQRZLQJ\RXU
work.  
Anthony: Great! At least we can estaEOLVKVRPHFRPPRQJURXQG%XW,KRSHZHGRQ¶WDJUHH
too much! That might not make for a very exciting discussion for our audience.  
Elena: 2K,¶PVXUHZH¶OOHVWDEOLVKRXUGLIIHUHQFHVEHIRUHORQJ«(turning to the audience and 
smiling then at Anthony) 
Anthony:  *LYHQWKHFKDQJHLQFLUFXPVWDQFHV,¶GMXVWOLNHWRRIIHUWKHDXGLHQFHDQGLQGHHG\RX
Elena, a brief overview of the area that Vanessa and I had planned to cover today. We had 
imagined this discussion would be a kind of live confrontation (friendly of course) between art 
DQGWKHRU\7KHWLWOHRIWKHVHVVLRQµ:KHUHLVWKH0DQDJHU¶DV\RXKDYHQRGRXEWVHHQLVIURP
Kierkegaard, a writer that has influenced both Vanessa and I a great deal.  Kierkegaard thought 
WKDWµall decision, all essential decision, iVURRWHGLQVXEMHFWLYLW\¶. This supposition was something 
WKDWZDVVWDUWLQJSRLQWIRUPHLQP\RZQZRUNDURXQGWKHVWUXFWXUHRIGHFLVLRQDQG«,¶P
concluding, for the moment, as far as one can conclude these things, that subjectivity has very 
little to do wLWKGHFLVLRQ9DQHVVD¶VYLHZLVVRPHZKDWGLIIHUHQWDQGIRFXVHVPRUHRQGHFLVLRQDV
DNLQGRIUDGLFDOO\VXEMHFWLYHPRYHPXFKOLNH.LHUNDJDDUG¶VGHILQLWLRQRIIDLWK6REULHIO\ZKDW
Vanessa and I had planned to do was to see if we could find not a bridge exactly, as we 
philosophers like to complicate things, but perhaps an interstice, a narrow chink in our positions 
ZKHUHZHFRXOGFRPHWRJHWKHU7KHQRWLRQRIµVRYHUHLJQGHFLVLRQ¶VHHPHGWRSURYLGHVXFKDQ
opportunity. Sovereignty, according to Giorgio Agamben, the Italian philosopher, is not a 
modern idea. It is the essence of the political.  Sovereign decision creates a state of exception,  
³DWKUHVKROGVWDWHRIWKHQRQ-identical, the liminal´DV$QGUHZ1RUULVVD\V:KHUHGRHVWKH
artist stand in relation to such a threshold? Does the artist create a space of exception within an 
DOUHDG\HVWDEOLVKHGRUGHUZKLFKWKHRU\WKHQKDVWRDFFRPPRGDWHDVH[FHSWLRQRU«GRHVD
space of exception emerge out of the rules, as a kind of loophole in the system, which the artist 
appropriates? Who is the sovereign, RULQ.LHUNHJDDUG
VZRUGVµWKHPDQDJHU¶ in the production 
of the artist? I suppose at its most simple this is a nature/ nurture question. Elena is this 
something you would like to comment on? 
Elena: Indeed ³«WKH sovereign decision or the state of exception opens the space in which it is 
possible to trace borders between inside and outside and in which determinate rules can be 
assigned to determinate territories. In exactly the same way, only language as the pure 
potentiality to signify, withdrawing itself from every concrete instance of speech, divides the 
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linguistic and allows for the opening of areas of meaningful speech in which certain terms 
correspond to certain denotations. Language is the sovereign who, in a permanent state of 
exception, declares that there is nothing outside language and that language is always beyond 
LWVHOI«1 
Anthony:  Precisely.  The question of language inevitably arises. How does the artist, or indeed 
any of us negotiate the determinations of language? How do we create something from the 
paradoxes that language leads us into when we try to defy it?  
Elena: ,IZHORRNDWZKDW'HUULGDVD\VDERXWGHFLVLRQ³the structure of decision can never 
become object of theoretical or speculative certainty ± LILWFRXOGLWZRXOGQ¶WEHDGHFLVLRQ´or  
³RQHVKRXOGQRWEHVXUHWKDWDGHFLVLRQKDVEHHQPDGHHYHQOHVVWKDWLWKDVEHHQDJRRGRQH´
we could begin to suspect that decision is not something that is made at all, at least not by us, 
whoever we are. Perhaps the sovereign (or the manager) is the law; something created by us 
EXWZKLFKKDVJDLQHGLWVRZQFKDUDFWHUEH\RQGRXUFRPSUHKHQVLRQDQGFRQWURO« 
Anthony: Given that you and I come from backgrounds in philosophy and science and not art, 
LW¶V right to extend the scope of this discussion.  I believe that contemporary artists are more 
than a little open to fields of enquiry outside of art. One only has to see the predominance of 
Deleuze on art theory programmes!  In this light I wanted to say that as Isobel was introducing 
us, I was reminded about some fascinating research that I believe you were involved with in the 
¶V"«UHVHDUFKRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQQDWXUHDQGFXOWXUHWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQRIWKH
µKXPDQ¶DQGVRRQ«LQIDFWWKHPHVWKDWZRuld be extremely useful to bring in here. I wonder if 
you would want to bring some of that expertise into the discussion?  (gesturing with his hands in 
the way that academics do)  
Elena: ( takes a breath ) $DK«,ZDVQ¶WWKLQNLQJDERXWWKDW«looks like she¶VWKLQNLQJ«ZHOO
its true I was involved in some ground-EUHDNLQJUHVHDUFKKRZHYHU\RX¶UHULJKWLWZRXOGEH
PRVWUHOHYDQW«,GRQ¶WNQRZKRZPXFK,FDQVD\IURPWKHVFLHQWLILFSRLQWRIYLHZ,ZDVQ¶W
actually the author, if you remember...  
Anthony:  ('RHVQ¶WVD\DQ\WKLQJFOHDUVKLVWKURDWORRNVHPEDUUDVVHGIRUFHVDODXJK"  Really!  
1R"«SDXVH 
Elena: :HOOZK\QRWWDONDERXWLW,GRQ¶WWHQGWRLQSXEOLFEXWWKLVLVDQXQXVXDOVLWXDWLRQDQGDQ
opportunity to break the rules, wont it?  No, I wDVQ¶WWKHDXWKRURIWKLVJURXQGEUHDNLQJUHVHDUFK
I myself was the research subject. Like a specimen! Can you imagine!  
Anthony: In what way?  
Elena:  ( a bit coy) 7KHµZROIJLUORI7XYD¶«KDKD«VRJUHDWZDVWKHLQWHUHVWLQP\FDVHWKDW,
became quite a FHOHEULW\«LQWKHVFLHQFHFRPPXQLW\DWOHDVW6RWKDWLVZKDW\RXPXVWEH
thinking of. (laughs) 
Anthony,¶PQRWVXUHPD\EH,¶PWKLQNLQJRIVRPHRWKHUUHVHDUFK«%XW(OHQD,GRUHPHPEHU
WKHFDVHRIWKHZROIJLUOYHU\ZHOO«,MXVWFDQWEHOLHYH«ZHOO«,DVVXPHWKH\¶YHVWRSSHGGRLQJ
those now, the case studies!  (a bit alarmed trying to be jokey)    
Elena: I agree it would have been good to see documentation of what a civilized person I had 
become!  But, yes, they stopped them. Maybe they felt that once I had mastered language I 
FRXOGQRORQJHUEHD³JRRGVXEMHFW´(does the inverted commas sign<RXVHH«HP«EHWWHU
                                                     
1
 Agamben ± Homo Sacer p21 
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QRWJRLQWRWKDWQRZ«VLOHQFH for a few seconds«KPP«WKH\ORVWLQWHUHVW,VXSSRVHWKDW¶V
the short answer. 
Anthony: (pause) Mastering langXDJHPHDQV\RXZHUHQRORQJHUDµVXEMHFW¶QRORQJHU
µVXEMHFWHG¶VRWRVSHDN«LVWKDWZKDW\RXDUHVD\LQJ" 
Elena:  :HOO\HV,WVHHPHGWRPHIRUDORQJWLPHGXULQJZKDWZDVFDOOHGP\³VRFLDOLVDWLRQ
SURFHVV´does the inverted comma sign again)  that I was PDGHWROHDUQµWULFNV¶,NQRZWKH\
were trying to help me, they did help me, but I was a bit like one of those dogs who learn to 
dance for Crufts, you know? It all felt quite unnatural to me. But once I had acquired language, I 
GLGQ¶WIHHODVWKRXJKW,Zas doing tricks anymore. I was just living, being myself. 
Anthony: But, if this is the case had you not then already in fact already been mastered in 
order to become yourself? 
Elena: ,ZDVQRORQJHUD³JRRGVXEMHFW´GRHV the inverted commas sign again) but I was still a 
subject of course, as we all are. There are many ways of being subject. 
Anthony:  Of course. 
Elena:  Well, you only have to look at the etymology! The Latin subjectus comes from subicere 
"to place under", a combination of sub meaning "under" and jacere "to throw.". From Aristotle 
we have to hypokeimenon, OLWHUDOO\µWKDWZKLFKOLHVEHQHDWK¶ but also µmaterial from which things 
DUHPDGH¶7KHYHUELVILUVWVHHQLQODWH0HGLHYDOSHULRGIURPWKH/DWLQsubjectare whilst 
subjective, "existing in the mind" dates from 1707. 
Anthony: <HV\HV«DV if remembering something«\RXUDQVZHUPDNHVPHZDQWWRDVN
KRZFDQ,SXWWKLV«GR\RXWKLQNWKDWHGXFDWLRQNQRZOHGJHDFDGHPLFDFKLHYHPHQWKDVPDGH
\RXRULQGHHGPDNHVDQ\RIOHVVRID³JRRG´(does the inverted commas sign) subject ? 
Elena: ,WKLQNLWZDV)ODQQHU\2¶&RQQRUZKRVDLGWKDW³Anybody who has survived his childhood 
has enough information about life to last him the rest of his days´ 
Anthony: But do you think that education beyond that of your own life has helped you in any 
way to understand your extraordinary situation?  
Elena:  (she gestures to the whole room). Perhaps I can see myself more clearly through your 
eyes. Is that self-NQRZOHGJH"««,¶PQRWVXUH«3HUKDSV,DPDEOHWRGHWHUPLQHP\ own 
destiny to a greater extent. 
Anthony: Ah yes? In what way?  
Elena: (her tone changes slightly to that of a news reporter).  In 1970, the discovery of Genie, a 
\UROGµZLOGFKLOG¶DURXVHGLQWHQVHFXULRVLW\DPRQJVWDFDGHPLFVLQDOOILHOGV7KHJLUOsuffering 
extreme neglect and social deprivation had been locked in dark room for over  ten years, tied to 
a potty chair and restrained by a harness.  Once brought to the attention of social services, a 
µ*HQLHWHDP¶ZDVHVWDEOLVKHGWRWDNHFDUHRIKHUDQGto study her behaviour. One psychologist 
VDLG³,W¶VDWHUULEO\LPSRUWDQWFDVH6LQFHRXUPRUDOLW\GRHVQ¶WDOORZXVWRFRQGXFWGHSULYDtion 
H[SHULPHQWVZLWKKXPDQEHLQJVWKHVHXQIRUWXQDWHSHRSOHDUHDOOZHKDYHWRJRRQ´ 
Everyone who came into contact with Genie was captivated by her. She was described as 
³IUDJLOH´³EHDXWLIXO´³DOPRVWKDXQWLQJ´HYHQ³HHULO\VLOHQW´8QGHUWKHVXSHUYLVLRQRIWKH*HQLH
team, she made good progress except in her speech. She failed to learn the kind of 
grammatical principles that, according to Noam Chomsky, distinguish the language of human 
beings from that of animals. In 1978 *HQLH¶VPRWKHUEHFDPHKHUOHJDO*XDUGLDQDQG
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LPPHGLDWHO\VHWDERXWVXLQJDPRQJVWRWKHUVFDUHUVDQGWKH&KLOGUHQ¶V+RVSLWDOIRUH[SORLWLQJ
Genie for personal gain. Now Genie is in a high security psychiatric unit, sedated with 
GUXJV«Pause«*LYHQRWKHUFLUFXPVWDQFHVLWPLJKWKDYHEHHQ*HQLHVLWWLQJKHUHZLWK\RX
today.  
Anthony: Tragic case, but ZHOO«,¶PQRWTXLWHVXUH«,PHDQDUH\RXVXJJHVWLQJWKat it was 
*HQLH¶VFLUFXPVWDQFHVRUKHUOHDUQLQJFDSDELOLWLHVRUERWKWKDWGHWHUPLQHGKHUIDWH" 
Elena: (excitedly, naturally) The law decided her fate. She is Homo Sacer !  Homo Sacer, the 
outcast, the one who is both sacred and damned, the one who has a peculiar kind of liberty; the 
kind that only the dispossessed can appreciate.  
Anthony:$K«SHUKDSVLWZRXOGEHJRRGWRFODULI\WKDW+RPR6DFHULVGHULYHGIURPDQFLHQW
Roman law. He or she is a human being who by virtue of their crime, were rendered impure and 
thus sacred (since sacredness was either pure or impure, Roman Law is obscure on this). 
Although they were sacred they could not be sacrificed in ritual offering but anyone who wished 
one could kill without incurring the penalty of murder. The life of homo sacer is situated at the 
intersection of a capacity to be killed and yet not sacrificed, outside both human and divine law. 
The emperor decided who became Homo Sacer.  Agamben has written a book of the same 
name. 
Elena: But there is a problem with Agamben. He thinks he needs to refuse to give his 
ILQJHUSULQWVDQGWREHEDQQHGIURPHQWHULQJWKH86$+HGRHVQ¶WXQGHUVWDQGWKDWKHLVDOUHDG\
banned.  
Anthony: I think what he is saying is that he has a choice. Some of us do. Perhaps Genie had 
no choice?  
Elena: You think that you have a secure place within the fold it the first place? 
Anthony: Can you explain what you mean by the fold? 
Elena: (maybe slightly hesitant slightly less confident) Hmm (silence pause while she thinks. 
She then looks at Anthony again expectantly.. then with a slightly French accent) ³I have an 
arm amputated, all right. I say: myself and my arm. If both of them are gone, I say: myself and 
P\WZRDUPV,ILWZHUHP\OHJVLWZRXOGEHWKHVDPHWKLQJ«EXWLIWKH\FXWRIIP\KHDGZKDW
could I say then? Myself and my body, or myself and my head? By what right does the head , 
ZKLFKLVQ¶WHYHQDPHPEHUOLNHDQGDUPRUDOHJFODLPWKHWLWOHRIµP\VHOI¶"´7UHONRYVN\IURP
3RODQVNL¶VILOP7KH7HQQDQWVKHDQQRXQFHVWKLVOLNHDUHIHUHQFH 
Anthony: (a bit agitated as  though reminded of an irritating/frightening incident) ,FRXOGQ¶WVOHHS
DIWHUVHHLQJWKDWILOP,WUHPLQGHGPHRIDWLPHZKHQ«VRPHRQHGHFLGHGWKDWWKHPXVLFWKDW
was keeping me awake at night,  was in fact being played by me. I was reported to the landlord 
and received a letter threatening eviction. After that I worried if I scraped a knife too loudly on a 
SODWH«(begins drifting off slightly, pause) EXW«ZKHUHZHUHZH" 
Elena: (slightly patronising as though humouring him) How iQWHUHVWLQJ«%XW,¶PVRUU\,
distracted you from your train of thought. Where were we?   
Anthony:  The fold. 
Elena:   :HOO«WKHTXHVWLRQRIbelonging interests me greatly. Does belonging mean to be 
absorbed into something? Does it mean to camouflage oneself? When a decision is made 
something changes, yes? Something is transformed perhaps? If it is transformed does it still 
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belong to the category that it was before?  Let me put it this way.  I am a nurse who decides to 
become a plumber. When I am a plumber am I no longer a nurse? At what point do I become a 
plumber and no longer a nurse? Is it possible that in transformation nothing is retained of the 
original or is the original always still there? Is transformation where two seemingly disparate 
forms overlap DQGZKHQWKH\DSSHDUWRJHWKHULQWKDWLQWHUVHFWLRQ«WKH\«ZHOOWKH\DSSHDUWR
make something altogether new. It is like community, one group of many intersecting 
individuals. Do you follow me? 
Anthony: (getting a bit excited even agitated now)  You remind me of Whitehead, but I suspect 
WKDW\RX¶UHDFWXDOO\DGRSWLQJDTXDVL-Deleuzian stance, would you agree? 
Elena:  'HOHX]LDQ«,WKLQNLW¶VEURDGHUWKDQWKDWDQGSHUKDSVVLPSOHU 
Anthony: ,¶PQRWVXUHWKDWLW¶VVLPSOHUEXWFRXOGZHSXWLWDQRWKHUZD\",IZH believe ourselves 
to be part of a community that we call human, maybe this is the fold you refer to, there is 
something which binds us as a species as it were. This something is humanity itself, yes? When 
someone is excluded from this community is it their humanity as such is in question? We might 
EHOLHYHWKDWIRUH[DPSOHWKHPXUGHUHU¶VDFWLRQVFRPSURPLVHKLVRUKHUKXPDQLW\EXWDUHWKH\
still regarded first and foremost as a human being.  Can one be robbed or relinquished of 
humanity through the actions of either oneself or the other?  
Elena: Your take on this question is that of moral philosophy. But what constitutes humanity 
FRXOGEHDVWKHHYROXWLRQDU\SV\FKRORJLVW5RELQ'XQEDUSXWVLWD³VRFLDOEUDLQLQJSURFHVV´(does 
the inverted comma sign). The neo-cortex, which is an evolutionary advancement found in 
primates and which in humans constitutes 80% of the brain gives us the ability to maintain 
complex social relations. The neo-cortex also produces imagination and story-telling abilities. Is 
it the ability to tell stories and also perhaps believe in them by virtue of the imagination that 
constitutes humanity?  
Anthony:  It seems that what we are asking in a round about way is this: Are we creatures 
which undergo creation as human beings or do we create ourselves?  How do we all create 
ourselves as belonging to the same group and at the same time conflicting or contrasting 
groups? Is this what we are asking?  
Elena: Is being human a creative decision? ( as though surprised at herself) 
(Silence for a few moments. Both look thoughtful and maybe hesitant) 
Anthony: You know Elena (..SDXVH«VLJK$VZH¶UHWDONLQJ«JRLQJEDFNWRZKDW\RXVDLGDW
WKHEHJLQQLQJ,¶PDFXWHO\DZDUHWKDW\RXUOLIHKDVLQPDQ\ZD\VEHHQWKHYHU\OLYLQJRIWKLV
question. You, in a sense, have been excluded from the beginning0D\EHLW¶VRQO\VWULNLQJPH
QRZWKDWLQIDFW\RXGLGQ¶WHQWHUWKHKXPDQFRPPXQLW\XQWLOWKHDJHRI«" 
Elena: (tense) Ten.  
Anthony: 6R«KRZFDQ,SXWWKLVZKDWVWRULHVGLG\RXWHOO\RXUVHOIEHIRUHWKHDJHRIWHQ? I 
mean until that point you were never with other human beings?  
Elena: I must say that it is strange to hear you suggesting that I may be an ambiguous example 
RIKXPDQLW\,¶PDOPRVWUHOLHYHGWKDW\RXKDYHVDLGLW0RVWSHRSOHZRQ¶WKHDURILW 
Anthony: (kindly) But if I admit ambiguity in you, then I must also admit ambiguity in myself. 
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Elena: Exactly. But for myself there is no ambiguity. I have never regarded myself as a human 
being, even though I know that physically I am supposed to be one. Of course, I cannot say for 
certain if I am right, objectively speaking.  
Anthony: Are we not DOOLQWKLVSRVLWLRQ",I,KDYHDQ\NLQGRIFRQVFLHQFH,DVNP\VHOIµ+RZ
PXFKGR,FDUH"+RZPXFKGR,ORYHµDQGVRRQ$P,QRWWKHQTXHVWLRQLQJWKHOHYHORIP\
humaniW\",VQ¶WKXPDQLW\DOZD\VDPELJXRXV",W¶VQRWVRPXFKZLWKZKHWKHURUQRWZHDUH
human but how human we are?  
Elena: <RXDUHDVVXPLQJTXLWHULJKWO\,¶PVXUHWKDWWKHUHLVKXPDQLW\LQ\RXin the first 
instance. For myself I cannot say whether it is a question of levels or a question of what I am 
starting out with. 
Anthony: If you put it like that, there is no doubt in my mind for me it is a question of degree. I 
must admit to finding what you say quite unfathomable. ,FDQ¶WFRQFHLYHRI\RXDVDQ\WKLQJ
othHUWKDWKXPDQ,QGHHGLI\RXGRQ¶WPLQGPHVD\LQJ\RXVHHPPRUHKXPDQPRUHKXPDQH
than I! 
Elena: (slightly coy) I know that is a compliment, thank you!   (changes tone).  Michael Lyvers in 
KLVDUWLFOH:KR+DV6XEMHFWLYLW\"VXJJHVWVWKDWDQG,TXRWH³in everyday life, most people 
generally assume that if it looks like a (phenomenally) conscious duck, walks like a conscious 
duck, and quacks like a conscious duck, then it probably is a conscious duck. A few of us might 
occasionally contemplate the counter-intuitive hypothesis that it could be an imposter, that only 
DFWVDVLIFRQVFLRXVEXWPRVWRIXV«KDYHQRUHDVRQWRWKLQNWKLVLVWKHFDVHIRUGXFNVPXFK
less for non-human mammals´+RZHYHUIURPDVFLHQWLILFSHUVSHFWLYHDWOHDVWVXEMHFWLYLW\LVQRW
needed to explain behaviour in humans or non-human animals.  
Anthony: Yes indeed, but thinkers from non-scientific traditions like Bakhtin have seen that a 
VHQVHRIRQHVRZQVXEMHFWLYLW\FRQWULEXWHVWRDQDZDUHQHVVRIWKHRWKHU³If I feel such and 
such then WKH\PXVWIHHOVXFKDQGVXFK´  
Elena:  Empathy! Empathy is not only to do with the mind and emotions but is a visceral, innate 
tendency to identify with other beings. For example when a monkey observes other monkeys 
performing certain actions, the same parts of his frontal cortex are activated as when he himself 
performs those actions. 
Anthony: But surely science reaches as many aporias as philosophy?  
Elena:  One can suspect that scientists know what reality is, because they have seen it, 
measured it and KDYHQDPHGLWVFRPSRQHQWV%XWZHKDYH¶FUHDWLYH¶PDWKHPDWLFLDQVOLNH
*UHJRU\&DLWOLQZKRKDYHIRXQGUDQGRPQHVVDWWKHEDVLVRIPDWKHPDWLFV«8QWKLQNDEOH«RU
physicists like Gregory Mulhauser who are now saying that quantum mechanics can tell us 
nothing about consciousness  ¶LQWHUDFWLYHGHFRKHUHQFH¶SURPLVHWRUHPRYHWKHFRQVFLRXV
observer from the phenomenon of state vector reduction ³KHVD\V1RZDIWHUDOOWKHVH\HDUVRI
VD\LQJWKDWWKHVHOIFDQQRWEHIRXQGRQHVFLHQWLVWZKRVHQDPH,FDQ¶WUHFDOOULJht now, is 
saying that, perhaps there is some thing, a thing , a phenomenal substance that can be called 
WKHVHOIDIWHUDOO«,IVFLHQWLVWVSURYHRQHWKLQJEH\RQGGRXEWWKH\ZLOOQHHGWKHSKLORVRSKHUV
again.  Even they cannot live with such simplicity. Philosophy will protect them from that. 
Anthony:  $UHDOOVFLHQWLVWVFDOOHG*UHJRU\"%XWVHULRXVO\«FDQSKLORVRSK\SURWHFWVXVIURP
anything? Socrates said that philosophy is a preparation for death.  The only thing of which we 
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can truly be certain is that one day, at a time we ourselves cannot predict, we will cease to exist. 
7KLVLVWKHXQEHDUDEOHVLPSOLFLW\,QWKHGHDWKRIRWKHUV¶ZHVHHWKDWZKDWHYHUZHFDOOOLIHFDQ
abandon us suddenly, without notice. It is the ceasing to exist of others that teaches us what it 
means to be human.  
Elena: What about animals then? What does death teach them?  
Anthony,¶PQRWVXUH,GLGVHHDSURJUDPPHDERXWHOHSKDQWVZKHUHWKHKHUGFDPHDFURVVDQ
elephant corpse. The whole herd fell silent. They scanned the corpse with their trunks as if 
trying to identify it. Some of them took the bones in their trunks and fondled them. It was as 
thought they were recognising something about death, perhaps even mourning. 
Elena: For some reason Spinoza comes to mind here, or perhaps I should say Deleuze comes 
to mind and through him Spinoza: ³RQH1DWXUHIRUDOOERGLHVRQH1DWXUHIRUDOOLQGLYLGXDOVD
nature that is itself an individual varying in an infinite number of ways. What is involved is no 
longer the affirmation of a single substance, but rather the laying out of a common plane of 
immanence on which all bodies, all minds and all individuals are situated´ 
Anthony: ( excitedly) Yes but what can we understand anything about that realm of 
immanence, especially of what we might all share in that common plane? Do you remember the 
amazing experiment that Heidegger talks about? A photograph is taken of retinal image that is 
SURGXFHGLQDJORZZRUP¶VYLVLRQDVLWORRNVLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIDZLQGRZ7KHSKRWRJUDSKVKRZV
very clearly a view of WKHZLQGRZDODUJHOHWWHUµ5¶ZKLFKKDVEHHQIL[HGWRWKHZLQGRZDVZHOO
as a blurred view of the church tower which can be seen through the window. The image proves 
that an insect is capable of forming this view, but can we tell from this what it really sees? 
Heidegger says we cannot. It is a question of how it sees not only what it sees. The human 
being has a capacity to see that has a different potential to that of the glow-worm. The fact that 
we can form the same view technically tells us nothing about this difference.  
 
SILENCE for a few moments 
 
Elena: I have few memories of the time before my capture. When I say memories I mean things 
I can put into words. Sometimes a smell or a sound will strike me with a certain force and cause 
me to cry out or feel some kind of pain. I believe that this must be a memory of sorts. 
Anthony: (quietly) $ULVWRWOHVD\V³0DQ\DQLPDOVKDYHPHPRU\DQGDUHFDSDEOHRILQVWUXFWLRQ
EXWQRRWKHUFUHDWXUHH[FHSWPDQFDQUHFDOOWKHSDVWDWZLOO´ 
 
Silence again 
 
 
Elena: We had been aware that humans had been following us for a while. Normally we would 
be so much faster than them, but there were the cubs, which slowed us down. One day these 
humans got close.  I felt more agitation that usual amongst them. We all felt it but had to lie low 
rather than run. We were exhausted and so were the cubs. All of a suddenly there was a loud 
bang.  I heard yelping. I thought the others had run off but I found out later they had been killed. 
,GRQ¶WNQRZZK\,GLGQ¶WUXQEXW,MXVWVWRRGULJLGDnd watched as the smoke from the guns 
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evaporating slowly around me.  The forest had never seemed so silent. Once the smoke lifted, I 
saw them standing around me. Only a few feet away our leader, was lying dead on the ground.  
One of them kicked her and made her body roll over, out of the way. Her coat was sodden with 
blood. I slumped down on top of her and started to lick her wounds. Her body was still warm 
and floppy, but I no longer felt the familiar moist breathe on my face, the rough tongue 
smoothing my KDLURUWKHZDUPQX]]OHSXVKLQJLQWRPH,MXVWOD\WKHUHOLNHWKDW,GRQ¶WNQRZ
ZKDWKDSSHQHGWKHQ,GRQ¶WUHPHPEHUPXFKRIWKHIROORZLQJ\HDURUVRAnya told me that in 
the early days she couldn't touch me, without me fighting her. I would fight, scream, kick, bite 
DQGWZLVW,¶GRIWHQSXOOP\RZQDUPVRXWRIWKHLUVRFNHWV,IVKHORFNHGPHLQDURRP,ZRXOG
tear the room apart and bite myself. I punched walls, doors and windows through. I always had 
cracked knuckles, sprained wrists and cuts. I coulGQ¶WVWDQGEHLQJLQDKRXVHDWWLPHV.2 There 
DUHSUREDEO\WKLQJVVKHGLGQ¶WWHOOPH,OLNHGWRJRRXWVLGHDQGOLHLQWKHPXG0\PRGHVW\ZDV
not what it should have been in a young girl. You know... 
,GLGQ¶WNQRZZK\WKH\KDGNLOOHGP\IDPLO\DQGWDNHQPH to this place. I kept trying to get back 
to the forest but never succeeded. As the years past I began to have newfound needs. There 
was a time I could run for days over icy plains, sleeping in dug out holes.  I could go for days 
ZLWKRXWHDWLQJ7KDW¶VZKDt we did. When we did eat it might only have been a rabbit or some 
tick ridden old elk that had already been half devoured. But I began to feel cold at night. I was 
eating at least once a day, sometimes more. I could no longer bear raw meat. I began to seek 
out things that I never thought about before- tastes, sensations, and sounds. The first time I put 
shoes on was like torture. Then I learned the usefulness of clothes. Then I always wanted for 
VRPHWKLQJ,WVVWUDQJHWHOOLQJ\RXWKLV\RXNQRZ,¶YHQHYHUVSRNHQDERXWLW,QIDFW,GRQ¶WHYHQ
NQRZWKDW,¶YHWKRXJKWDERXWLWEHIRUHOLNHWKLV«DVLI,¶PGHVFULELQJLWIRUWKHILUVWWLPH«  
Anthony: (tentatively) Are you saying that it would have been better if you had never been 
found?  
Elena: Being discovered was in a sense a tragedy.  
Anthony: Why? 
Elena:  I remember the look in their eyes as they saw that I was a human child. At the same 
time, on seeing them, a glimmer of recognition passed through me. Only a glimmer but it left me 
trembling. It was as though in that moment we were nothing but living matter blown apart into a  
chaotic mass of breath, fear, hope, energy, love, pain, skin, teeth, blood, sound.   In that 
PRPHQW«LWZDVDVWKRXJKWKHULIWWKDWZHWKRXJKWZDVEHWZHHQXVFORVHGRYHU«DWWKHVDPH
time another rift, deeper, older, more familiar somehow opened up within each of us. What was 
closed to us? What was open now? Something was lost when it came to light there in that 
clearing in the forest.  
 
 
SILENCE 
 
                                                     
2
 IURP.LWW\¶VWHVWLPRQ\ 
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Anthony: Look at the birds, at their half-certainty, who seem to fly with one wing in each world 
as if they were the souls escaping from Etruscan dead 
Elena: from one who shares a box with his own effigy, at liberty, reposing on the lid. 
Anthony: And how perplexed must any womb-born creature feel, who is obliged to fly thin air. 
As if in panic fear they flitter through that sky, afraid of flight itself 
Elena: swift as a flaw runs through a cup, the lightning passage of a bat makes hair-cracks in 
the porcelain of dusk. 3 
 
Elena and Anthony stand up, shake hands and leave.  
 
 
 
                                                     
3
 Rilke ± eighth elegy. 
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                                                                                                                        Supplement 2 
 
6KRUWSRVWVFULSWWRYLGHRGLDU\µ5HDGLQJ0LFKHO+HQU\¶ 
 
 
 
 
From quite early on in the project, I decided that I was going to donate my copy of The 
Essence of Manifestation to a library and for that reason made no notes in it as I usually do 
(in pencil!). Instead, I kept a written notebook and diary alongside the video documentation. 
 
In the light of the research I was doing on Kierkegaard at the time of making this work, it 
seems retrospectively that there is a coherence and link with the project that I did not 
initially foresee. What strikes me most clearly now is that no repetition is possible of this 
experience of making the work and of producing the video documentation. This is not only 
because it was my first ever reading of The Essence of Manifestation but for several other 
reasons.  The most obvious but at the same time surprising and totally unforeseeable were 
the circumstances that coincided in those months of reading the book such as the July 7th 
bombings in London and the shooting of Jean-Charles de Menezes.  Less significantly, the 
impractical decision to decorate my back room at the same time as carrying out the project 
and this coinciding with the (enjoyable but distracting) visit from my Australian cousin 
provided even more interruptions than usual.  Alongside these external events some of 
which were outside of my control, I had made some decisions of my own which affected the 
proceedings in a way that I did not initially consider.   I decided that I would always report 
in to the camera on the same day as the reading took place. At least this was the case after a 
IHZ µIDOVH VWDUWV¶ DQG VRPH SURFUDVWLQDWLRQ  , DOVR VWDUWHG WKH UHDGLQJ EHIRUH , KDG IXOO\
worked out how to use the video camera (I had not used a video camera for a long time and 
this small machine was entirely new to me). It is for that reason that there are some 
µXQFRQYHQWLRQDO¶HIIHFWVLQWKHYLGHRDQGQRWIRUDQ\DQWL-) aesthetic reason. The process of 
becoming more practised in video technology happened alongside the reading. Once I had 
finished the reading and the filming, I then had to teach myself video editing. I had only 
GRQH DQDORJXH HGLWLQJ EHIRUH DQG VR WKLV ZDV DQRWKHU µILUVW WLPH¶ LQ WKLV SURMHFW ,W ZDV
important for me to include something from every day of filming, whether the 
GRFXPHQWDWLRQZDVµVXLWDEOH¶RUQRW7KHUHIRUHHDFKGDWHLQWKHGLDU\ only includes material 
that I have recorded on that actual day. If days are omitted in the film it is because I was 
away or had other commitments which took me away from the project altogether.  
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Naturally, there are many things that I could have changed in the editing process to alter the 
aesthetic of the video, but in order to have fidelity to what I was doing, it quite simply had 
to be as it was - something completely unrehearsed and un-staged. I could have been 
tempted to re-shoot parts to make it (and myself!) appear more interesting, appealing, better 
groomed or prepared and so on, but if I had done so then it would have been an entirely 
GLIIHUHQW SURMHFW  7KH RQH µDHVWKHWLF¶ FKRLFH , GLG PDNH TXLWH FOHDUO\ ZDV EHWZHHQ WKH
visual element and the sound.  In effect, I had to decide between the two. I could not have 
coherency of both if I was going to be faithful to the idea and to the project I had set for 
rmyself.  I also had to consider that decisions, cuts, had to be made.  I could not subject an 
audience to endless hours of my unedited ramblings.  Therefore, I decided to sacrifice the 
continuity of the visuals in order to gain a more seamless or continuous soundtrack. This 
decision was made quite deliberately as I wanted to emphasise the disjuncture between the 
finished product in research or writing and the number of decisions, changes and false starts 
that lead to that final product, something that needs to be more or less polished in order to 
communicate to others.  In sacrificing visual coherency and leaving in the awkward jumps 
or visual glitches, I was in fact able to show something of the frequency of cuts and the 
effort involved in trying to produce a more seamless narrative.   
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                                                                                                                   Supplement 3 
 
5HSRUWRQUHDGLQJRIµ:KDWLVUDGLFDOVXEMHFWLYLW\¶)HEUXDU\ 
 
The first performed work that I did in this project was in February 2004. I had to give a 
presentation on my research and decided that I wanted to experiment with presentation.  
 
I had been thinking for some time that my research was leading towards thinking about 
performance as a form of presenting the ideas. So I decided to use the opportunity provided 
by the next Chelsea Symposium as an opportunity to try something out. Whenever I 
FRQVLGHUHGµSHUIRUPLQJ¶P\VHOILWIHOWWRRFRQWULYHGRULQDSSURSULDWH7KHQ,KDGWKHLGHDRI
asking someone to read my paper in my place. Almost at the same time I realised I wanted 
to ask Vasiliki Boutopoulous, a friend of mine, to help me. She has qualities that I thought 
would be perfect.  She has the correct balance of qualities that I was looking for. I was 
delighted when she said yes.  
 
When I first put the idea to Vasiliki, I suggested that I would be present while she presented 
the paper, that I would introduce her quite minimally without explanation of why she was 
WKHUHDQGWKDWVKHZRXOGQ¶WUHKHDUVHWKHSDSHUEXWZRXOGVHHLWIRUWKHILUVWWLPHRQWKHGD\
I also suggested that she feel free to comment on the paper as she read it. At that time I was 
quite interested in the process of reading something for the first time and for that process to 
become visible.(or audible). However, as the written text developed, I realised that I was 
tailoring it for this specific situation and that it was necessary for Vasiliki to at least 
familiarise herself with the content before reading it. She too felt happier about seeing it 
first, otherwise she would have felt too apprehensive. Vasiliki also said that she did not 
want to add any comments to my text, that it was my work and she wanted to simply 
present it. 
 
2Q WKH GD\ SUHVHQWDWLRQ , VLPSO\ LQWURGXFHG 9DVLOLNL VD\LQJ µ+HOOR ,¶G OLNH WR LQWURGXFH
Vasiliki Boutopolous who will be presenting the papeU RQ P\ EHKDOI¶ 6KH ZDV LQ WKH
VSHDNHU¶VVHDWDQG,VDWGRZQLPPHGLDWHO\QH[WWRKHU9DVLOLNLSURFHHGHGWRUHDGWKHWH[W
LQDYHU\EHDXWLIXOGHOLYHU\,KDGDFRS\RIWKHWH[WLQIURQWRIPHEXWGLGQ¶WDFWXDOO\ORRN
at it. I was transfixed on what Vasiliki was saying, trying to hear if it made sense or if it 
sounded as I had intended.  The experience for me was quite intense. I felt completely alive 
and attentive and somehow strangely exposed.  Before the event I had mentioned to Vasiliki 
WKDWZHGLGQ¶t need to be nervous because it was as though the work belonged to neither of 
  138 
us, as though it were in-between. As it happened, I had a strong proprietorial feeling on 
several occasions during the presentation along with a feeling of loss of control and 
exclusion. The experience was quite visceral and I had the sensation like a live current 
flowing through my body during the whole reading. I sensed sometimes that the content of 
the paper became absolutely alive in this situation, at times drawing attention to my 
SUHVHQFH LQ D FRPIRUWDEOHZD\ DW RWKHU WLPHV DV WKRXJK , ZDV WKLV µXQNQRZQ VRPHWKLQJ¶
hovering in the background, present but not visible. Certain passages in particular seemed 
exemplary in bringing together form and content, for example those from Henry and 
.LHUNHJDDUGZKHUHLWZDVDVWKRXJK,EHFDPHOLNHWKDWµVLOHQWZLWQHVV¶WKHXQVHHQFUHDWRU
WKHYRLGWKHDE\VVDQGDOORIWKRVHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHµLQHIIDEOH¶RIZKLFKRQHFDQQHLWKHU
talk of presence or absence. At times it was as though tKHVSDFHRIµVXEMHFWLYLW\µEHFDPH
ZLGHRSHQDQGIUHHIORDWLQJ7KHUHZDVTXLWHDSDOSDEOHVHQVHRIQRWNQRZLQJZKHUHWKHµ,¶
that the text referred was situated. (or rather that Vasiliki referred to when she spoke the 
text)  
 
When Vasiliki finished people applauded. Strangely, it was only at that point that it was 
REYLRXV WRPHWKDWZKDWKDG MXVWKDSSHQHGZDVDµSHUIRUPDQFH¶ :HEHJDQDGLVFXVVLRQ
and for a few minutes Vasiliki and I were in conversation about the experience.  Neil 
Cummings (my director of studies) said that at this point it was as though I was talking to 
myself, as though Vasiliki and I were two parts of the same person. Vasiliki said that when 
VKH VWDUWHG VKH WKRXJKW WKDW VKHFRXOGEH LQYLVLEOHEXW VRRQ UHDOLVHG WKDWZDVQ¶WSRVVLEOH
She said also that she was very aware of me sitting next to her and all of my body 
movements.  
 
The responses of the audience were interesting. Neil had a copy of the paper and was in a 
privileged position as it happened that the text was too dense to follow in places. He 
suggested handing out copies to everyone next time.  This was something that perhaps made 
RQH SHUVRQ VD\ WKDW WKH\ ZHUHQ¶W VXUH ZKHWKHU WR FRQFHQWUDWH RQ WKH FRQWHQW RU WKH IRUP
/performance. In fact, what happened was that these two aspects became inseparable. It was, 
DV 1HLO VXJJHVWHG DV WKRXJK WKH SHRSOH WKLQN WKDW D µQRUPDO¶ SUHVHQWDWLRQ DOORZV \RX WR
µJHW¶WKHFRQWHQWPRUHHDVLO\+RZHYHUSHUKDSVLISHRSOHKDGDFRS\RIWKHSDSHUGXULQJWKH
presentation., it may have been easier not to enter into that confusion.  
 
5HDFWLRQV IURP WKH DXGLHQFH VXJJHVWHG WKDW WR VRPHH[WHQW WKH µ]RQH¶ RI GHFLVLRQPRYHG
from the presentation to the audience. Some people in the audience were confused. 
6RPHRQH WKRXJKW , FRXOGQ¶W VSHDN EXW UHPHPEHUHG WKH\ KDG heard me speak before, or 
PD\EH,GLGQ¶WOLNHP\DFFHQWRUWKDW,ZDVVK\(YHQWXDOO\WKH\GHFLGHGMXVWWROLVWHQ 
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I was pleased with the outcome as it suggested potential for new work and I began to see 
ZKDWP\SUDFWLFHPLJKWEHFRPH3UHYLRXVO\WKHµSUDFWLFH¶HOHPHQWZDVTXLWHYDJXHIRUPH
This presentation suggested that the form has to be completely in tune with the content and 
that I have to remain very sensitive to that balance. It was also very simple or subtle 
decisions that made all the difference± i.e. substituting myself for Vasiliki, sitting next to 
KHUUDWKHUWKDQVRPHZKHUHHOVHLQWKHURRP,KDGQ¶WWKRXJKWRIWKDWEHIRUHWKHHYHQEXWGLG
LWVSRQWDQHRXVO\LQWURGXFLQJKHULQVXFKDZD\WKDW,GLGQ¶WJLYHWRRPXFKDZD\WXQLQJ
into the peUIRUPDQFH DV LW XQIROGHG VR WKDW , EHKDYHG DSSURSULDWHO\ VRPHWKLQJ , KDGQ¶W
anticipated or even really thought about beforehand either). 
 
,W VHHPHG WKDW LQ RUGHU IRU WKLV SUHVHQWDWLRQ WR ZRUN , KDG WR EH LQ D SDUWLFXODU µVWDWH¶ ,
needed to be completely and genuinely attentive and it had to really matter to me whether it 
ZRUNHGRUQRW6RPHWKLQJKDGWREHDVWDNHIRUPH:KDWWKDWZDV,GLGQ¶WTXLWHNQRZDWWKH
time. 
 
This presentation and first trial run of practice suggested exciting future possibilities and I 
decided to continue in trying to create contexts rather than waiting for them to present 
themselves. I also intend to start playing about with forms of presentation more.  
 
I have included the text that Vasiliki read in the following pages. It has not been prepared 
IRUSXEOLFDWLRQVRWKHUHLVQRUHDOUHIHUHQFLQJ,WLVVLPSO\DµSHUIRUPDQFH¶WH[W 
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What is radical subjectivity: paper for presentation Feb 2004 
 
7KHZRUNLQJWLWOHIRUP\UHVHDUFKLVµ:KDWGRHVLWPHDQWRPDNHDGHFLVLRQ"¶7KLVSDSHU will be 
looking specifically at whether we can say that subjectivity can be said to constitute a locus of 
GHFLVLRQ6R,¶OOEHJLQ« 
 
 
I remember being in the seaside resort of Morecambe.   I think I was with my childhood friend 
who I have lost touch with now. We were standing, on the pavement of a very wide stretch of 
road which runs along the promenade and we were facing the sea.  It was one of those warm 
breezy days with a slight mist coming in from the water. We were amongst a crowd of people 
who were gathered around a man with a table. The man asked four of us to come forward. For 
some reason, shy as I was, I found myself standing round the table with three others. The man 
asked one of us for an object which he could use to tap on the table. Someone gave him a set 
of keys. He asked us all to place our hands on the top of the table.  Then he banged the table 
ORXGO\ZLWKWKHNH\VVD\LQJ¶5LVHWDEOHULVH¶$WILUVWQRWKLQJKDSSHQHGEXWWKHQDVKHVDLG
µ5LVHWDEOH5LVH¶HYHQORXGHUDQGWKHWDEOHWUHPEled a couple of times and then stopped. We 
thought nothing was going to happen when it suddenly swooped upwards and took off across 
WKHURDGWRZDUGVWKHVHD7KHPDQVDLGWRXV³+ROGRQNHHS\RXUKDQGVRQWKHWDEOH¶:HWULHG
to keep our hands on the topEXWLWZDVWRRIDVWIRUXVDQGZHFRXOGQ¶WNHHSXSDQGKDGWROHWLW
JR0RUHSHRSOHZHUHJDWKHULQJLQDOLQHDFURVVWKHURDGDQGWKHPDQVKRXWHG³6WDQGEDFN´
When the table got to the other side of the road it hovered for a bit and then came veering back 
towards us swaying from side to side. As it reached us it slowed down and gently settled back 
on to the ground.  
 
For a long time I forgot about this story and began to think I had imagined it. Then on TV a year 
or so ago I saw a programme about magic and they did a slot on a well-known magician who 
used to perform amazing feats in places like Morecambe.  I was so excited to see to see 
HYLGHQFHWKDW,KDGQ¶WLPDJLQHGWKHZKROHWKLQJWKDW,ZURWHGRZQWKHPDJLFLDQ¶VQDPH
+RZHYHUVLQFHWKHQ,¶YHORVWWKH SLHFHRISDSHU,ZURWHLWRQDQGFDQ¶WUHPHPEHUWKHSURJUDPPH
or who I watched it with. 
 
 
 
Part 1 
 
$ORQJZLWKVRPHRWKHUSHRSOHLQWKLVDXGLHQFH,UHFHQWO\DWWHQGHGDFRQIHUHQFHFDOOHGµ7KHRU\
DVDQ2EMHFW¶ 
 
At this conference Peter Hallward gave a talk on texts by Gilles Deleuze, Alan Badiou and 
Michel Henry, none of which I had read at this time. 
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5HFHQW)UHQFKSKLORVRSK\VDLG+DOOZDUGSURSRVHVWKDWZKDWµZHDUH¶FDQQRWEHUHSUHVHQWHG
How do we know where we are now, theoretically speaking, if we do not know where we came 
IURPWKHRUHWLFDOO\VSHDNLQJ7KHµZH¶ in this case referred to that audience, attending a talk on 
art theory and therefore with a vested interest in what was, as Hallward suggested, at stake 
both in contemporary philosophy as well cultural and literary theory:  representation.   
 
,Q WKHGLVFXVVLRQDIWHUZDUGVVRPHRQH LQ WKHDXGLHQFHFULWLFLVHG WKHFRQWHQWRI+DOOZDUG¶V WDON
ZKLFK VKH FDOOHG µ+LGHRXV ,GHDOLVP¶  ,¶P QRW UHDOO\ VXUH ZKDW VKH PHDQW EXW QHYHUWKHOHVV LW
stayed with me. I felt somehow that it was aimed at me since I had been so interested in what 
Hallward had to say.  
 
For some reason, it seemed to me that what was suggested by this term ¶KLGHRXVLGHDOLVP¶, was 
something to do with the notion of radical subjectivity.  UnWLOUHFHQWO\,KDGQ¶WWKRXJKWVRPXFK
DERXW WKLV WHUP EXW , UHPHPEHUHG KHDULQJ WKH ZRUGV µUDGLFDO VXEMHFWLYLW\¶ used in a similarly 
critical way at another conference. The target this time was the work of the Danish philosopher 
Soeren Kierkegaard, whose work I have been very interested in as part of my research on 
decision. I have noticed this term radical subjectivity used quite a few times in relation to him, 
but not always critically.  
 
So I began looking at the work of Michel Henry to see if that threw any light on the subject. You 
would really have to read him to follow his arguments which are both compelling and very 
EHDXWLIXOO\GUDZQRXWDQGZKLFK,GRQ¶WUHDOO\XQGHUVWDQGDV\HWEXW,ZLOOWU\WRVNHWFKRXWDIHZ
things as I understand them so far. 
 
7KHFRYHUQRWHVRI+HQU\¶VERRNI am the Truth,  tell us that Henry proposes,  through what he 
FDOOV WKH³DXWR-DIIHFWLRQRI/LIH´DFFHVVWRD´UDGLFDOVXEMHFWLYLW\ WKDWDGPLWVQRRXWVLGH WRWKH
immanence of affective life found beyond the despair fatally attached to all objectifying 
WKRXJKW«>ZKHUH@DOOSUREOHPVRIODFNDPELYDOHQFHDQGIDOVHSURMHFWLRQVDUHUHVROYHG´ 
 
:KDWLVPHDQWE\µUDGLFDOVXEMHFWLYLW\¶ZKHQDSSOLHGWR.LHUNHJDDUGDQG+HQU\DQGFRXOGVXFKD
notion be considered to be idealist? Could the notion of radical subjectivity appear to be placing 
something in a privileged position; immune to discourse, theory, opinion or criticism, perhaps 
even to thought itself.  
 
Idealism, particularly subjective idealism, denies any knowable external reality beyond our own 
minds. Perhaps it is the solipsism implied in such an idea that would be considered such a 
hideous idea!    If subjectivity is grounded in an experience of self which is both untransmitable, 
DQGRUXQNQRZDEOHWKHQKRZFDQDQ\µRWKHU¶Rr outside ever really count?   
 
 
*** 
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I am the Truth, by Michel Henry is a philosophy of Christianity. It does not attempt to ask 
whether Christianity is true or not but looks at what Christianity can tell us about truth and 
reality.  In this work Henry refers to Ipseity many times.   ³WKHRULJLQDOHVVHQFHRI,SVHLW\´,  he 
VD\VLVWKHLGHQWLW\³between experiencing and what is experienced´ 
 
I found the term Ipseity described elsewhere , by John Taylor, a mathematician interested in 
consciousness. Ipseity, he says: 
 
«LVQRWVXSSRVHGWRDULVHE\VRPHVXEWOHSURFHVVRIVHOI-reflection: it is non-relational, 
and cannot correspond to any introspective process. But then how can it relate in any 
manner at all to external input? In so doing it would be polluted by content. How can it 
KHOSFUHDWHWKHµTXDOLD¶ of experience if it itself has no content?  
( just a note here to say that qualia refers to the felt or phenomenal qualities associated 
with experiences, such as the feeling of pain, seeing of colour etc).  
 
Taylor continues: 
This quandary has led to many proposed solutions: do away with ipseity altogether, do 
DZD\ZLWKFRQVFLRXVQHVVDVZHH[SHULHQFHLWDQGPDNHLWDµFHQWUHRIQDUUDWLYHJUDYLW\¶
make ipseity have mysterious powers (non-material, for example), and so on... 
 
For Henry the Classical (i.e. Greek) conception of man is that he is more than a living. Man is 
endowed with Logos (reason and language) and Life is less than man.  The Christian view says 
that Life is more than man, more than Logos. Life is more than a living (and this applies to God 
also).  Henry makes the distinction between life and the world;  whereas the world is a place 
where things are shown, life does not appear in the world.  
 
Life, according to Henry: 
« LV D VHOI-movement that is self- experiencing and never ceases to be self-
experiencing in its very movement- in such a way that from this self-experiencing 
movement nothing is ever detached; nothing slips away from it, away from this self-
moving self experience... 
 
The world is the place where things (phenomenon) show themselves as empty, life is where 
manifestation manifests itself. 
 
,QWKHUHFHQWH[KLELWLRQRI+LURVKL6XJLPRWR¶VZRUNDWWKH6HUSHQWLQH*DOOHU\WKHUHZHUHDVHULHV
of photographs depicting the horizon between the sea and sky in a variety of locations around 
the world. On one wall were images which appeared to be uniformly dark, verging on being 
completely black but not quite. We were told by the plaque on the wall that in this dark image 
there was a line which divided sea and sky. This line was hard to discern not only because the 
WUDQVLWLRQ IURP VHD WR VN\ ZDVQ¶W REYLRXV LQ WKH ZD\ WKDW IRU H[DPSOH LW LV GLIILFXOW WR NQRZ
where the outward breath ends and the inward begins, but because there seemed to be no 
difference at all between sea and sky.  Since we had been told that there was a horizon we 
looked more closely. On some images it was possible to glimpse tiny markings which looked 
like waves on the sea, but the effort to see them made one dizzy, especially since the gallery 
was lit by electric light as well as the glare from the crisp winter afternoon sun. On the whole I 
believed that there was a horizon to be found but gave up trying to find it.  
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Part 2 
 
Henry is a phenomenologist but one who differs quite fundamentally from Heidegger.  Henry 
starts by saying that Christianity is talked about as being a flight from reality and from the world. 
However, the world for Henry is not reality. It is on this point that he most emphatically 
disagrees with Heidegger.  I found it helpful to look at Heidegger again in order to see what 
+HQU\ZDVWDONLQJDERXW$OWKRXJK,¶PVWLOOQRWUHDOO\FOHDULWPLJKWKHOSKHUH 
 
)RU +HLGHJJHU 'HVFDUWHV¶ IDPRXV FRQFOXVLRQ cogito ergo sum ³, WKLQN WKHUHIRUH , DP´
investigates the cogito but not the sum+HLGHJJHU¶VSURMHFWLVWRWDNHXSWKHsum:  Why is it 
certain that if I think I must also exist? If I am because I think then what is the relation of 
thinking to being? Is it possible that my thinking can tell me something about what causes 
me to think? Why is it that there is something to think and not nothing?  
In works such as What is Called Thinking? Heidegger sees the human subject as occupying 
a unique position in terms of an enquiry into the nature of thought. The question, What is 
Called Thinking"FDOOVXSRQXVXSRQRXUYHU\EHLQJ ³We ourselves are the text and the 
WH[WXUHRIWKHTXHVWLRQ´ says Heidegger.  The fact that we are able to ask the question at all 
means that we already have an understanding if what it is that calls us to think.  
When we name a thing, says Heidegger, it is like bringing two things together, the name and 
thing named.  Although, for Heidegger the name and thing do not necessarily indicate a 
sameness, to name something means there is some relation to the RULJLQDOPHDQLQJ³A name´
KHVD\V³LVQRWMXVWGUDSHGRYHUWKHWKLQJ´Heidegger says: 
 
We are able to grasp beings as such, as beings, only if we understand something like 
being. If we did not understand, even though at first roughly and without conceptual 
comprehension, what actuality signifies, then the actual would remain hidden from us... 
 
The kind of thinking that is characteristic in our Age of Technology, is what Heidegger calls 
representational or calculative. This kind of thinking tries to regulate and transform the world for 
our own ends. Heidegger proposes a more authentic mode of thinking which he calls meditative 
or contemplative thinking, the task of which is to be open to what is given to thought.  
 
The thinking that we do nowadays, is not thinking in its proper sense, in the sense of techne, a 
NLQGRIµEULQJLQJIRUWKRIWKHWUXH¶ZKLFKEHORQJVWRpoesis. 
«WRWKH*UHHNVWHFKQHPHDQV«WRPDNHVRPHWKLQJDSSHDUZLWKLQZKDWLVSUHVHQWDV
this or that, in this way or that way.  The Greeks conceive of techne, producing, in terms 
of letting appear.. 
 
There was a time when the bringing forth of the true into the beautiful was called 
techne. The poesis of the fine arts was also called techne. Techne belongs to poesis. 
From earliest times until Plato techne also linked to episteme ± knowing in the widest 
sense. That is to be entirely at home in something, to understand. Such knowing is an 
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opening up. As opening up it is a revealing. Techne ± reveals whatever does not bring 
itself forth and does not yet OLHKHUHEHIRUHXV« 
 
6RZHFDQEHJLQ WRVHH IURPWKLVYHU\FXUVRU\YLHZ WKDW+HLGHJJHU¶VSURMHFW LV WRGRZLWK WKH
revelation of being, through language and through a thinking that is more authentically related to 
its source.  
 
However, for Henry the coQFHSWRI%HLQJEHORQJV WRKXPDQ ODQJXDJHDQGKHVD\V³ODQJXDJH
FDQQRWEOD]HDWUDLOWRHLWKHUUHDOLW\RUWUXWK´ 
 
The reality of most individuals or groups of individuals escape the truth of history. For example, 
Henry says, that an examination of the ScrLSWXUHV FDQQRW WHOO XV DERXW &KULVW¶V DFWLRQV RU
existence. He says it is precisely when one requires of a thing, specifically in this case the 
individual, to show itself that this individual and by definition the whole of mankind, since 
PDQNLQGLVDQ³XQGHWHUPLQHGPXOWLWXGHRILQGLYLGXDOV´+HQU\¶VZRUGV , that it slips beyond this 
requirement and beyond the truth of history. So then history, faced with the disappearance of its 
subject has to shift its target and look instead to texts.  In terms of Christ or God for example the 
New Testament becomes the only source of access to what these texts are about.  Yet 
strangely enough the scriptures themselves form the same critique of language: language 
leaves reality outside of itself. The only power left to language says Henry, is to lie. This is a 
strong statement but Henry insists that language contains nothing of the reality of the thing it 
describes. 
 
For Henry it is not being that is a matter for concern. Being belongs to what is shown to us in 
the world. The world is where things show themselves as phenomena but this showing is what 
Henry calls process of principled de-realization.  
 
Henry says that in order to understand life, it is necessary to rule out of its analysis the concept 
of being.  In relation WR OLIH ZH FDQQRW VD\ ³/LIH LV´ )RU +HQU\ /LIH µLV¶ QRW VLQFH LW LV DQ
occurrence which is a process of occurring without end:  
 
life plunges into itself, crushes against itself, experiences itself, enjoys itself, constantly 
producing its own essence, inasmuch as that essence consists in this enjoyment of 
itself and is exhausted init. Thus life continuously engenders itself  
 
The world for Henry is not a thing or set of things or beings but a horizon of light or visibility. He 
says (and I am simplifying here) that things are reduced to whatever shows itself to 
consciousness, as phenomena.  The phenomena of consciousness are its representations, its 
objects, the things that are placed before it. To re-present anything for oneself is in terms of 
consciousness, a placing before oneself. The fact of being placed before is what constitutes 
pure consciousness.  The fact of being placed before is the fact of being placed outside. The 
µRXWVLGH¶DVVXFKLVWKHZRUOG6R+HQU\FRQFOXGHVKHUHWKDW³FRQVFLRXVQHVVLQQR way refers to 
DWUXWKRIDQRWKHURUGHUWKDQWKHWUXWKRIWKHZRUOG´7KLVWUXWKRIWKHZRUOGLV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«LV D SODFLQJ RXWVLGH VHL]LQJ HYHU\WKLQJ WR UHQGHU LW PDQLIHVW«7KLV SXWWLQJ-outside-
itself by no means signifies a simple transfer of the thing from one place to another- as 
LI LQ VXFK D GLVSODFHPHQW LW UHPDLQHG VLPLODU WR LWVHOI« 5DWKHU WKLV FRPLQJ ±into 
DSSHDUDQFHLQWKH³RXWVLGHLWVHOI´RIWKHZRUOGVLJQLILHVWKDWLWLVWKHWKLQJLWVHOIWKDWILQGV
itself cast outside itself. It is fractured , broken, cleaved in two, stripped of its own 
reality- in such a way that, now deprived of that reality that was its own, emptied of its 
flesh, it is no longer outside itself in the worlds image, but just as its own skin, a simple 
image, in effect, a transparent film, a  surface without thickness, a piece of naked 
externality offered to a gaze that slides over it without being able to penetrate it or reach 
anything but empty appearance. 
 
This making seen which destroys is time. The process of principled de-realization does not 
mean that something which appears has its original state of reality abolished in the fact of 
DSSHDULQJ)RU+HQU\ LWPHDQVWKDW³IURPWKHEHJLQQLQJWKLV WKLQJZDVSDVVLQJDZD\´7LPHLV
not a slipping from the present to the past. There is no present in time. In time things come into 
appearance as already dead.   Because its power to make things manifest resides in the 
RXWVLGHLWVHOIWKHQWLPH³DQQLKLODWHVHYHU\WKLQJLWH[KLELWV´ 
 
It is only through living that we can experience what Henry calls reality, but living is not possible 
in the world , only in  Life   For Henry we as human beings are livings, we partake of life and 
H[SHULHQFH OLIH EXW  ³:H RXUVHOYHV DUH QRW OLIH DV VXFK EXW RXU OLIH FHUWDLQO\ RXU LQQHUPRVW
experience of ourselves as OLYLQJLVJHQHUDWHGE\OLIH³ 
 
It seems that Life here has nothing to do with subjectivity . Living seems to be the ability to be 
DIIHFWHGLQZKDW+HQU\FDOOVWKH³SDWKHWLNSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOVXEVWDQFHRIOLYLQJ´ZKLFKHQDEOHV 
us to experience ourselves not as separate from Life but in an experiencing which is the same 
as that which is experienced.   
 
 
 
 
I used to attend a Russian evening class.  Once during a coffee break I was chatting with a 
young man from the class. I liked him. He was funny and intelligent. We were discussing why 
ZH ZHUH GRLQJ WKH FRXUVH , DVNHG KLP ZKDW KLV UHDVRQ ZDV  +H VDLG  ³ 7KLV PD\ VRXQG
VWUDQJH WR\RXEXW LWZDVDSURSKHF\´+H WROGPHWKDWKHKDGEHHQYHU\XQKDSS\ LQGHHGDW
rock bottom. He had been dabbling in all sorts of New-Age practices, trying to find a way out of 
KLVVLWXDWLRQ7KHQRQHPRUQLQJKHZRNHXSDQGKHDUGDYRLFHVD\LQJWRKLP³,I\RXEHOLHYHLQ
PDJLFZK\FDQ¶W\RXEHOLHYHLQPH"´+HNQHZWKDWWKHYRLFHZDV-HVXV1RW*RGKHVDLGEXW
Jesus.  The voice prophesied that he would be a missionary in Russia and so he had begun the 
class. 
 
 
 
Part 3 
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One reason I was so interested in Henry was because what he was saying seemed to me to be 
related to something that I have been interested in for some time and that is what Kierkegaard 
FDOOVµLQZDUGQHVV¶ 
 
Even if there is no form of representation that can show us what experience is for another, is 
there something in Kierkegaard and Henry, which suggests that within this experience of 
profound interiority  which admits no outside,  there could be a kind of movement which breaks 
past interiority through the inside to the outside as it were?  How else to describe it ? We tend to 
think of a limit as reaching towards the maximum outward edge.  What about limits that are at 
the inner edge, where movement is towards the minimum possibility? What would happen if that 
limit were breached, the limit of the inside?  
 
Although for Kierkegaard, the impetus for decision ultimately lies with an external authority, for 
example God, he states that "all decisiveness adheres in subjectivity". A relationship to this 
authority is never assured and remains hidden even to the one who has faith. The paradox of 
faith of Kierkegaard lies in the incommensurability between interiority and exteriority.  
 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSURMHFWis a constant and uncompromising concern with faith and the paradoxical, 
relation of the human subject with God, a God who is beyond proof, and whose existence is a 
question of faith in the most radical sense.  
 
For Kierkegaard, it is passion, not reflection that is needed in order to make the leap of faith. 
However faith is constantly bound up with reason, in that it is the passion of reason he says 
which drives reason to its own downfall.  
 
Kierkegaard criticises the kind of exhaustive reflection typical of thinkers like Hegel which he 
sees as trying to get us back to a beginning; the source of being and the source of thought. He 
says that any beginning reached through this process must be reached only arbitrarily,  when 
reflection becomes tired, bored or forcibly stopped. 
 
For Kierkegaard there cannot be an existential system. To seek a beginning is to seek to 
comprehend what happens in this moment of transition from non-being to being. However this 
moment is between motion and rest, neither being nor non-being. And yet it is in this moment 
that we truly reside as becoming ±subject. There is no beginning for us, no before, at least not 
one that we can really know about. 
 
In this sense then a beginning, any beginning,  always appears to us a severance from an 
absolute beginning. Our relation to origin is always one of disjuncture and is only through 
repetition that we can rediscover this disjuncture.  Kierkegaard suggests that instead of talking 
or dreaming about an absoluWHEHJLQQLQJZHFRXOGWDONDERXWDµOHDS¶7KLVOHDSLVIDLWK 
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The moment  where reason and unreason collide is precisely where truth is discovered; the 
condition of our subjectivity, discovered not through reflection but by passion.  
 
The leap of faith is not so much it seems a leap over or through something ( like a chasm or 
abyss) but more like a leap into something.  I have been thinking of it recently like this breach of 
the limit of the inside that I mentioned before, a sudden implosion. For although .LHUNHJDDUG¶V
leap of faith is transformative,  it has nothing external about it.  It is the quality or condition of 
inwardness that Kierkegaard is careful to maintain in his conception of faith.  
 
Faith for Kierkegaard requires that the subject, in order to authentically inhabit subjectivity, must 
continuously subject itself to the unknown. More than this in subjecting itself to the unknown, the 
subject discovers something but the nature of this something cannot be known, at least 
objectively.  
 
Faith is D µPRQVWURXV SDUDGR[¶ for Kierkegaard; if someone has faith, then he or she exiles 
themselves from the realm of human discourse, the ethical4, which is a product of human 
thinking 
 
<RXPD\UHPHPEHUKHUH$EUDKDP¶VWULDORIIDLWKZKLFKLVWKHEDVLVIRU.LHUNHJDDUG¶VJUHDWZRUN
Fear and Trembling.  Abraham is asked by God to sacrifice his only son. At the very moment 
when Abraham is about to bring the knife down on Isaac, God substitutes a ram in his place and 
the ram is sacrificed instead.  Here Abraham could not speak about this decision since he did 
not know why God had asked him to kill his son nor why he had decided to obey. Derrida says 
of Abrahams decision : 
$EUDKDP GRHVQ¶W VSHDN KH DVVXPHV WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WKDW FRQVLVWV LQ DOZD\V EHLQJ
alone, entrenFKHG LQRQH¶VRZQVLQJXODULW\DW WKHPRPHQWRIGHFLVLRQ-XVWDVQR-one 
can die in my place, no-RQHFDQPDNHDGHFLVLRQZKDWZHFDOO³DGHFLVLRQ´LQP\SODFH 
 
Here the locus of decision could be said to be this state of inwardness which cannot show itself 
in the world or justify itself in the worlds terms.  
Even if one were able to render the whole content of faith into conceptual form it would 
not follow that one had grasped faith, grasped how one came to it, or how it came to 
one 
 
Faith in Kierkegaard brings about a transformation, but one which brings us back to ourselves 
DVRXUVHOYHV$EUDKDP¶VGHFLVLRQPHDQWWKDWKHUHFHLYHG,VDDFEDFNDJDLQRQWKHSURSHUEDVLV
that is as a gift from God.  
 
The case of Adolph Peter Adler illustrates something of what it is that is at stake for Kierkegaard 
in the notion of inwardness. Adler was a Magister of Theology in Copenhagen, who claimed to 
have had a revelation from Christ.  Kierkegaard who knew Adler, bought his four books which 
he published simultaneously and which contained sacred verses and insights that he claimed 
were from Jesus. Kierkegaard subsequently wrote The Book on Adler, a scathing critique of 
                                                     
4
 See Fear and Trembling DQG'HUULGD¶VGLVFXVVLRQRILWLQ*LIWRI'HDWK 
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$GOHULQSKLORVRSKLFDODQGSHUVRQDOWHUPV*HRUJH6WHLQHUZKRZULWHVDERXWLWLQKLVHVVD\³7KH
Wound of NHJDWLYLW\7ZR.LHUNHJDDUG7H[WV´VD\VWKDWIRU.LHUNHJDDUG 
 
7KHFUX[RI WKH$GOHUDIIDLU LV WKDWRI µFDOOLQJ¶ LQ WKHYHU\VWURQJHVWVHQVHRI WKH WHUP
How does a human being know that he/she is being summoned by God? How can 
human sensibility and intellect differentiate between ecstatic, deeply felt intimation of 
divine solicitation, whose actual sources are those of personal need or emotion, and the 
authentic word of God? 
 
For Kierkegaard there remained the possibility that Adolph Peter Adler has received direct 
communication from Christ. Even if the manner in which Adler expressed himself was 
undignified or that he was potentially prone to hallucinations or delusions, his claim survived 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VFULWLFLVPDQGQHJDWLRQ,WZDVas Kierkegaard claimed, both indefensible and at 
at the same time inviolable. How can we know for sure that Adler was not speaking the truth? 
 
In Philosophical Fragments .LHUNHJDDUGFDOOV*RG µWKLVXQNQRZQVRPHWKLQJ«ZLWKZKLFK WKH
Reason collides when inspired by its paradoxical passion with the result of unsettling even 
PDQVNQRZOHGJHRIKLPVHOI¶ 
 
'HUULGD VXJJHVWV WKDW *RG LV DQRWKHU QDPH IRU  ³WKDW VWUXFWXUH RI LQYLVLEOH LQWHULRULW\ WKDW LV
FDOOHG>LQ.LHUNHJDDUGVVHQVH@VXEMHFWLYLW\´ 
 
We should stop thinking about God as someone over there, transcendent....Then we 
might say; God is the name of the possibility I have of keeping a secret that is visible 
from the interior but not from the exterior. Once such a structure of conscience exists, of 
being-with-oneself. Of speaking, that is, of producing invisible sense, once I have within 
me , thanks to the invisible word as such, a witness that others cannot see, and who is 
therefore at the same time other than me and more intimate with me than myself, once I 
can have a secret relationship with myself and not tell everything, once there is secrecy 
and secret witnessing within me, then what I call God exists, (there is) what I call God in 
me, (it happens that) I call myself God ± DSKUDVH WKDW LVGLIILFXOW WRGLVWLQJXLVK IURP³ 
*RGFDOOVPH´IRU LW LVRQWKDWFRQGLWLRQWKDW,FDOOP\VHOIRUWKDW,DPFDOOHG LQVHFUHW
*RGLVLQPHKHLVWKHDEVROXWH³PH´RU³VHOI´  
 
 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VSURIRXQGO\&KULVWLDQYLHZWRR&KULVWLDQHYHQIRUPDQ\ZKRFDOOWKHPVHOYHV
Christians, may not siWHDVLO\ZLWKXVµQRZDGD\V¶Contemporary  critics might try to rescue 
.LHUNHJDDUG¶VZULWLQJIURPWKHIDWHRI&KULVWLDQLW\E\EUDFNHWLQJRXWVHFWLRQVRIWKHWH[WWKH\ILQG
unpalatable. However those words remain like shadows which cannot disappear ; they are not 
in the writing of Kierkegaard but in us and through them Kierkegaard, in all of his work, refers us 
back to the realm of inwardness. 
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Conclusion 
 
I am wondering if this talk of God or the unknown something as a structure of interiority or 
subjectivity is a way of trying to bring it back into the realms of what is understandable or 
acceptable in terms we have already decided upon? Is this sphere of inwardness where we are 
at the moment of decision and yet as long as we are subjects we are at the same time banished 
from it?  If as Kierkegaard says decisiveness adheres in subjectivity is it that as long as 
decisiveness is subjective then it is there that we can be found clinging to that from which we 
are forever banished, at least as thinkers. In the leap perhaps we become what Henry would 
call Livings?  
 
It seems to me lately that when I am thinking about subjectivity it is like that effect when you 
look at a light too long and then when you look away there is a coloured dot in front of your 
eyes. :KHUHYHU\RXORRNLWLVWKHUH/LNH.LHUNHJDDUG¶VHWHUQDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVµneither here nor 
WKHUHRQO\DQXELTXHHWQXVTXDPHYHU\ZKHUHDQGQRZKHUH´ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
